By Aleksandar Stošić, long-time journalist and MA in Political Science
The question of Serbia’s membership in the European Union has long ceased to be merely a matter of foreign policy orientation; it has become part of an internal political struggle in which citizens are frequently offered a false dilemma.
This dilemma is maintained through a narrative according to which European integration is supposedly opposed to national interests, whilst simultaneously ignoring the fact that the greatest resistance to European principles most often stems from structures whose survival relies on the existing system of political and economic privileges.
The European Union can be discussed on many levels: the crisis of democratic institutions, the sluggishness of its vast bureaucratic apparatus, its position in global political trends, cultural patterns, and topics encountered daily in the public domain. Each of these topics deserves to be treated pluralistically within a democratic space for argument. Every single one undoubtedly has its pros and cons – much like almost everything in the life of every individual and every society.
What is striking in the domestic public domain is that these two aspects are often incorrectly placed on the same level, where legitimate debates about the challenges of a political, legal, and economic union are used as an argument against the very idea of European Union membership.
At the turn of this century, European integration was strongly linked with the process of societal democratisation and Serbia’s economic recovery. The European Union was the main partner in economic, legislative, and political reforms. In the period following the democratic changes in 2000, public support for European integration reached 72 per cent, representing an all-time high.
In the second half of that decade, as the country faced the difficult political legacy of the 1990s, cooperated with the Hague Tribunal, and underwent state transformation following the breakup of the joint state, support dropped to around 57 per cent. Whilst this marked a decline, it remained a level typical for candidate states undergoing complex and lengthy accession processes. Nevertheless, that level of support was lower than in most Central and Eastern European countries immediately prior to their accession to the European Union.
This trend continued after the Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012. Today, more than two decades after the historic peak, Serbia has reached what can be described as an all-time low, with support for EU membership hovering around 40 per cent.
This outcome should be viewed in the context of a prolonged weakening of institutions and a continuous political discourse that frequently portrays European integration as a threat rather than a framework for development. Such a process could not occur without consequences, even amongst citizens who previously identified clearly with the European idea. This has led to a loss of trust in the EU as a political partner and an actor capable of contributing to the country’s future.
The problem is no longer simply a matter of how many citizens support or reject formal membership, but rather that the very idea of European integration – a project that for decades served as a vital source of institutional, economic, and developmental support for Serbia – has been eroded. This loss of trust is particularly paradoxical given the extent of aid and support the European Union has provided to Serbia across various sectors, from infrastructure and education to institutional strengthening and societal modernisation. It is even more paradoxical when viewed in the wider European context, taking into account the experiences of states that have built stronger institutions, more stable economies, and higher living standards through European integration.
Today, barely a quarter of Serbian citizens view the European Union as a reliable partner. An even smaller number believe that the EU genuinely wants Serbia as a future member state. This demonstrates that the issue is no longer just about how many citizens desire or oppose formal membership, but that the very concept of European integration as a project once symbolising change, modernisation, and an end to isolation has been weakened.
In other words, the long-term marginalisation of the European idea in public discourse has resulted in the European Union losing not only a portion of its support, but also a degree of its political and symbolic authority in the eyes of Serbian citizens.
Under current circumstances, the European Union has, in parts of the public domain, become a symbol for everything framed as contrary to alleged national interests – ranging from political pressure to threats against national identity. It is often used as a catch-all explanation for problems that stem from far more complex domestic causes.
The degree to which a society is susceptible to populism is perhaps best reflected in its ability to distinguish genuine national interests from political myths offered as a substitute for accountability. This is also evident in a society’s willingness to accept criticism, acknowledge its own mistakes, and understand that modernisation often requires abandoning comfortable illusions.
Populism, however, does not thrive on emotion alone. The phenomenon also depends on the ability of political actors to control the parameters defining their system of power. Outside such a system – built on concentrated influence, control over institutions, and weak public accountability – a populist model of governance struggles to maintain its full momentum.
This is why the topic of Serbia’s EU membership has ceased to be the subject of serious democratic debate. The future of a small, economically weak country with limited political influence, which has faced developmental challenges for decades, ought to be discussed primarily through the lens of its citizens’ actual interests, rather than through ideological constructs.
One need only look at the map of Europe to see that there is hardly a European state left that does not align its strategic development with the European political and economic space. Therefore, an important question for Serbian society should be: why is European integration presented so frequently here as a threat rather than an opportunity?
Serbia’s future in the European Union was never meant to be a matter of identity disputes; it was always about development, institutions, and the quality of life for its citizens. Once the debate is shifted to that side, the “yes/no” answer to EU membership largely becomes self-evident. Serbia is a European nation, and Serbian society is part of the European historical, cultural, and political landscape. The question is not whether Serbia belongs to Europe, but whether it is capable of building institutions that meet the standards to which it aspires.
For Serbia, the European Union is far more than a foreign policy choice. It represents a framework for institutional, economic, and social development. That is precisely why the question of European integration has become so vital: not because the European Union is a perfect political project, but because it represents a system of rules, institutions, and standards that curb arbitrary power.
Resistance to European principles is therefore often not merely the result of differing political convictions, but also stems from the fact that stronger institutions, greater transparency, and the rule of law would restrict the scope for opaque governance patterns and the concentration of power.
The European Union, of course, is not a flawless entity. Particularly under current circumstances, it is striving to find its place on the geopolitical stage at a time when it faces challenges from all sides. In an era of widespread distrust and the formation of a new international order, it is illusory to expect any political organisation to be free of weaknesses and internal contradictions.
The European Union should be subject to criticism. Its problems, democratic challenges, and future direction must be discussed openly and through reasoned debate. However, the difference between constructive criticism and political manipulation is that the former seeks to improve the system, whereas the latter exploits its flaws to challenge the very idea of European integration itself.
The prospect of Serbia’s membership in the European Union should therefore no longer be a battleground for ideological conflicts, but rather the subject of serious democratic debate based on the interests of its citizens and the tangible consequences of political choices.
It is up to future political elites and leaders to carry this responsibility for the well-being of their citizens.
(Danas, 05.08.2026)