Spain has been shaken by a new security scandal after a file running to nearly 500 pages surfaced containing sensitive personal data on members of the Guardia Civil, National Police, and Armed Forces. Justicia Guardia Civil (JUCIL) asked Spain’s National Court to investigate where the data came from, how it was compiled, who distributed it, and for what purpose, warning that its circulation could expose the officers concerned and their families to security risks.
The case comes amid a succession of breaches that has revived questions about Spain’s ability to protect its own institutions, even as its security apparatus has accumulated a long record of surveillance and spying at home.
A pattern of security breaches
Only weeks earlier, Spanish police announced in June 2026 the arrest of a person accused of publishing personal data relating to members of several sensitive state institutions, including the Public Prosecutor’s Office, National Security Council, National Cybersecurity Institute, National Police, Guardia Civil, Finance Ministry, and Tax Agency.
The same month, Operation Borraska uncovered the use of illicit software to query restricted government databases. In February, another breach affected data linked to National Police and Guardia Civil officers and later reached the European Parliament. The August file therefore adds another episode involving institutions that are supposed to stand at the heart of Spain’s national security system.
Pegasus and Spain’s political surveillance record
This wider pattern also brings back the Pegasus affair, one of the largest political-surveillance scandals Spain has faced. Citizen Lab documented the targeting of dozens of politicians, activists, lawyers, and figures associated with the Catalan independence movement using Pegasus and Candiru spyware.
Spanish state authorities subsequently acknowledged that the CNI had monitored 18 people from that milieu using Pegasus, the sophisticated spyware developed by Israel’s NSO Group that can penetrate smartphones and access their contents.
The same tool was later found to have infected the phones of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and the ministers of Defense, Interior, and Agriculture.
Instead of keeping the focus on the failure to protect communications at the highest level of government, parts of Spain’s political and media discourse quickly sought to place Morocco in the dock, against the backdrop of the diplomatic crisis then separating Rabat and Madrid. Morocco World News documented at the time how Spanish media rushed to blame Morocco without evidence.
Yet Spain’s judicial investigation never established Moroccan responsibility and never identified the actual perpetrators. In January 2026, Spain’s National Court closed the case for a second time without attributing the operation to any person or entity.
The contradiction was clear. Spain had used Pegasus to monitor domestic opponents, yet failed to protect its own top officials from the same tool. Morocco then became a convenient target for accusations that Spain’s own courts never substantiated. The same reflex is resurfacing today, in a different form, in the narratives surrounding the events in occupied Ceuta and Melilla.
Spain’s surveillance record extends beyond Pegasus. Parliament is still investigating “Operation Catalonia,” a case involving allegations that security structures and senior police officials were used under Popular Party governments to gather information against pro-independence Catalan political figures. The Spanish Congress has kept the parliamentary investigation open into 2026.
In July, meanwhile, the trial over “Operation Kitchen” concluded and was left awaiting judgment. The case concerns allegations that former Interior Ministry officials ran a parapolice operation to spy on Luis Bárcenas, the Popular Party’s former treasurer, and his family in an effort to obtain documents and recordings potentially damaging to party leaders, allegedly using state resources and secret funds. The National Court spent months examining the alleged operation before the trial concluded in July.
José Manuel Villarejo, a former commissioner in Spain’s National Police, has also become associated with years of secret recordings, information gathering, and the use of sensitive material in political, business, and personal disputes.
In May 2026, the National Court sentenced him to three and a half years in prison for unauthorized access to data from the phone of Dina Bousselham, a former adviser to former Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias, and for leaking its contents to media outlets. Taken together, these cases show how security tools and privileged information have repeatedly become instruments of surveillance, score-settling, or private interests.
Ceuta and Spain’s competing narratives
The Ceuta crisis exposed another form of institutional dysfunction. After the events of July 30 and 31, a public dispute erupted over what Spanish authorities knew beforehand. Defense Minister Margarita Robles said the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) had done its job and that its officers had reported on July 29 the existence of calls for people to swim across the border the following day. She also disclosed that the agency had 25 officers in Ceuta.
Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska, however, denied that any report existed that could have anticipated the scale of what happened, while the Government Delegation in Ceuta also denied receiving such a warning. The dispute between Spain’s defense and interior ministries has since become public, leaving sovereign institutions that are supposed to operate within a single security architecture openly arguing over who knew what and when.
At the same time, some Spanish newspapers began citing “security” and “intelligence” sources speaking with striking certainty about Morocco, what Rabat allegedly wanted, and what its agencies supposedly planned, including claims of a Moroccan “hybrid operation.” Other outlets treated anonymous, unverified leaks as lists of “Moroccan spies” and linked Moroccan diplomats to intelligence activity on the basis of material whose authenticity and provenance had not been established.
The contradiction is difficult to ignore. Agencies unable to agree on whether they warned their own government about a crisis unfolding before them appear, through parts of the media, to possess remarkably precise knowledge of what is happening inside Moroccan institutions and what Rabat is supposedly planning.
Spain does not need Morocco to explain its current crises. The problems are already visible inside Madrid, from surveillance scandals involving political opponents and parapolice operations that have reached the courts and parliament, to a prime minister and ministers whose phones were compromised without the perpetrator being identified, repeated leaks affecting the police, Guardia Civil, military, and other sensitive institutions, and defense, interior, and intelligence bodies publicly contradicting one another over responsibility for the failure in Ceuta.
Amid this institutional turbulence, Morocco appears to offer some Spanish political, security, and media circles the shortest route for exporting domestic crises outward. But a proliferation of accusations cannot substitute for answers in Madrid.
Before speaking of “Moroccan spies” and “hybrid wars,” Spain first needs to establish who is protecting its secrets, who is spying inside its institutions, who knew what was coming in Ceuta, and why its own agencies have been unable to present a single coherent account of what happened.