in February<\/a> it doesn\u2019t expect Russia to militarily attack any NATO member state in the coming year, indicating the assessment will likely be similar next year as Europe bolsters its deterrence.<\/p>\nThe war in Ukraine is part of a long-standing effort to \u201cfundamentally alter\u201d Europe\u2019s security architecture, according to the MIVD. With Russia seeking a multipolar world in which it is one of the superpowers, and with liberal-democratic values posing a threat to Russia\u2019s leadership and internal stability, the war in Ukraine takes on an existential character, it said.<\/p>\n
Conflict-mitigating factors in place during the Cold War, such as a clear world order, arms control and structured dialogue, now appear largely absent, the report said. At the same time, the world is on the eve of a technological revolution around artificial intelligence, quantum computing and bio-science \u201cwhose consequences are not yet fully foreseeable.\u201d<\/p>\n
Russia\u2019s use of methods just below the threshold of open conflict \u201ccreates a real risk of unintended and therefore difficult-to-control escalation,\u201d the MIVD said, adding that the current unpredictable United States security policy could influence Moscow\u2019s cost-benefit calculations.<\/p>\n
Russia in October tested a nuclear-powered cruise missile and a nuclear-powered torpedo that will be equipped with nuclear warheads in the future, and has likely stationed the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile in Belarus, according to the MIVD, which said \u201cthese weapons have an extremely destabilizing effect during crises, partly due to the extremely short warning time.\u201d<\/p>\n
Russia suffered about 1.2 million permanent casualties since 2022, including more than 500,000 deaths, compared to about half a million Ukrainian permanent casualties, according to the MIVD which noted a \u201cconcerning\u201d convergence in daily combat-death ratios in 2025 that\u2019s unfavorable to Ukraine.<\/p>\n
Despite the losses in Ukraine, Russia still expanded its armed forces in 2025 by recruiting and training personnel, producing heavy weapon systems, and preparing strategic ammunition reserves, according to the report. The economic feasibility remains to be seen, and ongoing high material and personnel losses in Ukraine could frustrate the planned growth, it said.<\/p>\n
\u201cAs long as the Ukrainian defense holds, the build-up of a potential Russian military threat toward NATO territory is thereby delayed,\u201d the MIVD said.<\/p>\n
Combat experience gained in Ukraine and the ability to integrate this into training have resulted in a \u201csignificant qualitative improvement\u201d in the Russian armed forces, particularly in unmanned systems, according to the MIVD.<\/p>\n
The Zapad-2025 exercise in Belarus in September showed improvements in command and control and integration of unmanned systems at all levels, and the MIVD assesses the Russian forces are \u201cdemonstrating a strong adaptive capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cThe Russian armed forces have not only grown larger but have also become more effective than before the war in Ukraine,\u201d the MIVD said.<\/p>\n
Russia has managed to keep up large-scale weapons production despite sanctions and limited access to raw materials and components, and large-scale deployment of one-way attack drones show the country capable of maintaining \u201can adaptive weapons industry both quantitatively and qualitatively.\u201d<\/p>\n
The Russian space industry has significantly weakened due to economic sanctions and a brain drain of highly-educated technical personnel, and a lack of independently developed satellites for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) means Russia \u201ccannot fully achieve the pace required for modern warfare.\u201d<\/p>\n
To compensate, Russia is turning to solutions including publicly available satellite imagery, buying off-the-shelf satellites and satellite imagery from Chinese companies, and deploying alternative intelligence sensors such as unmanned aerial vehicles.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe MIVD observes a concerning collaboration between Chinese companies and the Russian state in the field of space technology,\u201d the report said. \u201cThis collaboration is expected to intensify further in the coming years.\u201d<\/p>\n
China maintains a position of \u201cpseudo-neutrality\u201d regarding the war in Ukraine, but in practice has \u201csignificantly intensified\u201d military cooperation with Russia over the past year, according to the MIVD. The experience of Russian forces in Ukraine is of \u201cgreat interest\u201d to the People\u2019s Liberation Army, which has little combat experience, the Dutch intelligence service said.<\/p>\n
The MIVD said indications are of Chinese leadership drawing a connection between the theaters in Europe and East Asia, meaning the threat posed by China is \u201cbroadening and deepening.\u201d<\/p>\n
The People\u2019s Liberation Army reorganized its cyber units in 2024, which the MIVD assesses allowed China to better integrate offensive cyber capabilities with military operations, and the country is now likely on par with the U.S. in terms of offensive cyber capabilities.<\/p>\n
Chinese cyber espionage systemically targets the Western defense industry, according to the MIVD. The service estimates likely only a \u201climited portion\u201d of Chinese cyber operations against Dutch interests are detected and mitigated.<\/p>\n
The world is in the early stages of a new nuclear arms race, with a substantial expansion of China\u2019s strategic nuclear arsenal, according to the intelligence services.<\/p>\n
Weak arms control, the prospect of China as a third nuclear super power and advancing technology, \u201cparticularly the potential impact of artificial intelligence and quantum computing on nuclear decision-making processes,\u201d create such a complicated security situation \u201cthat this arms race will be more difficult to curb than during the Cold War,\u201d the MIVD said.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"PARIS \u2014 Russia could be ready to start a regional conflict with NATO within a year after the…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":9819,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2437,5815,220,5810,340,5,25,233],"class_list":{"0":"post-9818","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-russia","8":"tag-artificial-intelligence","9":"tag-dutch-intelligence-service","10":"tag-intelligence","11":"tag-mivd","12":"tag-nato","13":"tag-russia","14":"tag-ukraine","15":"tag-war-in-ukraine"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9818","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9818"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9818\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9819"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9818"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9818"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/russia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9818"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}