An interview with Maciej Duszczyk, an employee and adviser on migration to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, and a professor at the University of Warsaw. Interviewer: Andrii Kutsyk.
May 14, 2026 –
Andrii Kutsyk
Maciej Duszczyk
– 
Interviews
Maciej Duszczyk speaking at the Conference of the National Contact Point of the European Migration Network in June 2025. Photo: The Chancellery of the Prime Minister / PAP S.A / wikimedia.org
ANDRII KUTSYK: According to data from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and Eurostat, Poland is currently the sixth-largest economy in the European Union in terms of nominal GDP. Poland achieved this position within approximately 30 years. How do you assess the role of migration in this economic growth, particularly the contribution of migrants from Ukraine?
MACIEJ DUSZCZYK: If we consider the entire 30-year period, the emigration of Poles had a greater impact on the Polish economy and GDP than immigration itself. Looking at these two main migration processes — emigration and immigration — several migration waves can be identified. The first wave occurred shortly after 1989; it also included some interest in returns by Poles who had left before 1989. The second, main wave came after Poland joined the European Union, when more than one million people left the country. This phenomenon had a very strong impact on the Polish economy — not only because it triggered specific economic processes. For example, mass emigration led to labour shortages, which translated into higher wages and increased worker productivity. An important role was also played by so-called remittances, that is, financial transfers sent to Poland by migrants. These constituted a significant inflow of financial resources.
Poland’s integration into international structures largely took place through migration — both arrivals and departures fostered the creation of networks and connections, which undoubtedly had a positive effect. The importance of immigration for the Polish economy began to grow significantly around 2007–08, when two processes coincided. On the one hand, the first signs of the slowdown of the second demographic transition appeared — fewer people were entering the labour market while more were leaving it. On the other hand, dynamic economic growth, including the inflow of structural funds, contributed to rapid changes in the economy. In 2007, Poland decided to open its labour market, mainly to citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Since then, we have observed a systematic increase in the number of newcomers, primarily from Ukraine, taking advantage of this opportunity. A turning point came in 2014, when the war broke out — this became a significant factor influencing the scale of migration. At that time, during public debates on the issue, it was emphasized that Poland should do more in this regard. Supporting Ukraine through access to the labour market should be done not only for moral reasons, but also for economic ones. As a result, successive cohorts of Ukrainian citizens began coming to Poland, taking up employment here and gradually settling down. They returned to their country of origin less and less frequently, even though they were often formally treated as seasonal workers. The situation changed further in 2022. According to data from the Central Statistical Office, approximately 1.3 million Ukrainian citizens were staying in Poland in February 2022. Some of them returned after the outbreak of the war, although the scale of these returns was smaller than is often assumed. At the same time, a large group of war refugees appeared. The EU directive enabled the opening of the labour market, which Poland took advantage of. Thanks to this, integration through employment is progressing very quickly today. Currently, Poland is a typical immigration country, fulfilling almost all the characteristics of such a state. From the perspective of the labour market and the economy, there are sectors heavily dependent on workers from third countries, primarily from Ukraine. Without their participation, the functioning of these sectors would be impossible.
Which sectors are the most dependent?
Certainly gastronomy, but there is also the question of construction. It seems that the construction sector would cope more easily than gastronomy. More generally, however, public services rely to a large extent on the work of Ukrainian citizens. Of course, they function mainly thanks to Poles, but without this additional support it would be very difficult. Once, speaking from the parliamentary podium, I said that if we were to organize a kind of “national sobering-up day”, during which foreigners — mainly Ukrainians — simply did not come to work, Poland would come to a standstill. Suddenly, there would be hardly nobody to drive buses, hardly nobody to prepare food, nowhere to go — bakeries would be closed. Poland therefore meets the definition of a country whose economy in certain sectors depends on the presence of foreigners. Importantly, this does not negatively affect economic growth or the country’s increasing prosperity. Quite the opposite — the presence of Ukrainian citizens generates additional economic growth and also increases demand for services. This is because the economy develops faster, and foreigners are not a burden on the state but rather a resource — they pay taxes, work, and largely spend their earnings locally.
An interesting and very pragmatic example is the issue of waste management. Waste is a problem, but at the same time there are companies responsible for collecting and processing it. In 2022, this became a major challenge for Warsaw. The waste management system had been designed for approximately 1.2 to 1.3 million residents, and suddenly the population increased to around 1.7 million. Naturally, this translated into a greater amount of waste, because more people means greater consumption. This demonstrates a broader mechanism: if waste appears, it means that someone previously bought something. In other words, they contributed to GDP growth, stimulated demand, and increased economic activity. These processes are therefore coherent and beneficial for the economy.
To sum up, Poland is currently a rapidly developing country — one of the fastest-growing in the world. Good economic management plays a key role, but an important element of this success is also the high level of activity of foreigners in the labour market. On the one hand, they generate demand for services. On the other, they themselves contribute to the labour supply. As a result, the overall effect is positive for economic development.
Can it be said that Ukrainians in the Polish labour market are a highly flexible migrant group when it comes to retraining?
The problem is that each of us has to adapt to ongoing changes — this is a natural process, especially under conditions of rapid national development. Until around 1850, that is, before the Industrial Revolution, people usually practiced one profession throughout their entire lives — they were farmers and remained farmers until the end of their lives. Their children followed the same path. Only the social and economic transformations connected with industrialization led to mass migration to cities and the need for retraining. A farmer became a factory worker and, over time, could advance, for example, to become a craftsman, workshop owner, or merchant. Access to power, however, remained limited for a long time — only the development of democratic systems gradually changed this. After the Second World War, professional mobility became much easier, but it still required adaptation and changes in qualifications.
Today, we are dealing with a very similar phenomenon. For example, someone may work as a driver for several years and then — due to market changes — lose that job and find employment in another sector. They may still be a driver (for example, a food delivery driver) but in completely different fields such as manufacturing, public transportation, or industry. The key factor is the ability to retrain and the willingness to change. In the case of Ukrainian citizens, this does not pose a major problem — especially if they speak Polish. Their ability to adapt and change professions is comparable to that observed among Poles. During the work on the migration strategy, there was a broad debate about whether a special system dedicated to Ukrainian citizens should be created. On the one hand, their numbers and specific characteristics could justify such an approach. On the other hand, there was the question of whether it would be better to integrate them into the mainstream of public policies and treat them on equal terms with Polish citizens. Intermediate solutions were also considered, such as additional mechanisms supporting integration and identifying existing deficits.
Ultimately, it was decided not to create a separate system, although “Foreigners’ Integration Centres” were partially established to provide support. However, not all of them were launched in the end. This question remains relevant and will probably require renewed reflection. Especially now, as the process of transitioning from temporary protection to temporary residence begins, it will become clear how the system functions in practice. It is possible that there will be a need to introduce temporary, dedicated integration programmes — for example, for Ukrainian citizens or Ukrainian children. If the deficits prove too significant, there is a risk of losing some of the positive effects that we currently observe. At this moment, it is difficult to determine unequivocally whether such solutions will be necessary — only practice will show.
Do you observe an increase in the number of people with higher education after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — especially doctors from Ukraine — and how is their integration progressing?
Personally, I prefer to use the concept of qualifications rather than education. Education can vary greatly — someone may hold a university degree, for example from the University of Warsaw, but not necessarily possess the skills needed in the labour market. That is why real competencies, flexibility, and the ability to function in changing conditions are crucial. In this respect, migrants — especially those who are professionally active — are often in a better position because they tend to have lower expectations and a greater willingness to adapt. This phenomenon also has historical roots. People who migrate are generally more willing to take on different kinds of jobs and retrain quickly.
As for the inflow of highly qualified individuals, we indeed observe an increase in the number of Ukrainians working in professions requiring specialized skills — although these positions do not always correspond to their formal education. The case of doctors is particularly interesting. For a long time, there was a debate surrounding their presence in the Polish labour market. Part of the medical community approached the issue skeptically, pointing to language barriers, systemic differences, or concerns about the quality of services. On the other hand, public institutions such as the Ministry of Health, as well as patients themselves, supported greater openness due to the growing demand for healthcare services. In practice, the share of doctors from Ukraine is not very high. It amounts to approximately six per cent, which is roughly equivalent to the proportion of Ukrainian citizens within the population as a whole. Therefore, they are not overrepresented in this professional group. At the same time, a very large number of Ukrainians work in healthcare in supporting positions — from the perspective of hospital operations, they are often essential. There is also an important systemic effect: as the population increases, demand for medical services rises, and Ukrainian doctors partly provide care to Ukrainian patients as well. This indirectly relieves Polish doctors and stabilizes the system. From this perspective, their presence is beneficial, although at the same time it constitutes a form of competition in the labour market — which explains the resistance among some professional circles. It is also worth emphasizing that when I speak with hospital directors, they state directly that without workers from Ukraine, hospitals would come to a halt. This was also my argument when it was necessary to convince the president to sign the law (“the Act of September 12th 2025 amending certain laws for the purpose of verifying the right to family benefits for foreigners and concerning the conditions of assistance for Ukrainian citizens in connection with the armed conflict on the territory of that state”). At that time, I pointed out that if the law were not adopted, it could lead to paralysis in the functioning of hospitals.
Was the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland not aware that this was a very important issue and that it could lead to chaos? After all, the entire process was handled at the very last moment.
I understand, but this is politics — and this is one of its elements that we are currently trying to reduce. It was the final stage of a very important debate. It is worth noting that after the president signed the first law in particular, the second one passed much more calmly and practically without major publicity. The first one, however — processed in September — became a major political issue. This was partly because the main critic of the president’s decision at that time was the Confederation party. In this sense, it can be said that the president paid a certain political price for signing the law. Therefore, my role at that time — as someone co-responsible for preparing and advancing the legislation — was to demonstrate that the potential political losses would not be so significant. It was also crucial to make clear that the absence of the law could lead to real systemic consequences, including the paralysis of hospitals. The message was therefore very pragmatic: certain consequences could simply occur. And it is good that the president took this into account and decided to sign the first law. It is also good that he signed the second one — although it did not fully meet his expectations either. In this case, the adopted structure and strategy made it difficult not to sign it. As a result, the issue no longer generated as much debate as had originally been expected. And with hindsight, it can be said that it was good that this process was concluded in this way.
If Poland continues to need migrants, including those from Ukraine, why do we instead see a return to more restrictive legalization procedures and a linking of work permits to a specific employer? Will the planned MOS online system really improve and speed up case processing, given that today many people wait for years without any real contact with the office?
The fact that the application submission system works poorly is true. However, a person who is currently under temporary protection and wants to change their status will receive a residence card for three years, which means they will not have to renew it every year. This provides a three-year horizon to organize their legal situation. It seems to me that within a year the system will, in a sense, stabilize itself, but at the same time additional functionalities will be introduced to improve its operation. When I talk to representatives of other European countries, I hear that the system that has been designed is sometimes assessed as a model. This is primarily because it is simple in its assumptions: a person submits a short application, visits an office or municipal authority once, leaves the required documents, and then receives an SMS notification about the issuance of the card. In practice, this process can take from two months up to even half a year — and currently the more realistic scenario is closer to six months. Nevertheless, after submitting documents, it is assumed that a decision will be issued, and the person gains stability for a period of three years, with access to the labour market, healthcare, and other benefits, while also paying contributions.
Such a solution was long negotiated with the Ukrainian government. The intention was not to create the impression of full assimilation, but rather a system of integration while maintaining ties with Ukraine. From a strategic perspective, it is important that Ukraine maintains its institutional capacity and pro-western orientation, and that Ukrainian citizens do not lose contact with their own state. Therefore, it is crucial to create a system in which a person can function in Poland, but at the same time — if necessary — can temporarily return to Ukraine, for example for academic or professional purposes, without losing their status in Poland. This requires balancing many interests: social acceptance in Poland, political decisions, including the president’s signature, as well as agreements with Ukraine and European Union institutions. Additionally, it is necessary to take into account the European context, including the extension of the “Temporary Protection Directive”. This means that the entire system must be developed in a kind of “triangle” of agreements: Poland, Ukraine and the European Union. What we have done creates a certain triangle that not everyone likes. Nobody is particularly happy, but if we have three overlapping triangles, then no one will be fully satisfied, right? What matters is that the system works, even if errors and problems occur. This system has the potential to function. We will see what comes of it. I could answer that question more easily after the summer, when we have a fuller picture of the situation.
It is worth remembering that the application system was designed to handle 100,000 applications per year. Currently, within the next two months, approximately 100,000 applications may be submitted to the Mazovian Voivodeship Office. We must be aware of this situation. Of course, we can try to hire additional staff, but we have already allocated 500 positions and it has not improved the situation. High staff turnover is a problem. Digitalization needs to be properly organized. However, we had an extended situation due to COVID-19 and the war, which delayed processes. It certainly will not happen without conflicts and problems, as the system is constructed in such a way that flood defences are not built for a thousand-year flood. A state that was not prepared for such a large influx of foreigners had to deal first with economic migration, then war-related migration, and now it must also deal with migration inspired by Lukashenka and Russia. This is a situation that requires quick decisions because a “thousand-year flood” has arrived. I am not comparing people to a flood, but emphasizing that the state does not build structures for such situations. The system was designed for a normal load — 100,000 applications per year — yet suddenly we have several million.
Therefore, this system cannot function without appropriate solutions that will provide warnings about potential problems. We plan to create floodplain areas so that in the event of a disaster like a thousand-year flood, it does not destroy our homes. Difficulties will certainly still arise. It is also worth noting that the MOS system was created in 2021, but was not launched because there was no appropriate law. A lot has happened since then. So 2026 may be problematic but 2027 should be a period of relief, when people will see that the system is beginning to work and the flood is receding. Everyone will have their documents, and the situation will stabilize. I can only say that it is a pity the system does not work as it should. On the other hand, the state’s capacities are limited. A situation in which someone submits documents and waits a year is unacceptable. They may wait half a year, but not longer. We need to improve this.
Do you have any involvement in the processes of reforming the Polish-Ukrainian border? Is there a chance that in the near future the queues at the Polish-Ukrainian border will be reduced and crossing it will become easier and faster?
Not so much. My main interest was primarily an internal issue. But, I often crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border, many times not being identified as a minister. I managed to improve the border crossing in Przemyśl, which previously was in a dramatic condition. Today the situation looks somewhat better, although the problem has not been completely solved. The fact that people no longer have to stand in the rain and that a second set of doors is open is a huge improvement.
When I was crossing the border, I was in that queue myself, and I know what it looks like. I got wet and froze while waiting for the train. It had to be done differently: a roof over the platform or opening additional doors so that people do not have to stand outside when getting off the train. People are waiting because their train is supposed to leave at 13:15, but it has not arrived yet. They have to get off first in order to get on again, which causes long waiting times, sometimes even hours. Now it is a bit easier because there are direct trains from Warsaw, but we are still dealing with problems resulting from the war.
Maciej Duszczyk is a Polish political scientist and migration expert at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, and a professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. From 2023 to 2025, he served as Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior and Administration. Between 1999 and 2007, he worked at the Office of the Committee for European Integration, including as Deputy Director of the Department of Analysis and Strategy. From 2008 to 2011, he was a member of the Strategic Advisors Team to Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Between 2012 and 2014, he headed the team responsible for developing Poland’s migration policy at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland.
Andrii Kutsyk holds a PhD in Philosophy of Media (Lesya Ukrainka Volyn National University/Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań) and a Master’s degree in Eastern European Studies (University of Warsaw). He is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, University of Gdańsk, a member of the Research Institute for European Policy, and Secretary of the European Journal of Transformation Studies. He is also a member of the Polish Political Science Association (Gdynia branch) and serves as author, co-author, and editor of various monographs and books. In 2024, he was awarded the Ivan Vyhovsky Prize.
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border, migrants, migration, migration policy, Poland, Polish-Ukrainian relations, Ukrainians in Poland