\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/O4I38F25lZbepFhJT1OebYooRlloIyBklT1ichyv.kykh.jpg\")
<\/a> ![\"US-Polish](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/poland\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/i1PAIm26F8iOsQiUObRTY08P06qlugAKhCXfr9yf.zdz8.jpg\")
\n Wsp\u00f3\u0142praca wojskowa Polski i USA nabra\u0142a nowego kszta\u0142tu w przeci\u0105gu kilku ostanich lat i jest nadal rozwijana
\n
Photo. U.S. Army Reserve, Sgt. Ronald D. Bell<\/p>\n
This year, the United States celebrated its 250th anniversary. Some of those events also reached Poland, where American soldiers are stationed. Moreover, there is a real possibility of further shifts in the nature of the U.S. Army\u2019s presence in our country. All the more reason, then, to emphasize that the military relationship between the two nations is the product of an enormous amount of work by soldiers, diplomats, and politicians \u2014 work that did not begin today.<\/p>\n
This year, the United States celebrated its 250th anniversary. Some of those events also reached Poland, where American soldiers are stationed. Moreover, there is a real possibility of further shifts in the nature of the U.S. Army\u2019s presence in our country. All the more reason, then, to emphasize that the military relationship between the two nations is the product of an enormous amount of work by soldiers, diplomats, and politicians \u2014 work that did not begin today.<\/p>\n
A debate is currently underway in Poland about the scale of possible U.S. armed forces engagement on NATO\u2019s eastern flank in the event of a potential reduction in American military presence in Europe. In this context, the prospect of additional infrastructure and \u2014 above all \u2014 what amounts to new ground forces (U.S. Army) takes on particular significance. This debate has three dimensions.<\/p>\n
\n Warfighter 26-03, Camp Ko\u015bciuszko, Pozna\u0144 2026
\n
Photo. U.S. Army Sgt. Devin Klecan, domena publiczna<\/p>\n
The first is the political dimension, relating to bilateral relations between state authorities at the highest levels. The second is the military dimension, connected to the threat posed by Russia and the importance of deterrence and defense in the context of NATO plans. The third concerns Poland\u2019s status as a Host Nation for American forces. Public attention most often focuses on the first of these \u2014 especially since emotions are running high over the aforementioned American announcements regarding changes to the nature of its presence within NATO\u2019s European area of responsibility and, more broadly, within NATO\u2019s architecture. To put it plainly, the United States is seeking to reduce its military footprint in Europe in those areas where European nations themselves can and should rebuild or develop their own capabilities, drawing on their own human, financial, and technological resources. Yet discussions about strategic aspects frequently overshadow the significance of the purely military dimensions of the Polish-American relationship mentioned above.<\/p>\n
Great work has been done <\/p>\n
In the military dimension, the relationship between the two allies is at an entirely different level than it was before Russia\u2019s first aggression against Ukraine in 2014. This refers not only to the scale of the U.S. military presence (primarily the ground component \u2014 the Army \u2014 at times reaching approximately 10,000 soldiers, though not exclusively), but also to the experience accumulated by American commanders and their subordinates since their arrival in Poland. First came ad hoc operations, then missions within NATO\u2019s Enhanced Forward Presence structures (the Battlegroup in Poland is commanded and coordinated by Americans), and finally the current system of continuous rotations. In recent years, the armed forces of both nations have conducted intensive training activities through numerous exercises and maneuvers \u2014 consider alone the scale of events such as Defender Europe, and now Sword \u2014 often of an unprecedented scale on the eastern flank.<\/p>\n
This is a transformation that could not have been seen in the early years of our Alliance membership. Not even the years-long missions in Afghanistan and Iraq \u2014 characterized as they were by the specific conditions of asymmetric operations against non-state adversaries \u2014 delivered to Poland and the United States the same depth of interoperability that we see today. Currently, Polish and American soldiers train across multiple domains, focusing above all on force integration for Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) in a Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) environment.<\/p>\n
\n Sk\u0142adnica APS-2 w Powidzu.
\n
Photo. J. Raubo<\/p>\n
Furthermore, many commanders have had the opportunity to work together at various levels of command. Numerous seminars and strategic studies are also being conducted, enabling a deeper understanding of the specific characteristics of our theater of operations. From a military perspective, we are no longer talking about reactive measures in response to a crisis or war, but about a systemic approach by both allies \u2014 and about embedding these relations within a broader doctrinal and planning framework and, most importantly, within the overarching NATO context. This last point is critically important because the United States has no intention of abandoning NATO \u2014 only of revising certain post-Cold War arrangements within the structure. One thing is certain: the years of military cooperation have yielded an enormous wealth of data and information that has allowed both sides to truly understand one another, achieve genuine interoperability, and develop the know-how for potential reinforcement in the event of a threat.<\/p>\n
While U.S. ground forces are the most visible element, one must not overlook the fact that the air components (Air Force) of both nations have been intensively cooperating for years. Poland is also home to Naval Support Facility Redzikowo (NSFR), operating as part of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense system \u2014 a direct contribution from the U.S. Navy.<\/p>\n
Much has also been written in recent years about Special Operations Forces (SOF) cooperation \u2014 to put it vividly, the entire community of operators could speak at length about the interoperability forged through their service (as evidenced, for example, by the recent exercise Trojan Footprint 2026). It is time to move away from the notion that the current discussion about strengthening U.S. military presence in Poland should be framed as a revolution. On the contrary \u2014 it is precisely through evolution that military professionals from both nations have taken numerous steps in recent years, more or less visible, that were necessary to achieve effectiveness on the modern battlefield. Moreover, both nations are learning a great deal from each other, as the Polish side today has enormous expertise and a unique understanding of regional specifics to offer.<\/p>\n
\n Kooperacja wojsk specjalnych\/si\u0142 operacji specjalnych obu pa\u0144stw jest od lat uznawana za wzorcow\u0105.
\n
Photo. U.S. Army National Guard Sgt. Glenn Brennan
\n Equipment cooperation drives interoperability <\/p>\n
Both nations are today also linked by a range of equipment-related matters. Poland has based a significant portion of its broad-ranging military modernization program on American weapons systems. The acquisitions of F-16 and F-35 fighters, Patriot air defense systems with IBCS, Abrams tanks, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and HIMARS rocket artillery are not merely technology transfers. Behind each of these contracts lies a new doctrinal challenge and the need to integrate these platforms into national and allied command-and-control structures (C2). This drives wide-ranging cooperation within frameworks such as the European HIMARS Initiative (EHI) and the Polish Apache Initiative, which bring together military personnel, civilian experts, and the defense industries of both nations. All of these factors translate into a long-term dimension of cooperation that de facto integrates strategically vital military-industrial domains for both sides for decades \u2014 not merely for a particular political moment.<\/p>\n
It should be emphasized that the United States had already made a qualitative leap earlier by pre-positioning materiel and equipment stocks at APS-2 (Powidz) in the Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) region, to say nothing of the aforementioned facility at Redzikowo. It is worth noting here that not without reason was the decision by Washington to reactivate the V Corps of the U.S. Army and establish its forward headquarters in Pozna\u0144 so important \u2014 and perhaps still underappreciated. That decision delivered a critical contribution to the modern command and control (C2) system, and indeed to the entire C5ISTAR complex in our region.<\/p>\n