Russia’s Engagement with the Global South: From Concept to Practice

Editors’ Note

In recent years, the prioritisation of engagement with the non-West has re-emerged as a salient feature of Moscow’s strategic orientation. This shift must be understood against the backdrop of deepening Russia–West antagonism, where deteriorating relations with Western states have prompted a broadening of Russia’s ties with the non-Western states. While existing scholarship offers useful insight into these dynamics through bilateral case studies and region-specific analyses, more attention needs to be paid to the conceptual framework that underpins recent shifts in Russia’s foreign policy. Current policymaking in Moscow relies on two primary documents: Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept of 2023 and the concept of the ‘World Majority.’

The war in Ukraine has exposed shifts in the global order, with signs of a gradual erosion of Western pre-eminence. These changes are reflected in the emergence of a nascent multipolar order, evidenced by the number of countries that abstained from condemning Russia’s military action and that more than three-fourths of states did not join the sanctions regime against the Russian economy. As Russia’s access to its traditional Western markets is increasingly curtailed, these developments are contributing to a reorientation of its supply chains eastward, alongside more institutionalised engagement with the Global South.

In Russia’s lexicon, ‘the West’ refers to the Euro-Atlantic security system, which includes the United States (US), its NATO allies, and certain Asia-Pacific allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. In recent years, Moscow has also designated most Western countries as ‘unfriendly states’. This group comprises around 50 countries and territories that have joined the sanctions regime and undertaken other “unfriendly actions” against Russia. Moscow juxtaposes this with the rest of the world, including influential regional and middle powers that do not fully align with Western interests, have not joined anti-Russia sanctions, and continue to cooperate with Russia. Against this backdrop, Moscow describes this grouping as the “world majority”. According to the concept, these countries have followed independent policies and are not involved in a binding relationship with the US and its alliance system.

While in Moscow’s outlook, Russia politically aligns with the ‘world majority’, it is not part of the Global South. In many respects, Moscow has a different view of the acute problems confronting these countries, including climate change, migration, and access to food and natural resources.

In addition to dividing the world into ‘friendly’ and ‘unfriendly’ nations, Russia has articulated a blueprint for an alternative order distinct from the Western-led one. This vision draws on existing non-Western regional and plurilateral organisations such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the African Union and seeks to harmonise supply chains and connectivity projects across Eurasia, with the larger aim of creating structures and mechanisms alternative to the Western-led ‘rules-based order’.

Since the war in Ukraine, China, India, and Türkiye have emerged as Russia’s largest trading partners. The Russia-China relationship has seen rapid convergence across multiple domains, warranting separate analysis and therefore is not examined in depth in this report. Additionally, although China is a non-Western power, it does not qualify as part of the Global South, meaning its role in Russian foreign policy lies beyond the scope of the report. Türkiye has emerged as a key logistics hub for the rerouting of Russian trade. Lastly, Moscow’s relations with India have received a boost through energy cooperation and have remained largely insulated from Western pushback.

While ties with individual countries reflect new trends, a broader, macro-level analysis of Russia’s engagement with the Global South requires a regional or sub-regional approach to ascertain the directions of its foreign policy and grand strategy. Such an approach offers a more comprehensive view of Russia’s role across regions, outlining the main trends and key features of its contemporary foreign policy.

This special report aims to shift away from unit-level analysis of individual states towards mapping Russia’s engagement with the Global South. It focuses on regional developments concerning Russian foreign policy in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In the first chapter, Daria Saprynskaia examines Russia’s relations with Central Asia, outlining the region’s primacy in Moscow’s strategic calculus, especially in the context of its attempts to institutionalise security cooperation. Situating Russia’s ties with Central Asia within the undercurrent of domestic shifts in the Central Asian Republics, the chapter explores the link between security and regional development, highlighting Russia’s potential role in addressing structural economic challenges faced by regional powers.

Sergei Melkonian builds on the analysis of Russia’s approach to the “near abroad”, outlining the shifting regional balance of power in the South Caucasus and the evolving pillars of Russia’s partnerships in the region. After identifying setbacks in Russia’s influence, the author describes a new modus operandi in Moscow’s relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, in which the economic considerations currently prevail over political and diplomatic interactions.

In the third chapter, Ruslan Mamedov provides a theoretical backdrop to Russia’s engagement with the Middle East, highlighting the framework for cooperation under a polycentric approach by strengthening diplomatic outreach to regional states. As the author argues, the future of Russia’s relationship with the Middle Eastern powers will rest on a convergence of interests among states with strategic autonomy. Responses to regional challenges are likely to remain in the hands of regional states, while Moscow positions itself as a stabilising force and a provider of development and economic aid.

Ivan Bocharov, in his essay, places more emphasis on Russia’s military and security ties in the Middle East, tracing the evolution of its regional strategy. Russia’s approach remains largely pragmatic, maintaining balanced relations with multiple regional actors while navigating key flashpoints, including the crisis in Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Iran-Israel confrontation through calibrated diplomacy.

In the fifth chapter, Aleksei Zakharov traces the evolution of Russia-South Asia relations, focusing on Russia’s approaches in the Indian subcontinent amid recent shifts. As Russia continues to strengthen its relationship with India by finding new areas of cooperation, it has also improved relations with Pakistan. The region holds economic relevance for Russia, reflected in the growing impetus to reinvent ties with Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

In the sixth chapter, Gleb Toropchin revisits Russia’s approach to Southeast Asia, whose importance to Moscow has grown over the previous decade. Viewing ASEAN as central to the Asia-Pacific security architecture, Moscow has attempted to intensify links between the association and its individual members as well as other regional organisations such as the SCO and the EAEU under the Greater Eurasian Partnership Framework.

In the seventh chapter, Olga Folomeikina (Kulkova) discusses Russia’s Africa strategy, focusing on engagement across the continent’s sub-regions. Russia’s presence in the region has expanded. In the last five years, for example, Russia’s trade with the region has increased by 60 percent, with Moscow prioritising exports of non-resource goods, ranging from food products to high-tech equipment. Security and military-technical partnerships covering 33 African states illustrate the region’s salience for Russia’s long-term strategic calculus.

Samir Bhattacharya examines a specific and often overlooked area of Russia’s engagement with Africa—that of soft power. As part of the 2019 Concept of International Scientific and Technical Cooperation, Russia’s soft power outreach in education received an institutional focus. This has resulted in a marked rise in the number of scholarships awarded and institutional agreements between Russian and African universities and scientific institutions, particularly in the STEM fields. These micro-level initiatives have multiplier effects in terms of building ties with regional powers.

In the final chapter, Bogdan Grachev and Tatiana Vorotnikova discuss the broad global shifts that have shaped Russia’s approach to Latin America. Russia has strengthened its outreach to strategic allies Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and enhanced its economic partnerships with countries such as Brazil and Mexico. Despite logistical, financial, and sanctions-related constraints, trade and investment ties are growing, driven by an expanding presence of leading Russian companies in regional markets and a rise in transactions in national currencies.

Taken together, these trends highlight the growing importance of the Global South in Russia’s strategic calculations. Even with the variable of progress in talks on ending the war in Ukraine, it is unlikely that Moscow will abandon its interests in the Global South, as the “world majority” constitutes the strategic pivot in constructing an equitable polycentric world order.

Read the report here.

Aleksei Zakharov is Fellow, Russia and Eurasia, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF.

Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is Junior Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF.

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