It is easy to be seduced by the thousands of slick Twitter/X videos showing strike drones performing amazing feats of precise destruction. And without a doubt, drones have had a major impact on the war between Russia and Ukraine.
They are now responsible for up to 70% of all battlefield casualties. Ukraine needs drones, and should definitely continue to use them, as well as any other available weapons systems it can acquire to fight the Russian invasion.
But the hype risks downplaying their very real weaknesses to the detriment of proven, effective, and economical legacy weapons systems.
Take this example. Compare drones, especially radio-controlled first-person-view drones, to the humble mortar. Remember that drones originally became ubiquitous in Ukraine because of a dire shortage of artillery and mortar ammunition, not because they were the optimal choice for close-support strikes. Even now, despite the evolution of drone warfare, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are still inferior to mortars in many respects.
Both systems fulfill similar battlefield roles by providing tactical fire support a few kilometers beyond the line of contact. Both carry comparable explosive payloads and are used to target troops in the open, buildings, trenches, field fortifications, and vehicles.
In these roles, the primary advantage of mortars is their reliability. It almost goes without saying that mortars can fire at night and in any type of adverse weather. Mortar shells are a dumb weapon; they usually have no onboard electronics and do not need to send or receive any kind of electromagnetic signal. So they cannot be jammed, or suffer unintentional electronic interference, or loss of signal due to terrain features.
The absence of electronics also means that there are fewer sensitive components that are prone to malfunction. In situations when every second counts, a mortar crew can usually complete a fire mission in less than five minutes.
None of these obvious features of mortars can be taken for granted when using strike drones. Most first-person-view strike drones cannot fly at night. Reduced visibility, precipitation, or wind also prevents operations.
Drones are highly susceptible to jamming and interference. When jammers are operating along any part of a drone’s flight path, the drone simply cannot reach its target. The UAS is prone to malfunction and often cannot take off, or simply fail to reach their target due to technical faults. Frequencies used to control drones can become cluttered, which can mean serious delays in response time. It is not unusual for the time between a call for a drone strike and the moment the drone lands on target to exceed 30 minutes.
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Under optimal circumstances, first-person-view (FPV) drones should at least be more precise than mortars; hence, the impressive videos on my X feed showing drones flying into windows or hitting vehicles on the move. But these clips are the exception, not the rule.
Often, drones are unable to use their advantages for precision. Due to terrain features, the connection between the drone and the operator often degrades significantly once it approaches a target at ground level, when precision is needed most.
None of these situations is hypothetical. Long hours of winter darkness and adverse weather are common on the Ukrainian battlefield. Jamming is ubiquitous and is used by both sides. Several drone teams can compete for a handful of the same frequencies in areas of intense combat. Drones rarely operate in flat open terrain with optimal lines of sight to their targets.
Some of these problems will eventually be resolved as drone technology develops. New features, such as night vision and guidance by fiber-optic cables, will improve resilience to environmental factors and jamming. But this higher quality and added features come at a price, and here mortars once again have an advantage.
A simple mortar shell costs around $100. A basic model first-person-view attack drone costs about $500. Features like night vision or fiber-optic control can easily double the cost of a drone. In a hypothetical scenario that calls for fire support at night, a mortar can afford to miss its target nine times before the cost of the fire mission is equal to the cost of one drone sortie.
Drones will become more reliable. Currently, most rely on parts sourced from China. Those parts are of highly variable quality; another reason for unreliability. Improving quality control, or even moving drone production to Europe or North America, would improve reliability, but also increase prices.
Mortars, meanwhile, go on being mortars. The technology is established, familiar, and reliable. They require no learning curve or major technological innovations. Militaries already know how to use them. Manufacturing capacities for the mortars themselves and mortar ammunition already exist in NATO countries, though expanding these remains paramount.
None of this means that FPV drones are useless, or that they do not have their place on the modern battlefield, especially in Ukraine. They can be particularly devastating when they are able to make full use of their precision-strike capabilities. Mortars have trouble hitting vehicles on the move or targets hiding inside bunkers, for example.
The fascination with drones is understandable. They are cool, innovative, and telegenic. But NATO militaries and Ukraine’s supporters should resist the temptation to chase every new technology at the expense of proven weapons systems.
Mortars do not make for sexy social media clips, but they are the workhorses of tactical fire support. Flashy drone footage may impress armchair generals, but it is steel rain that wins wars.
Jakub Jajcay is a former Slovak army officer and served in several elite units. He is currently working on his Ph.D. in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies of Charles University in Prague.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Date: June 5, 2025
Time: 9:00 am to 12:00 pm CET
Europe’s Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.