MARSEILLE — In the weeks after the Assad regime fell last December, Europe moved fast. The first western diplomat to visit Damascus, on December 16, was the European Union’s (EU) Syria envoy. The next day, a French diplomatic mission arrived in the capital, three days before their United States (US) counterparts.
The months that followed brought more engagement: visits by Germany, Italy, Greece and Cyprus came in January and February. At the start of July, the United Kingdom’s (UK) foreign secretary became the latest European official to visit, reestablishing his country’s ties with Damascus after 14 years.
While European countries raced to reestablish ties, they initially remained wary of the new authorities, conditioning full sanctions relief on the protection of minorities and inclusion of women.
That changed following US President Donald Trump’s surprise announcement during a visit to Saudi Arabia in May that his country would lift “all” sanctions on Syria. Two weeks later, the EU followed suit, removing its own sanctions—except for targeted measures against former Assad regime figures.
The move came despite Europe’s stated concerns about the safety of minority groups in Syria and violence in Alawite and Druze communities: clashes and killings on the Alawite-majority coast in March that left 1,500 dead, and in Druze areas near the capital and in southern Suwayda province in May.
In the most recent bout of violence, clashes involving local Druze forces in Suwayda, Bedouin groups, the Syrian army and security services have killed at least 558 people, injured hundreds and displaced nearly 100,000 in the province over the past week. The fighting, and Israel’s military intervention as a self-proclaimed protector of the Druze, has also unleashed a torrent of sectarian incitement.
“The Europeans clearly followed President Trump’s decision-making, and the US decision to lift full sanctions resulted in the Europeans doing the same a few days later,” Julien Barnes-Dacey, Director of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) program at the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR), told Syria Direct. “That’s not a coincidence.”
That said, “the Europeans, like France, Italy, Germany and the UK were ahead of the US in terms of high-level engagement with Syria,” Rym Momtaz from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said.
French President Emmanuel Macron was the first western leader to have a call with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, and hosted him in Paris in May in his first visit to a western capital. The EU also introduced partial sanctions relief ahead of the US in late February, Momtaz emphasized, while conceding that US sanctions were the “heftiest” and had the most impact. Without relief from Washington, any economic actors seeking to engage with Syria would have continued to be subject to secondary sanctions, making changes by the EU ineffectual.
However, “even if the Americans have been leading the way and creating a space for the Europeans to widen their own approach, there’s a lot of space to carve out quite a unique, added-value relationship with Damascus going forward,” Barnes-Dacey added.
The same day the EU lifted its sanctions on May 28, it imposed new targeted sanctions on three Syrian militias affiliated with the new Syrian army, and two of their leaders, over their participation in massacres on the Alawite-majority coast in March. Members of these same factions have also been accused of committing violations against Druze in Suwayda in recent days.
As Europe navigates Syria’s post-Assad reality, will it walk in the US’ footsteps or carve out a Syria strategy of its own?
Read more: Why has US policy toward Syria shifted, and what might the future hold?
A unified approach?
Wary of the growing regional influence of Turkey—a key backer of Damascus—some EU countries, like Greece and Cyprus, were initially opposed to engaging with the new Syrian administration and lifting sanctions. Part of Cyprus remains occupied by Turkish forces, while Greece has an ongoing dispute with Turkey over the Aegean Sea.
“They also see it through the prism of terrorism—they have a very binary vision of what Syria is,” Momtaz said. “In many ways they preferred the Assad regime, to be very blunt,” she added. Al-Sharaa and his armed faction Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), under prior iterations of the group, were affiliated with Al Qaeda and had ties to the Islamic State of Iraq.
Overall, however, the EU has had a “unified” approach to Syria, unlike other issues its 27 member states have been unable to reach a consensus on, said Katarzyna Sidło, senior MENA policy analyst for the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). “The general approach throughout the EU and within EU institutions is for supporting the transition [in Syria],” she said.
“European member states and the EU have a strategic interest in carving out their own Syria policy because Syria has such consequences on the security, stability and prosperity of Europe’s southern flank,” Momtaz echoed.
However, the EU as a whole does not have a concrete Syria strategy yet. Only a handful of European states—France, Italy and the UK, which is no longer part of the EU—do, Momtaz said. “Other countries that are members of the EU don’t have that level of thinking, and the EU institutions themselves are still trying to find their footing in terms of striking the right balance between engagement and also conditionality.”
European interests
Renewed European engagement with Syria is related to several factors, namely security and refugees, Sidło, Momtaz and Barnes-Dacey agreed.
“There are of course interests [in Syria]…beyond purely good heart wishes,” Sidło explained. “The European thinking [is] ‘if our neighbors are safe then we’re safe as well,’” she said, adding that the EU hopes to include Syria in the New Pact for the Mediterranean.
The pact, set to be announced in October, aims to foster “a shared space of peace, prosperity and stability” through investments in education and trade, as well as cooperation around migration, organized crime and counterrorism.
“There is a hope in Europe that a stable Syria would help address those concerns, in terms of helping to draw back voluntary returns of Syrian refugees and not exporting terrorism and other destabilizing elements—whether it’s drugs or things like that,” Barnes-Dacey said.
Under the Assad regime, the state-sponsored Captagon trade reached Europe’s shores, while IS conducted multiple mass casualty attacks in Europe, with thousands of European nationals joining the group. Hundreds of EU citizens remain in detention centers in northeastern Syria.
Many fear a resurgence of the Islamic State (IS), as the group has conducted nearly 100 attacks in Syria since the start of the year—mainly against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). France, alongside the US, retains a military presence in northeastern Syria under a counter-IS mission in support of the SDF. “If the Americans pull out as is expected, the Europeans will also withdraw their troops on the ground,” Barnes-Dacey said.
Regardless of a potential withdrawal, he believes the Europeans will continue to support ongoing negotiations between the SDF and Damascus for the integration of their security forces, as well as providing intelligence support to the new authorities.
As for migration, calls for restricting influxes are growing louder in Europe. With the Assad regime gone, many European countries are also reconsidering asylum for Syrian refugees. Germany recently revoked family reunification for refugees with protection status—a move that will disproportionately impact Syrians.
To encourage returns, Sidło said some European states are considering adopting a “go-and-see” approach like Turkey. Until July 1, Ankara permitted one adult per Syrian household to visit Syria up to three times to decide whether conditions were suitable for long-term return. Nearly 300,000 Syrians have returned from Turkey since the fall of the Assad regime, according to the Turkish government.
Carrot and stick approach
“There will be a continued widening of European support so long as the government is able to get a grip on the risk of sectarian violence and questions related to minorities,” Barnes-Dacey said.
“If there were to be a sense of the government being directly involved in attacks on minorities, or if there was a belief that the government was losing control over the situation, there would be more European hesitation and a slow-walking of that engagement,” he said. The involvement of government forces in the targeting of Alawites along the coast and central Syria has been documented.
So far, however, European governments widely view al-Sharaa and his foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, as “credible figures who want to move the country in the right direction,” Barnes-Dacey added.
“If there were continuous breaches of different minorities, groups and sectors of Syrian society, if the progress of the constitution is not on the path, after the timeline that the government imposed on itself, then it could be a red flag,” Sidło echoed, saying it could “trigger a revision or reapplication of some sanctions at least.” To date, however, “there is no list of red lines, there is nothing officially published,” she added.
The bout of violence in Suwayda over the past week is unlikely to lead to an immediate shift in European policy, Momtaz and Sidło agreed, despite EU statements condemning attacks on civilians.
The EU is closely monitoring allegations that government forces committed abuses in Suwayda, Sidło said. “The key issue is whether, assuming these reports are accurate, al-Sharaa lacks the ability or the will to rein in those forces. The distinction is critical: it will directly influence any recalibration of EU policy.”
“For now, the prevailing assessment is that he lacks control, not intent—a view that justifies continued engagement with the current government as part of Syria’s transitional stabilization,” she added.
As for democracy, Sidło, Momtaz and Barnes-Dacey agreed that the EU is more likely to be an advocate, unlike the US—which has stated it will not conduct “nation-building” or dictate a “democratic model.”
“The Europeans are going to be one of the few voices internationally who are…going to try to work with the Syrians to stabilize the country beyond narrow economics or security dynamics, but also address issues like inclusive governance and participation as a cornerstone of longer term stability,” Barnes-Dacey said.
“The EU is definitely more ready [than the US] to support any democratic reforms or any structural reforms, also in terms of capacity-building and reestablishing state institutions,” Sidło echoed.
“The EU doesn’t want to impose anything, but it has more interests and more instruments to support those kinds of changes than the US,” she added. The EU’s Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) and Twinning instruments could both be used to encourage such transformations through institutional capacity-building.
However, sanctions are not the only leverage at the EU’s disposal. “Preferential trade—offering preferential treatment as a trade partner—is a big carrot that the EU can offer to Syria,” Sidło said, noting that it is the biggest trading partner for many countries in the region.
“As Syria looks to reconstruct itself, to build up its domestic industry and economy, it will be looking to Europe as a potential export market that can help grow out the economy in positive ways,” Barnes-Dacey echoed.
He expects Europe will also attempt to find common ground with the US to put in place “economic incentives and disincentives critical to broader stabilization objectives.” However, “in Washington these days, Europeans are not really seen as a serious actor when it comes to the Middle East,” he added. “They are marginalized on most issues—whether it’s Iran, Israel-Palestine or Syria.”
