{"id":13705,"date":"2026-06-23T21:26:36","date_gmt":"2026-06-23T21:26:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/13705\/"},"modified":"2026-06-23T21:26:36","modified_gmt":"2026-06-23T21:26:36","slug":"polands-economic-miracle-may-not-last-much-longer","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/13705\/","title":{"rendered":"Poland\u2019s economic miracle may not last much longer"},"content":{"rendered":"

But having embarked on one of the most ambitious rearmament programmes in Europe, Poland now finds itself subject to the EU\u2019s Excessive Deficit Procedure, with markets increasingly scrutinising the long-term sustainability of its fiscal trajectory. Investing everything in defence may make you secure, but it isn\u2019t economically a growth driver in and of itself.<\/p>\n

The second reality is institutional. For much of the post-communist era, Poland benefited from a form of borrowed credibility. Investors were not simply investing in Poland. They were investing in a country that was integrating into the EU, aligning itself with European legal norms and embedding itself within a broader institutional framework whose legitimacy was largely taken for granted.<\/p>\n

That mattered because it reduced the burden on Poland to establish its own reputation from scratch. The rule-of-law premium was, to some extent, imported alongside foreign capital.<\/p>\n

But the more Poland seeks to move beyond the convergence model and pursue a strategy based on its own economic sovereignty, domestic capital formation and strategic industrial policy, the harder it is to fall back on European institutional credibility alone. The integrity of Polish institutions inevitably matters more and more.<\/p>\n

This is where a longstanding domestic constitutional crisis over the Polish judiciary<\/a> continues to weigh on the country\u2019s potential.<\/p>\n

The background to the crisis is complex. For years, the former ruling Law and Justice Party argued that economic sovereignty required not only greater control over strategic industries and banks, but also a sweeping overhaul of the judiciary and state apparatus. Its supporters saw this as a necessary correction to a post-communist settlement that had never been completed. Critics, especially those in Brussels, saw it as an attack on the rule of law.<\/p>\n

The result was a constitutional conflict that has never truly been resolved. On the contrary, all signs point to it continuing to metastasise as the conflict between Poland\u2019s political factions \u2013 notably the government and the presidency \u2013 only deepens.<\/p>\n

That matters because the new economic and security model Poland is pursuing depends far more on the state than the old one did. Defence-led industrial policy requires long-term contracts, politically sensitive procurement, domestic champions, offset agreements, state-backed finance and decisions about who gets access to strategic supply chains.<\/p>\n

In other words, repolonisation is not merely a slogan. It is a vast allocation of capital and privilege that depends on legal certainty.<\/p>\n

If investors cannot be sure which judicial appointments are valid, which rulings will be recognised, or which reforms may be reversed after the next election, the risk is no longer confined to politics. In a country whose sovereignty has repeatedly been contested throughout its history, this matters more than usual for growth. All the more so if Poland is serious about carving out a comparative advantage in Europe as the bloc\u2019s key security provider.<\/p>\n

Investors may dislike British governments, taxes or regulations, but few question the continuity and legitimacy of the institutions through which power is exercised. This alone ensures Britain will retain an upper hand for a while yet.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"But having embarked on one of the most ambitious rearmament programmes in Europe, Poland now finds itself subject…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":13706,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[500,4590,1216,74,75,2556,9,4591,3793],"class_list":["post-13705","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-poland","tag-business","tag-comment","tag-defence-industry","tag-europe","tag-european-union","tag-opinion","tag-poland","tag-top-story","tag-uk-economy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13705","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13705"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13705\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13706"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13705"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13705"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13705"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}