This is a special series on opportunities for bilateral cooperation between the US and Europe based on expert working group discussions that CEPA held under the Chatham House rule. The article below on US-France cooperation is the first installment.

US and France: Old Friends Facing New Challenges

President Trump has made clear that Europe must take ownership of its own security. Similarly, President Macron has talked about European strategic autonomy since first taking office in 2017. His ideas about a “European pillar in NATO” were not well received by core European allies then, but today, as Europe faces its greatest security challenge in decades, those ideas seem farsighted.  

Trump’s reelection has brought new energy to the French initiative, pushing greater strategic alignment between the quadrilateral leadership group of France, Germany, Poland, and the UK. The extent to which Macron can tinker with French domestic defense and security policy is limited by his precarious relationship with his parliament, which holds the reins on spending approvals.  

NATO’s most recent summit in The Hague, however, appears to have solidified Europe’s commitment to security independence from the US. With European NATO leaders on board and modifying their strategy in lockstep, French domestic aversion to increasing defense spending is likely to be less potent, paving the way for Macron’s European pillar in NATO.  

Another key element of the country’s security leadership are its ambitions for nuclear burden sharing. France has the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal, and President Macron has discussed the deployment of his country’s nuclear weapons across the continent to share the burden of Europe’s nuclear deterrence.  

It seems that many European allies are keen on this notion, with leaders in Germany, Poland, Lithuania, and Denmark expressing their openness to hosting French nuclear weapons. 

Macron’s rhetoric is promising — it represents a major shift in French policy and a new direction for the European security order. It is further evidence of France’s commitment to a more independent security architecture for Europe and the country’s alignment with some of the Trump administration’s priorities for the transatlantic alliance.  

Opportunities for More Cohesion on China 

As France and other European allies come around to the economic and security threat Beijing poses to the entire world, there is now room for a reset on bilateral and multilateral collaboration on China policy, especially in limiting the flow of advanced technology to China. Though France is generally more averse to the notion of upsetting Beijing than the US, concerning developments in key sectors like artificial intelligence and advanced chip manufacturing could break new ground in US-French alignment on export controls. 

Such an alignment could go a long way to thaw economic relations between the US and France — and between the US and the EU, for that matter — which have suffered longstanding fissures as a result of strict, French-led regulatory policy. Strong European regulatory policy, particularly in the tech sector, has drawn the ire of the US government and American private investors alike, who share an aversion to pieces of European legislation like the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Tax. Finding common ground on economic policy vis-à-vis China, particularly in FDI screening and export controls, could present an opportunity for a new beginning for French and European relations with US investors. 

European Energy Independence  

The strength of France’s civil nuclear energy sector has far-reaching potential for shoring up Europe’s energy security. There is ample opportunity for France to export its nuclear power capabilities for civilian use across Europe, allowing European allies to decouple from Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and mitigating Europe’s dependence on Russian energy.  

Beyond the damage such an approach would inflict on the Russian war machine and the flexibility it would grant Europe; it would benefit the US as well. For one thing, it would likely result in increased US LNG exports to Europe. French nuclear energy exports would permit Europe to move away from Russian energy dependence, but it would not end Europe’s need for oil and gas. The US, which has already filled much of the void in Europe’s energy market left by sanctions on Russian oil and gas, could easily become Europe’s primary source for LNG — something that the Trump administration has been promoting since taking office.  

Meanwhile, if France were to augment its civil nuclear energy capacity to become Europe’s primary exporter, we would likely see increased collaboration with US companies. With a reenergized French civil nuclear energy sector, the US and France would have ample opportunity to build on promising, mutually beneficial partnerships, such as French-owned Orano’s multibillion-dollar investment in a uranium enrichment facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee – the single largest investment in the history of the state.  

Challenges and disconnects 

Iran

The global discussion around Iran changed drastically overnight after the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Even before the strikes, American diplomats positioned themselves as the sole negotiators with the Islamic Republic, and it was unclear what role, if any, Paris would have in those talks.  

Residual disagreements over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) cast a long shadow, but that should not preclude US-French collaboration on enforcing a possible deal with Iran. It is impossible to predict at this stage what will happen in these negotiations, but a deal that permits any sort of civil nuclear program in Iran will likely require a group of international inspectors. French support for this effort (akin to French obligations under the JCPOA) will be essential in assuring that Iran does not refine weapons-grade uranium.  

Multilateral vs. Bilateral Frameworks

Halfway through the first year of President Trump’s second term in the White House, it is clear that the president prefers bilateral negotiation over multilateral formats. While the friendly relationship that President Macron shares with President Trump will serve as an essential channel across the Atlantic, it is not the way the French (or any EU power, for that matter) like to conduct geopolitics, particularly within the context of recent US-European quarrels over trade and security provisions. These are not issues that can be resolved through bilateral talks.  

Nevertheless, France will have to find a way to make the most of talks with the White House and push the larger European agenda without disrupting friendly relations with Washington.

David Kagan is a Program Officer with the Democratic Resilience program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).