{"id":16331,"date":"2026-05-08T05:29:36","date_gmt":"2026-05-08T05:29:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/16331\/"},"modified":"2026-05-08T05:29:36","modified_gmt":"2026-05-08T05:29:36","slug":"russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/16331\/","title":{"rendered":"Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 7, 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

Toplines<\/p>\n

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the terms for Russia\u2019s unilaterally-declared May 9 Victory Day ceasefire. The Russian MoD stated on May 7 that Russia will unilaterally enact a Victory Day ceasefire starting at midnight local time on May 8 to midnight on the morning of May 10.[1] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces will completely cease hostilities, including on the ground, frontline drone and artillery strikes, and long-range drone and missile strikes. The Russian MoD called on Ukraine to \u201cfollow this example\u201d and reiterated its warning that Russian forces will launch a \u201cmassive\u201d missile strike against Kyiv City if Ukraine does not comply with the ceasefire either on the battlefield or in strikes against Russian and occupied regions. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 7 that Russia responded to Ukraine\u2019s May 5 to 6 unilateral ceasefire with additional strikes and new threats[2] Zelensky stated that Russia \u201cwants Ukraine\u2019s permission\u201d to \u201csafely take to Red Square for one hour once a year\u201d for the Victory Day parade before returning to its war against Ukraine.\u00a0 Russia will likely use its unilaterally imposed ceasefire to justify threats of or actual escalation against Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Russia is issuing increasingly dramatic threats of escalation against Ukraine in the lead up to the unilaterally-declared Victory Day ceasefire. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 7 that Russia will take \u201cappropriate steps\u201d if Ukraine conducts strikes against Russia to \u201cdisrupt\u201d the May 9 Victory Day celebrations, including strikes against decision-making centers in Kyiv City.[3] Zakharova and the Russian MoD reiterated the Russian MoD\u2019s May 4 call for Ukrainian civilians and personnel of foreign diplomatic missions to leave Kyiv City immediately.[4] Zakharova claimed that the Russian MFA sent this warning to all foreign diplomatic missions and international organization representative offices due to the possibility of a Russian retaliatory strike against the city.[5] Russian State Duma deputies, who often act as bullhorns for the Kremlin\u2019s rhetorical lines, claimed that Russian forces may use Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the retaliatory strikes against Kyiv City and that these statements are Russia\u2019s \u201clast warning to Brussels.\u201d[6] European Commission Spokesperson Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Anouar El-Anouni stated on May 7 that the EU will not change its presence in Kyiv City and noted that Russian strikes have already damaged several diplomatic missions in Kyiv City, including the EU\u2019s mission to Ukraine.[7] El-Anouni stated that Russia is again attempting to shift the blame for its war onto Ukraine and that Russia is only escalating its war instead of showing a serious intent to make peace.<\/p>\n

The Kremlin is likely attempting to establish that it can depopulate Kyiv City and control the decision-making of Ukraine\u2019s partners with threats of escalating the war, even as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks to disguise the weakness that Ukrainian deep-rear strikes against Russia have exposed. ISW continues to assess that Russia\u2019s threat to retaliate against Ukraine for allegedly planning strikes against Moscow for Victory Day celebrations reflects Putin\u2019s recognition that he cannot reliably defend his capital or other deep-rear areas from Ukrainian strikes.[8] The Kremlin\u2019s escalating threats leading up to the May 9 Victory Day likely intend to obfuscate this weakness by threatening or demonstrating a show of force against Ukraine and its allies, including with the Duma deputies\u2019 invocation of the Oreshnik. The Kremlin has periodically launched or otherwise invoked the threat of its Oreshnik IRBMs in order to unsuccessfully compel Ukraine to capitulate at key points in the war and has also used the deployments of Oreshniks to Belarus to threaten Europe.[9] Russia has conducted failed efforts to compel Ukrainians to leave Kyiv City through cognitive warfare efforts falsely portraying Russian forces as able to make a rapid drive on Kyiv City and through intense drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities in Winter 2025-2026.[10] Russia is likely attempting to continue its cognitive warfare effort in part by issuing escalating threats against Ukraine and its partners.<\/p>\n

Russian milbloggers criticized Russian threats to strike central Kyiv City and questioned the Kremlin\u2019s willingness to carry out such a strike at all. Russian milbloggers criticized the MFA\u2019s threats, claiming that Russian forces should have struck Ukrainian decision-making centers earlier in the war if they have the capability to do so.[11] One milblogger questioned why Russia does not similarly respond to daily Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure and cities.[12] Another milblogger claimed that the Kremlin must follow through on its threats in order for them to be convincing.[13] Another milblogger associated with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) claimed that a Russian strike on central Kyiv City would need to be a systematic and well-planned campaign, not a \u201cvague\u201d one-off strike.[14] The milblogger claimed that Russia would have to launch a large package of drones and missiles, including Oreshniks, to have the desired media effect. The milblogger claimed that a large-scale strike against central Kyiv City would \u201cwaste\u201d Russian options for leverage to compel Ukraine to surrender to Russia, leaving only Russian strikes against Ukraine\u2019s military or the use of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n

The Kremlin continues to set informational conditions to justify possible future air defense activity against NATO airspace. The Latvian National Armed Forces reported on May 7 that several drones entered Latvian airspace from Russia and two drones crashed in Latvian territory.[15] Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds stated on May 7 that preliminary information suggests these drones were Ukrainian drones directed at targets in Russia but emphasized that Ukraine has every right to defend itself and to strike legitimate targets on Russian territory.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 7 that the Russian forces detected six drones, two French Rafale fighter jets, and two F-16 fighter jets in Latvian airspace at 0400 local time on May 7, that five drones disappeared near Rezekne in eastern Latvia, and that Russian forces downed the sixth drone in Russian airspace near Likhachevo, Pskov Oblast at 0441 local time.[17] The Russian MoD\u2019s regular report on Russian air defense activity overnight did not claim that Russian air defense shot down Ukrainian drones over Pskov Oblast but did claim to have shot down drones other Russian regions that Ukrainian drones could plausibly have flown through en route to Russian Baltic Sea ports from Ukrainian territory, including Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk, Tver, and Novgorod oblasts.[18] The MoD\u2019s attempt to portray Ukrainian forces as using Baltic airspace to target Russia is a continuation of Russian officials\u2019 efforts to set conditions to violate Baltic and Finnish airspace for allegedly allowing Ukrainian strike drones to use Baltic and Finnish airspace.[19]<\/p>\n

Internal Russian Presidential Administration documents suggest that Russia remains unwilling to meaningfully compromise on an end-state to the war in Ukraine. Russian investigative outlet Dossier Center published on May 7 presentation slides titled \u201cAfter Victory,\u201d which employees of Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko reportedly created to outline the \u201cmost plausible scenario\u201d for the end of the war in Ukraine and ways to \u201csell\u201d a peace agreement to the Russian population.[20] Dossier Center reported that Kremlin employees began working on the presentation as early as February 2026. A source close to the Presidential Administration told Dossier Center that the Presidential Administration created the presentation due to the Kremlin\u2018s worry about poor Russian battlefield performance and the effect of the war on the Russian economy. The presentation\u2019s \u201cmost plausible scenario\u201d reportedly envisioned the United States signing two separate peace agreements with Russia and Ukraine in which Russia would gain control over Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, withdraw from Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, and freeze the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. The scenario foresees that the United States will lift sanctions against Russia, that European sanctions will remain in place, that Ukraine would have a neutral status and serve as a \u201cbuffer zone\u201d between Russia and the West, that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would remain president, and that Russia would achieve only the \u201csymbolic and restrained denazification\u201d of Ukraine. The presentation noted that continuing the war in Ukraine would be risky as it would require Russia to transfer its entire economy to a full wartime footing and conduct a general mobilization and would further damage Russia\u2019s demographic problems due to high losses. The presentation acknowledged that parts of Russia\u2019s ultranationalist community, including milbloggers, will most likely oppose this peace scenario but that Russian authorities would threaten the milbloggers with discrediting Russian forces and would strengthen the voices of moderates in the media space to counter them. The slides also discussed rhetorical frameworks for explaining the peace agreement to the Russian population, including narratives that Russia prevented a humanitarian catastrophe in Donbas, that Russia achieved maximum results without a general mobilization, that Putin thwarted Western efforts to expand and prolong the conflict, and that Putin knows what is best for Russia.<\/p>\n

The Russian Presidential Administration may have leaked the slides as part of a cognitive warfare effort intended to portray Russia as willing to make compromises to end the war in Ukraine. The slides are not part of the official Russian position on negotiations, but the presented scenario for the end of the war is similar to what the Kremlin has framed as acceptable in recent months.[21] Leaking the presentation slides may have been intentional in order to demonstrate Russia\u2019s alleged willingness to cede territory in exchange for Ukraine handing over the rest of Donetsk Oblast. The Presidential Administration is falsely presenting this war termination scenario as a major Russian concession, however, as Russian forces are unlikely to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast militarily in the near- to medium- term, if at all.[22]<\/p>\n

Key Takeaways<\/p>\n

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the terms for Russia\u2019s unilaterally-declared May 9 Victory Day ceasefire.<\/p>\n

Russia is issuing increasingly dramatic threats of escalation against Ukraine in the lead up to the unilaterally-declared Victory Day ceasefire.<\/p>\n

The Kremlin is likely attempting to establish that it can depopulate Kyiv City and control the decision-making of Ukraine\u2019s partners with threats of escalating the war, even as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks to disguise the weakness that Ukrainian deep-rear strikes against Russia have exposed.<\/p>\n

The Kremlin continues to set informational conditions to justify possible future air defense activity against NATO airspace.<\/p>\n

Internal Russian Presidential Administration documents suggest that Russia remains unwilling to meaningfully compromise on an end-state to the war in Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced.<\/p>\n

Russian forces launched 102 drones toward Ukraine overnight.<\/p>\n


\n\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. \u00a0<\/p>\n

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation<\/p>\n

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and defense infrastructure on the night of May 6 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Perm City, Perm Krai (roughly 1,500 kilometers from the front line), causing explosions and fires at the isomerization unit and the AVT-2 crude oil processing unit.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez oil refinery is designed to process roughly 13 million tons of oil per year and produces gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel used to support Russian forces. Perm Krai Governor Dmitry Makhonin acknowledged on May 7 that a Ukrainian drone struck an industrial facility in Perm City.[24] Geolocated footage published on May 7 shows smoke rising from the Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez refinery after the strike.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Project 22800 Karakurt-class small missile corvette near Kaspiysk, Republic of Dagestan (roughly 1,000 kilometers from the front line).[26]<\/p>\n

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis<\/p>\n

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border <\/p>\n

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on May 7 but did not advance.[27]<\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

Ukrainian forces struck Russian equipment in the Sumy Oblast. The Ukrainian State Border Guard Service reported on May 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Peroed electronic warfare (EW) system worth roughly $30,000, a drone signal amplifier, and a vehicle in the North-Slobozhansk direction. [28]<\/p>\n

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine<\/p>\n

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 \u2013 Kharkiv Oblast<\/p>\n

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City<\/p>\n

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 7 but did not advance.[29]<\/p>\n

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 7, but ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces advanced.[30]<\/p>\n

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 \u2013 Oskil River<\/p>\n

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast<\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

Russian forces conducted a limited mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction as they continued offensive operations within and north, southeast, and east of Kupyansk on May 6 and 7.[31] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault, destroying one armored fighting vehicle and 12 all-terrain vehicles.[32]<\/p>\n

Russian forces are reportedly increasing their offensive activity in the Kupyansk direction ahead of the May 9 Victory Day holiday. The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces have recently intensified their activity in the brigade\u2019s area of responsibility, likely in order to present battlefield successes ahead of Victory Day, but are not conducting large group or mechanized assaults.[33] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces conducted first-person view (FPV) drone strikes in violation of the recent unilaterally announced Ukrainian ceasefire. Another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces continue small group infiltration missions in the area.[34]<\/p>\n

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against Izyum (southwest of Borova) as Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Borova on May 6 and 7.[35]<\/p>\n

Ukrainian forces continued mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert \u201cMagyar\u201d Brovdi reported, and geolocated footage confirmed, that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone pilot training center in Khrustalnyi (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline) on May 5 causing a fire.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post in Sosnivka (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline) and a fuel and lubricant warehouse near Smolyanynove (roughly 54 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of May 6 to 7.[37]<\/p>\n

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 \u2013 Donetsk Oblast<\/p>\n

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia\u2019s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast<\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 7 as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks southeast and east of Slovyansk.[38] A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on May 7 that Russian forces seized Pryshyb (northwest of Lyman).[39]<\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

Russian forces continue their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign targeting Ukrainian logistics in the Lyman direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 7 that elite drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies have intensified drone strikes aimed at disrupting Ukrainian logistics in the Lyman direction.[40]\u00a0 Rubikon has been largely responsible for the successes in Russia\u2019s operational BAI efforts, targeting Ukrainian logistics and fortifications to degrade Ukrainian capabilities ahead of ground operations.[41]\u00a0 A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade reported on May 7 that both Russian and Ukrainian units are struggling to move from positions in the Lyman direction because they are easily spotted by Russian drones, which has created additional complications for conducting logistics on both sides.[42]<\/p>\n

Russian forces conducted infiltrations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on prior dates. Geolocated footage published on April 10 and May 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions northeast of and in southeastern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were both Russian infiltration missions that did not occur within the last 24 hours.[43]\u00a0 A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka.[44]<\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions southwest of Maiske (north of Kostyantynivka) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[45]<\/p>\n

Russian forces have reportedly reduced the number of infiltrations and are leveraging mine-equipped unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in the Kramatorsk direction. The company commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on May 7 that Russian forces have not changed their tactics but have reduced the frequency and intensity of infiltrations due to their low success rate.[46] The company commander stated that the line of contact has not moved more than a kilometer in either direction in the past three years. The company commander stated that Russian forces are leveraging mine-equipped UGVs in their attacks and continue using heavy bomber drones.<\/p>\n

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on May 7 but did not advance.[47]<\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 7 but did not advance.[48]<\/p>\n

A Ukrainian officer operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on May 7 that Russian forces are attacking in waves and using spring foliage to conceal Russian positions from Ukrainian drones.[49] The officer stated that Russian forces are attacking at all times of the day and during the night but are sending a fewer troops to assault compared to the same time in 2025.<\/p>\n

Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Novopavlivka direction on May 7 but did advance.[50]<\/p>\n

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on May 7, concentrating attacks east and southeast of Oleksandrivka, but did not advance.[51]<\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions north of Sichneve (west of Oleksandrivka) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[52]<\/p>\n

Ukrainian forces continued their mid to long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone command post near occupied Yasne (roughly 67 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian manpower concentration near occupied Dersove (roughly 126 kilometers from the frontline).[53] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on May 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a logistics depot of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) and a command and observation point of an unspecified Russian drone unit in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[54]<\/p>\n

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis<\/p>\n

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City<\/p>\n

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on May 7 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[55]<\/p>\n

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against frontline Russian military assets in the Zaporizhia direction. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) published footage and reported on May 7 that Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones struck a Russian BM-21 Grad Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) near Hulyaipole and that Ukrainian forces recorded a secondary detonation from the MLRS ammunition exploding.[56]<\/p>\n

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks west and northwest of Orikhiv.[57] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the situation in western Zaporizhia Oblast is worsening for Russian forces as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks and restored positions between Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv), Pavlivka (northeast of Stepnohirsk), and Orikhiv.[58]<\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

Geolocated footage published on May 5 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[59]<\/p>\n

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near occupied Smile (roughly 34 kilometers from the frontline).[60]<\/p>\n

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and Antonivka and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on May 7 but did not advance.[61]<\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a><\/p>\n

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign<\/p>\n

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line<\/p>\n

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drones strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 102 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, Parodiya, and other drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[62] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 92 drones, that eight drones struck six locations, and that downed debris had fallen on four locations as of 0800 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck railway infrastructure in Mykolaiv Oblast and residential infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast.[63]<\/p>\n

Significant Activity in Belarus\u00a0<\/p>\n

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks<\/p>\n

Nothing significant to report.<\/p>\n

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.<\/p>\n

\"Powered<\/p>\n

Endnotes<\/p>\n

[1] https:\/\/t.me\/mod_russia\/63289
[2] https:\/\/t.me\/V_Zelenskiy_official\/18921
[3] https:\/\/mid dot ru\/ru\/foreign_policy\/news\/2104313\/; https:\/\/t.me\/tass_agency\/374571; https:\/\/t.me\/tass_agency\/374573
[4] https:\/\/t.me\/mod_russia\/63189; https:\/\/mid dot ru\/ru\/foreign_policy\/news\/2104313\/; https:\/\/t.me\/mod_russia\/63289
[5] https:\/\/mid dot ru\/ru\/foreign_policy\/news\/2103953\/
[6] https:\/\/aif dot ru\/society\/kiev-sorval-peremirie-rossiya-gotovit-oreshnik-v-otvet-na-provokacii; https:\/\/www.gazeta dot ru\/politics\/news\/2026\/05\/07\/28417879.shtml
[7] https:\/\/suspilne dot media\/1307847-es-ne-zminuvatime-svoeii-prisutnosti-v-kievi-u-ek-vidreaguvali-na-pogrozi-moskvi\/; https:\/\/english dot nv.ua\/nation\/ceasefire-on-may-9-europe-responds-to-russia-s-call-to-evacuate-diplomats-from-kyiv-50606213.html; https:\/\/t.me\/astrapress\/111937
[8] https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026\/
[9] https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2025\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2024\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2025\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2024\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2026\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2026\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2024\/;
[10] https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2026\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025\/ ; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025\/
[11] https:\/\/t.me\/milinfolive\/171841; https:\/\/t.me\/sashakots\/61575
[12] https:\/\/t.me\/vysokygovorit\/22895; https:\/\/t.me\/vysokygovorit\/22900
[13] https:\/\/t.me\/NgP_raZVedka\/25210
[14] https:\/\/t.me\/bomber_fighter\/25171
[15] https:\/\/x.com\/Latvijas_armija\/status\/2052213463477260703
[16] https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=QgzoVItjzBg; https:\/\/meduza dot io\/news\/2026\/05\/07\/v-latvii-upali-dva-bespilotnika-zaletevshie-so-storony-rossii-odin-popal-v-neftyanoy-rezervuar
[17] https:\/\/t.me\/mod_russia\/63275
[18] https:\/\/t.me\/mod_russia\/63267
[19] https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026\/
[20] https:\/\/dossier dot center\/ura-pobeda\/
[21] https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2025\/
[22] https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026\/ ; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026\/ ; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2026\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026\/ ; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025\/; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025\/
[23] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38322
[24] https:\/\/t.me\/mahonin59\/12179
[25] https:\/\/t.me\/DniproOfficial\/7527 ; https:\/\/t.me\/DniproOfficial\/7528
[26] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38325
[27] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291 ; https:\/\/t.me\/uvkkursk\/349 ; https:\/\/t.me\/rybar\/80059 ; https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/34013 ; https:\/\/t.me\/dva_majors\/92577 ; https:\/\/t.me\/severnnyi\/7908 ; https:\/\/t.me\/DnevnikDesantnika\/42824 ;
[28] https:\/\/armyinform dot com.ua\/2026\/05\/06\/syl-oborony-znyshhyly-novitnij-reb-peroed-ta-zirvaly-vorozhyj-shturm-na-pivnichno-slobozhanskomu-napryamku\/; https:\/\/t.me\/DPSUkr\/32792
[29] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293 ; https:\/\/t.me\/Joint_Forces_Task_Force\/20609 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291 ; https:\/\/t.me\/DnevnikDesantnika\/42793 ; https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/34013 ; https:\/\/armyinform dot com.ua\/2026\/05\/07\/vorog-topchetsya-vzhe-kilka-rokiv-poblyzu-vovchanska-rosiyany-hochut-obijty-pozycziyi-syl-oborony\/; https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https:\/\/t.me\/dva_majors\/92577 ; https:\/\/t.me\/severnnyi\/7908 ; https:\/\/t.me\/kharkivnapriamok\/2470 ; https:\/\/t.me\/otukharkiv\/7460
[30] https:\/\/t.me\/RVvoenkor\/114629
[31] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293 ; https:\/\/t.me\/Joint_Forces_Task_Force\/20609; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/3829; https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/34013; https:\/\/t.me\/dva_majors\/92577; https:\/\/t.me\/gvZapad\/18487
[32] https:\/\/armyinform dot com.ua\/2026\/05\/07\/syly-oborony-vidbyly-mehanizovanyj-shturm-rf-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku\/; https:\/\/t.me\/brigade_14\/4418
[33] https:\/\/suspilne dot media\/kharkiv\/1307339-aktivizacia-pid-svata-pid-akis-dati-ce-vidbuvaetsa-vijskovij-116-ombr-pro-situaciu-na-kupanskomu-napramku\/
[34] https:\/\/t.me\/oaembr77\/1311
[35] https:\/\/t.me\/izyum_official\/36497; https:\/\/t.me\/DnevnikDesantnika\/42820; https:\/\/t.me\/DnevnikDesantnika\/42815; https:\/\/t.me\/DnevnikDesantnika\/42790; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293 ; https:\/\/t.me\/Joint_Forces_Task_Force\/20609 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291
[36] https:\/\/t.me\/robert_magyar\/2317; https:\/\/x.com\/99Dominik_\/status\/2052048513916104832 ; https:\/\/x.com\/99Dominik_\/status\/2052049120982962362; https:\/\/t.me\/usf_army\/1886; https:\/\/x.com\/dmitrij46839\/status\/2052312711044677774?s=20
[37] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38325
[38] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293 ; https:\/\/t.me\/Joint_Forces_Task_Force\/20609 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291 ; https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/34013 ; https:\/\/t.me\/voenkorKotenok\/72169 ; https:\/\/t.me\/dva_majors\/92577 ; https:\/\/t.me\/gvZapad\/18487 ; https:\/\/t.me\/DnevnikDesantnika\/42790
[39] https:\/\/t.me\/voenkorKotenok\/72169 ; https:\/\/t.me\/gvZapad\/18487
[40] https:\/\/armyinform dot com.ua\/2026\/05\/07\/mozhut-raptovo-zyavlyatysya-zi-svoyih-zasidok-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-rezhymu-tyshi-ne-vidchuly\/ ; https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=G_-e1L724OU
[41] https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025\/ ; https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/russia-ukraine\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2026\/
[42] https:\/\/armyinform dot com.ua\/2026\/05\/07\/do-nas-pihota-navit-ne-dijshla-yih-rozbyly-poblyzu-lymana-rosiyany-jdut-v-odyn-kinecz\/; https:\/\/youtu.be\/HsySq50o4lk?t=1506
[43] https:\/\/x.com\/AudaxonX\/status\/2052071298105217056; https:\/\/x.com\/AudaxonX\/status\/2052072708431630775; https:\/\/t.me\/ombr_28\/3005; https:\/\/t.me\/Gryphon501\/111; https:\/\/x.com\/AudaxonX\/status\/2052373807092977683
[44] https:\/\/t.me\/RVvoenkor\/114602
[45] https:\/\/x.com\/AudaxonX\/status\/2052101641503985669; https:\/\/x.com\/AudaxonX\/status\/2052101707052560642; https:\/\/t.me\/Ukr_G_M\/79863
[46] https:\/\/armyinform dot com.ua\/2026\/05\/07\/kilometr-tudy-syudy-protyagom-troh-rokiv-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-infiltracziyi-voroga-zastoporylysya\/; https:\/\/youtu.be\/HsySq50o4lk?t=2743
[47] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291
[48] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291; https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/34013; https:\/\/t.me\/motopatriot78\/51494; https:\/\/t.me\/DnevnikDesantnika\/42812
[49] https:\/\/armyinform dot com.ua\/2026\/05\/07\/vony-vyrishyly-zrobyty-shhos-dyke-poblyzu-pokrovska-vorog-atakuye-vyprobovuyuchy-rizni-prykoly\/; https:\/\/youtu.be\/HsySq50o4lk?t=602
[50] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291
[51] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323; https:\/\/t.me\/SJTF_Odes\/13931; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291
[52] https:\/\/t.me\/RtrDonetsk\/35483; https:\/\/x.com\/moklasen\/status\/2052082055161192596
[53] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38325
[54] https:\/\/armyinform dot com.ua\/2026\/05\/06\/ptahy-madyara-nakryly-shkolu-dronariv-sbs-vdaryly-po-tylah-i-shtabah-okupantiv\/ ; https:\/\/t.me\/usf_army\/1886
[55] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323 ; https:\/\/t.me\/SJTF_Odes\/13931 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291 ; https:\/\/t.me\/rybar\/80062 ; https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/34013
[56] https:\/\/t.me\/usf_army\/1890 ; https:\/\/armyinform dot com.ua\/2026\/05\/07\/grad-ne-vstyg-utekty-dronari-sbs-pidirvaly-rszv-razom-iz-boyekomplektom\/
[57] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323 ; https:\/\/t.me\/SJTF_Odes\/13931 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291 ; https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/34013 ; https:\/\/t.me\/rybar\/80074 ; https:\/\/t.me\/dva_majors\/92577
[58] https:\/\/t.me\/rybar\/80074
[59] https:\/\/t.me\/creamy_caprice\/11857; https:\/\/t.me\/voickokipchaka\/316
[60] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38325
[61] https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38323 ; https:\/\/t.me\/SJTF_Odes\/13931 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38293 ; https:\/\/t.me\/GeneralStaffZSU\/38291
[62] https:\/\/t.me\/kpszsu\/61484
[63] https:\/\/suspilne dot media\/1307217-norvegia-vidilila-ukraini-300-mln-evro-ukraina-dzerkalno-vidpovidatime-na-nedotrimanna-rf-rezimu-tisi-1534-den-vijni\/?anchor=live_1778160338&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https:\/\/t.me\/synegubov\/21645<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Toplines The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the terms for Russia\u2019s unilaterally-declared May 9 Victory Day ceasefire.…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":2294,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5],"class_list":{"0":"post-16331","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-russia","8":"tag-russia"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16331","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16331"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16331\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2294"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16331"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16331"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16331"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}