Analysts disagree over how directly Tehran is involved and what is driving the Houthis back into action after largely sitting out the Iran war. But whether Tehran is directing them or benefiting from decisions they make independently, renewed Houthi activity puts additional pressure on Iran’s adversaries, particularly Saudi Arabia.
On Tuesday, the Houthis fired missiles at the Tanzania-flagged cargo ship Tihamah in the Bab el-Mandeb strait, killing four crew members and two members of the government-allied National Resistance Forces, according to Yemeni authorities.
Later on Tuesday, the Houthi-affiliated Al-Masirah network said the group targeted another vessel carrying what it described as Saudi “military equipment” in the Bab el-Mandeb.
Houthis pursue their own war
The Houthis’ return to action appears rooted first in their own calculations inside Yemen.
Kamran Bokhari, a senior resident fellow at the Middle East Policy Council and strategic forecaster, describes Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance as a corporate brand in which some groups operate more like Iranian-controlled subsidiaries, while the Houthis resemble an independent franchise.
“They’ll come in and participate in a conflict and they’ll act as and when they see that it’s in their interest to do so,” Bokhari told Iran International. “They’re not like, you know, Iran says jump and they say how high?”
For months, that interest appeared to lie in staying out of the Iran war while its trajectory remained uncertain.
The calculation began to change following a confrontation involving an Iranian aircraft bound for Houthi-controlled territory. Saudi Arabia struck a Yemeni airfield after the aircraft attempted to land, helping trigger a renewed cycle of attacks between the Houthis and Riyadh.
The escalation also comes amid growing activity by Saudi-backed government forces and UAE-backed southern separatists inside Yemen.
“It’s all domestic, is what I’m trying to say. It has nothing to do with Iran,” Bokhari said of the immediate Houthi calculation.
But that domestic struggle is unfolding in a regional environment transformed by the Iran war.
Iranian disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has already increased pressure on Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states. Renewed Houthi activity around Bab el-Mandeb means Riyadh increasingly has to contend with threats around two critical waterways.
Saudi Arabia is also trying to build a stronger security architecture around itself. The recently signed Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish defense pact could give the kingdom greater regional support as it confronts those threats.
That may give the Houthis an incentive to press Riyadh now.
“The Houthis want to be able to extract concessions from the Saudis before the grid goes up, if you will,” Bokhari said.
Their ultimate objective, he argues, remains establishing themselves as Yemen’s dominant political and military power and forcing Riyadh to accept that they cannot simply be eliminated.
Iran benefits
But the Houthis’ pursuit of their own objectives does not mean Tehran is a bystander.
Fatima Al-Asrar, a Yemen and Iran specialist, sees the renewed Houthi pressure as increasingly intertwined with Iran’s broader strategy against the United States.
“Of course, they [Iran] see it as an extension to them. They’re no longer hiding it,” Al-Asrar told Iran International, pointing to Iranian rhetoric linking pressure around the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.
She said Tehran is closely watching growing US fatigue with the Iran war and sees the approaching midterm elections as an opportunity to increase pressure on Washington.
“They’re very transparent, very calculating, and they’re using the Houthis on that front in order to press their advantage,” she said.
New reporting from Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat raises the possibility of a more direct Iranian operational role.
Citing Yemeni security sources, the newspaper reported on Tuesday that IRGC officers are overseeing aspects of the Houthi escalation and that an Iranian official, Ali Mohammad Rezaei, is supervising an operations room managing military and security affairs in Houthi-controlled territory. Iranian officers have also helped establish additional missile and drone launch positions, according to the report.
Iran International has not independently verified the claims.
What will this lead to?
In July of this year, US President Donald Trump has warned Washington would hold Tehran responsible for renewed Houthi attacks, describing the group as an Iranian “Surrogate and/or Proxy” and threatening military punishment against both.
But retired Royal Navy Commander Tom Sharpe, who served for 27 years and commanded four warships, told Iran International that he doubts Trump will want to launch another major military campaign against the Houthis.
“He definitely doesn’t want to be embroiled on a second tangent here,” Sharpe told Iran International.
Bab el-Mandeb also does not carry the same strategic weight as the Strait of Hormuz, Sharpe said, because ships have alternative routes, albeit at considerably greater cost and distance.
Yet Iran can still benefit.
Greater Houthi disruption could complicate shipping and potentially force the United States and its partners to devote resources to another strategic waterway.
“I think they’ll be pleased,” Sharpe said of Tehran. “If it does draw away resources, US resources from the Gulf of Oman, then that’s in Iran’s favor.”