Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Pakistans Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, accompanied by their ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, pose after signing a joint defence agreement in Mecca.
On Friday night, landmarks and towers across Saudi Arabia were illuminated in the colours of the Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani flags, marking the signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, according to Arab News. The symbolism was striking, but the strategic significance of the agreement could prove considerably more consequential.
Invoking Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognises the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, the agreement provides that an external armed attack on one member will be treated as an attack on all three. In effect, Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad are attempting to create a framework of collective deterrence against external aggression.
The development has already attracted criticism from Iran. Ibrahim Rezaei, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security Committee, argued that reliance on external agreements “will not provide Riyadh with a safety valve.”
“The Saudis should understand that an agreement on paper with Türkiye and Pakistan will not bring them security, just as years of exclusively hosting the Americans did not provide them with security,” Rezaei said, adding: “Correct your policies so that you do not have to beg others for security.”
More significant, however, is the possibility that the arrangement could expand. Speaking to Anadolu Agency, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan suggested that Egypt could eventually join the grouping. “I believe that at the next stage Egypt will also be among us in the alliance. We already act toward one another as if we were alliance members,” he said.
If such an expansion materialises, the agreement could evolve from a trilateral security arrangement into the nucleus of a much broader defence architecture in the Islamic world.
The Idea of an ‘Islamic NATO‘
Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has gone further, calling for the creation of a broader “Islamic NATO” following the signing of the agreement. The concept envisages a collective-defence arrangement among Muslim-majority countries, broadly inspired by NATO’s principle that an attack on one member constitutes an attack on all.
Asif also referred to India and Israel while discussing security challenges confronting Pakistan and the wider region. For New Delhi, therefore, the evolution of the agreement—and particularly any attempt to transform it into a larger military bloc—will be watched carefully.
What makes the Saudi–Türkiye component particularly intriguing is the historical relationship between the two powers. Ankara and Riyadh have moved in recent years from intense geopolitical competition towards pragmatic cooperation. Saudi Arabia has emerged as an important purchaser of Turkish defence technology, particularly drones, while political engagement between the two governments has expanded.
Yet behind this contemporary partnership lies more than two centuries of rivalry, conflict and competition for influence across the Islamic world.
From Rivalry to Partnership
The Saudi-Ottoman confrontation of the early nineteenth century provides a striking historical contrast to today’s strategic partnership.
The rise of the first Saudi state, closely associated with the religious movement led by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, challenged Ottoman authority in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi-Wahhabi expansion extended well beyond Najd, eventually encompassing Mecca and Medina and challenging the Ottoman political and religious order.
The expansion also extended towards Iraq. The attack on Karbala, a city of enormous religious importance to Shia Muslims, became one of the most controversial episodes associated with this period.
For the Ottoman Empire, the expansion of the Saudi state represented both a political and religious challenge. The Ottoman Sultan ultimately relied on Muhammad Ali Pasha, the powerful Ottoman governor of Egypt, to suppress it. Egyptian forces launched a prolonged military campaign in Arabia between 1811 and 1818.
The campaign culminated in the destruction of Diriyah, the Saudi capital near present-day Riyadh, and the capture of Abdullah ibn Saud. He was subsequently taken to Constantinople and executed in 1818, marking the effective end of the First Saudi State.
The historical irony is difficult to miss: two centuries after an Ottoman-directed military campaign destroyed the first Saudi state, the successors of those two political traditions are attempting to construct a common defence architecture.
The Rise of the Saudi States
The modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is historically rooted in the political-religious alliance established between the Al Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century. Saudi political and military expansion provided the territorial foundation of the state, while Wahhabism supplied an ideological framework that helped consolidate authority across tribal and regional divisions.
The emergence of this alliance transformed the politics of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi forces expanded beyond Najd, eventually occupying Mecca and Medina and projecting influence into territories nominally under Ottoman authority.
The Ottoman-Egyptian campaign of 1811–1818 destroyed Diriyah and brought the First Saudi State to an end, but it did not eliminate the political influence of the Al Saud.
The family subsequently re-established its authority in central Arabia, giving rise to the Second Saudi State. Riyadh became the political centre of this renewed Saudi power.
Turki bin Abdullah established control over Riyadh, while his son Faisal bin Turki subsequently emerged as one of the most important rulers of the Second Saudi State. Egyptian forces again intervened in the late 1830s, and Faisal was captured and taken to Egypt. Khalid bin Saud, another member of the ruling family who had spent years in Egyptian custody, was installed with Egyptian support.
The regional balance changed again after the 1840 Convention of London constrained Muhammad Ali’s ambitions and contributed to the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Arabia. The retreat provided the Al Saud with greater room to rebuild their political authority.
These nineteenth-century struggles illustrate how the Arabian Peninsula was already embedded in a larger geopolitical contest involving Ottoman power, Egyptian ambitions, local dynasties and growing European involvement.
The Modern Saudi–Turkish Contest
The establishment of the modern Republic of Türkiye and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia transformed the nature of the relationship, but geopolitical competition persisted.
During the twenty-first century, Ankara and Riyadh increasingly competed for influence across the Sunni Muslim world. Their differences became particularly pronounced following the Arab uprisings, when Türkiye and Saudi Arabia frequently backed competing political movements and regional actors.
The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul on October 2, 2018, pushed relations towards one of their lowest points in modern history. The episode intensified an already growing strategic rift between Ankara and Riyadh.
By this period, two broadly competing alignments had emerged across parts of the Middle East: Türkiye and Qatar on one side, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates on the other. Their competition extended into theatres such as Libya and influenced political developments elsewhere in the region.
Yet geopolitics rarely permits permanent rivalries.
Regional instability, changing US priorities, economic considerations and the growing importance of defence-industrial cooperation gradually encouraged rapprochement. Türkiye’s rapidly expanding defence industry, particularly its expertise in unmanned aerial systems, provided another foundation for cooperation with Saudi Arabia.
The new trilateral agreement with Pakistan represents a potentially much deeper stage in this transformation.
What Does It Mean for India?
For India, these developments require careful strategic assessment.
New Delhi has traditionally avoided formal military alliances, preferring strategic autonomy and issue-based partnerships. At the same time, India has been steadily expanding defence and strategic relations with countries around Türkiye’s extended neighbourhood, including Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Armenia.
These relationships should not automatically be interpreted as an anti-Türkiye alliance. Each has its own bilateral economic, technological and strategic rationale. Nevertheless, collectively they give India a wider network of partnerships across the Eastern Mediterranean, West Asia and the Caucasus at a time when Türkiye has itself been expanding its political and military footprint across these regions and South Asia.
India’s defence relationship with Armenia has become particularly significant, with Yerevan acquiring Indian-origin military platforms and showing interest in deeper defence-industrial cooperation. Cyprus has also expressed interest in expanding defence ties with India, while New Delhi and Nicosia have been strengthening their broader strategic engagement.
India and Greece, meanwhile, have moved towards deeper defence-industrial cooperation. Their partnership increasingly combines India’s Aatmanirbhar Bharat programme with Greece’s efforts to modernise its defence sector under its Agenda 2030 reforms.
Israel remains an even more important defence and technology partner for India. Cooperation spans missiles, air-defence technologies, sensors, unmanned systems and other advanced military capabilities, with an increasing emphasis on manufacturing and technology partnerships in India.
The larger strategic picture is therefore becoming increasingly complex.
A Saudi–Türkiye–Pakistan arrangement does not automatically constitute an anti-India bloc. Saudi Arabia is one of India’s most important partners in West Asia, with deep economic, energy and political ties to New Delhi. India has also maintained engagement with Türkiye despite substantial differences, while its difficult security relationship with Pakistan has an entirely different historical and strategic character.
New Delhi should consequently avoid viewing the emerging arrangement solely through the prism of Pakistan. Its significance will depend on how the agreement is institutionalised, whether its collective-defence provisions translate into operational military commitments, whether additional countries such as Egypt join, and whether the grouping develops common positions on conflicts involving its individual members.
These questions become particularly important if the idea of an “Islamic NATO” moves from political rhetoric towards an institutional military framework.
There is also a deeper historical question surrounding the durability of the Saudi–Turkish partnership. Riyadh and Ankara have travelled an extraordinary distance—from the destruction of the First Saudi State by Ottoman-directed forces in 1818 to discussions about collective defence in the twenty-first century.
History does not predetermine contemporary geopolitics. Countries that were once adversaries routinely become strategic partners when their interests converge. But the old competition for political influence in the wider Sunni world has not necessarily disappeared; it has been overtaken, at least for now, by strategic pragmatism.
For India, the appropriate response is not to replicate alliance politics but to continue strengthening a diversified network of strategic and defence partnerships while retaining its traditional freedom of action.
As Ankara, Riyadh and Islamabad move towards closer defence coordination, New Delhi will be watching three questions particularly closely: whether the trilateral agreement expands into a larger grouping, whether Pakistan succeeds in giving the arrangement an explicitly anti-India dimension, and whether the longstanding competition between Saudi Arabia and Türkiye for regional leadership ultimately strengthens—or constrains—the ambitions of the emerging partnership.
(The author is a Supreme Court Advocate; Views expressed are personal)
Published On Aug 16, 2026 at 09:02 AM IST
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