Central question: Can the European Union become an effective geopolitical actor in Southeast Europe?

To answer this question, I will focus on two cases. They are different in many ways, but both are closely connected to European security and to the EU’s position in the world: the Western Balkans and Turkey.

Introduction – The European Union as a geopolitical actor

The European Union is a rather unusual international actor. It is not a state, it is not a federation, but it is not simply an international organisation either.

It has considerable economic power, a single market, a common trade policy, strong regulatory influence and an extensive network of diplomatic relations. At the same time, however, its ability to develop and implement a common foreign policy remains limited.

There is a well-known question: “Who should I call if I want to speak to Europe?”

This question captures the EU’s particular character. The Union has a High Representative for Foreign Affairs, a European External Action Service, the European Commission and the European Council. But when it comes to major foreign policy issues, decisions still depend to a large extent on the governments of the member states.

This creates a basic contradiction. The EU has the tools and resources to influence international developments, but it cannot always use them in a united and effective way.

Geopolitical power, after all, is not measured only in terms of economic strength or military capabilities. It is also measured by the ability of an international actor to influence the choices of others, shape the balance of power and promote its own interests and priorities.

Southeast Europe is a particularly useful region in which to examine this ability. It is important for European security, transport, energy, trade and the management of migration flows. At the same time, it remains an area where other powers seek to expand their influence.

The Western Balkans and Turkey illustrate, in different ways, the same fundamental question: how effectively can the European Union shape developments in its immediate neighbourhood?

A. The Western Balkans – The credibility of the European perspective

The European perspective of the Western Balkans is not a recent policy choice. At the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, the European Union made it clear that the future of the countries in the region lay within Europe.

More than two decades later, however, the enlargement process remains unfinished. The Western Balkan countries are at different stages of their European path, and some of them still face serious political and institutional problems.

We cannot blame the candidate countries alone for this situation.

Of course, there are major issues that need to be addressed: weaknesses in the rule of law, corruption, problems with judicial independence and media freedom, shortcomings in the functioning of democratic institutions, nationalist attitudes and unresolved bilateral disputes.

But the European Union also has a responsibility.

Internal disagreements, different priorities among member states, the use of bilateral disputes to block the accession process and the absence of a clear political timetable have all undermined the credibility of the European perspective.

North Macedonia is a telling example. The country made important political concessions in order to overcome obstacles to its European path. Yet it still faces difficulties in moving forward with substantive accession negotiations.

Serbia presents a different set of problems, particularly concerning democratic standards, its foreign policy and the normalisation of relations with Kosovo.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the complex institutional system established by the Dayton Agreement, combined with internal political divisions and separatist tendencies, makes progress towards European integration particularly difficult.

This situation also has a clear geopolitical dimension.

The more uncertain the European perspective becomes, the more room there is for other powers to expand their influence.

Russia uses historical, political, cultural and religious ties, particularly in Serbia and in the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its aim is to maintain its influence and prevent the full integration of the region into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

China, for its part, has developed a mainly economic and business presence. It invests in infrastructure, transport, energy and other strategic sectors. Its influence is different from Russia’s, but it can create economic dependencies and strengthen alternatives to the European path.

Of course, we should not exaggerate the extent of this influence. The European Union remains the most important economic and institutional partner for the countries of the region.

The problem is that the EU does not always make full use of this advantage. It needs greater political consistency.

Enlargement in the Western Balkans is not simply a process in which candidate countries have to comply with European rules. It is also a strategic investment by the European Union itself.

This means that the accession process must become more credible, more predictable and more closely linked to concrete results.

Reforms and accession criteria cannot be abandoned. On the contrary, they must be applied consistently.

But it makes little sense for every step forward to depend on an uncertain date of full membership, somewhere in the distant future. Countries that meet specific requirements should gradually receive real benefits from their participation in the European project.

Gradual integration could take more concrete forms. Participation in certain EU policies, access to common programmes and gradual involvement in selected areas of the single market could create a more direct link between reforms and their benefits.

We could even consider a more substantial institutional innovation.

When a candidate country has completed negotiations and fulfilled its obligations in a particular policy area, it could be given the opportunity to participate, under a special status and without voting rights, in the relevant work of the Council of Ministers.

For example, if a country has completed the necessary adjustments in agricultural policy, its Minister of Agriculture could take part, under specific conditions, in certain meetings or activities related to the EU Agriculture Council.

This is not a right that candidate countries currently enjoy. It would require an appropriate legal and institutional arrangement, so that the composition and decision-making procedures of the Council were not affected.

But it could be a meaningful step towards gradual political integration.

The aim would not simply be to bring candidate countries into line with European rules. It would also be to familiarise them with European political life, decision-making procedures and the culture of cooperation within the Union.

There is one more aspect of enlargement that is often underestimated.

The Western Balkans are not simply countries seeking EU membership. They can also contribute to European security and strategic autonomy.

Their geographical position, transport corridors, energy infrastructure, economic potential and access to important raw materials can strengthen Europe’s resilience.

Their integration should therefore not be seen as an additional burden for the Union, but as an opportunity to strengthen its overall power.

The European perspective of Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the future European path of Georgia, provided the necessary conditions are met, are important developments.

However, they should not lead to the neglect of the Western Balkans. The European Union must maintain the credibility of its commitments across the entire region.

B. Turkey – A necessary but difficult European partner

Turkey is a different and more complex case than the Western Balkans.

It is not simply a neighbouring country or a candidate for EU membership. It is an important regional power, a member of NATO since 1952, with a strong economic and political presence and ambitions to play an independent role in international affairs.

Its geographical position gives it particular strategic importance. It is located at the meeting point of Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Turkey has a direct influence on developments in the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It has significant military capabilities, a growing defence industry and an important role in energy, transport and the management of migration flows.

At the same time, the Turkish economy remains closely connected to Europe. The European Union is one of Turkey’s main trading partners, and economic interdependence is an important feature of their relationship.

Turkey, however, wants to expand its room for strategic autonomy.

It does not want to be limited to the role of an ally that simply follows Western choices. It seeks to maintain relations with different centres of power, negotiate on the basis of its own interests and use its geopolitical position to increase its international influence.

This policy often creates contradictions.

Turkey is a member of NATO, but it also maintains close relations with Russia and has taken decisions that have caused serious concern among its Western allies.

It participates in regional cooperation with European countries, but in other cases it follows different strategic priorities.

For the European Union, the main question is not whether Turkey is an easy partner. Clearly, it is not.

The question is whether the EU can develop a policy that reflects Turkey’s strategic importance without ignoring the serious political and institutional disagreements between them.

The accession process is effectively at a standstill. Negotiations have been frozen, while European concerns about democracy, the rule of law, judicial independence and the rights of the political opposition remain serious.

These are not secondary issues. The European perspective requires respect for specific political and institutional criteria.

Turkey’s strategic importance cannot replace its obligations as a candidate country.

On the other hand, it would also be a mistake for the European Union to limit its relations with Turkey to a policy of constant demands and sanctions, without making use of the opportunities for cooperation.

European policy towards Turkey needs to combine a firm defence of European principles with positive incentives for cooperation.

Modernising the Customs Union, facilitating visa procedures for Turkish citizens and allowing Turkey to participate in specific European defence cooperation programmes, under clearly defined conditions, could all help maintain and strengthen its ties with Europe.

These are not unconditional concessions. They are instruments of political influence.

The European Union has an interest in keeping Turkey as closely connected as possible to the European economic, institutional and political framework.

Of course, this requires reciprocity, clear criteria and gradual progress.

Cooperation must be linked to the fulfilment of agreed obligations, respect for the rule of law and the avoidance of actions that undermine the interests or sovereign rights of member states.

In the field of defence in particular, cooperation with Turkey cannot be taken for granted.

It needs to operate within a clear European framework, with rules, conditions and safeguards. Turkey’s strategic importance and its NATO membership do not automatically give it access to every European defence programme.

The same logic applies to Turkey’s relations with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.

Disputes in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as the Cyprus issue, are important outstanding problems in Turkey’s relations with the European Union.

But they should not become the only focus of European policy towards Turkey.

The EU can help create an environment that encourages dialogue, de-escalation and the search for political solutions.

Closer cooperation does not, by itself, guarantee that these disputes will be resolved. It can, however, create additional incentives for compromise and help build trust.

This is also the essence of a more active European policy.

The Union should not simply ask Turkey to adapt to European positions. It should also make use of the positive incentives offered by European cooperation, in order to retain influence over Ankara’s choices and create the conditions for gradual political convergence.

The choice is not between uncritical cooperation and isolating Turkey.

The real challenge is to develop a relationship in which cooperation and conditionality work together.

Conclusions – Enlargement and deeper integration: two sides of the same challenge

Our examination of the Western Balkans and Turkey leads to a common conclusion.

The European Union cannot become an effective geopolitical actor unless it develops greater political cohesion and a stronger capacity for common action.

In the Western Balkans, it needs to restore the credibility of the European perspective and move towards a more meaningful, gradual integration of the candidate countries.

Towards Turkey, it needs an active policy that combines European principles and necessary conditions with positive incentives for cooperation. This would help the EU maintain its influence and strengthen Ankara’s ties with Europe.

But to implement such a policy, the Union itself must address its institutional and political weaknesses.

Enlargement without deeper integration risks creating a larger but less effective European Union.

Deeper integration without enlargement risks leaving important parts of the European continent in a prolonged state of geopolitical uncertainty.

These two processes should not be treated as competing alternatives.

They are closely connected and mutually reinforcing.

The real challenge for the European Union is to combine the enlargement of the European political community with the strengthening of its own political and strategic capacity.

Only then can it move from being a powerful economic and regulatory actor to becoming a truly effective geopolitical player.

Theodoros TSIKAS

Theodoros TSIKASis a Political Scientist and International Relations Expert, Head of the Programme “Theory and Practice of International Relations” at the Institute of International Economic Relations (IDOS/IIER), Greece.