17/02/2024. Munich, Germany. President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, meets the UK’s then-Leader of the Opposition, Keir Starmer, at the 2024 Munich Security Conference. Picture by Christophe Licoppe / European Commission Audiovisual Service.
As part of a series of articles for the Young European Federalists’ What If? Campaign, the UK’s International Officer, Jonathan Saunders, writes for The New Federalist about the history of the post-war relationship between Britain and Europe, the reasons for Brexit, and what could have gone differently to prevent it.
“I wish to speak about the tragedy of Europe, this noble continent, the home of all the great parent races of the Western world, the foundation of Christian faith and ethics, the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy, and science both of ancient and modern times. If Europe were united in the sharing of its common inheritance, there would be no limit to the happiness, prosperity, and glory which its millions of people would enjoy.”
Winston Churchill, at this point the Leader of the Opposition in the UK Parliament, an elder statesman in the fifth of his staggering seven decades as an MP, was speaking to academics and students at the University of Zurich in 1946 in favour of Austrian-Japanese intellectual Richard von Coudengove-Kalegri’s manifesto for a European Union (EU).
Commending the late socialist French Prime Minister, Artistide Briand, for attempting to save the League of Nations, he argued that only the union of France and Germany under Europe’s banner could ensure the United Nations’ longevity. Churchill’s endorsement for European integration put credibility and momentum towards its cause. Two years later, he presided over hundreds of national representatives at the Congress of Europe in the Hague.
68 years later, Churchill’s country — my country of birth — voted to leave the EU that was formed in his image. Some have argued that Churchill’s support for Europe is exaggerated or taken out of context. Others have argued that the modern-day EU is far different to what he advocated. Neither of these claims could be further from the truth: Churchill rightfully holds his spot as one of its founding fathers, even if our country is no longer one of its member states.
Churchill’s Role as a Founding Father of Europe
So, how did Britain and Europe’s marriage break-up so acrimoniously? I believe that it is not any one factor — Britain’s economy and its regulations, immigration and its multicultural society, or a loss of control over its domestic affairs — but a series of missed opportunities for Britain to take the leading role in European politics that Churchill as a post-war statesman longed for.
Speaking at the Congress in 1948, Churchill provided his support for the creation of a Council of Europe, which Britain was a founding member of and from which resulted in the Convention on Human Rights, which safeguards European’s protections from arbitrary power to this day. Yet, he went much further than this.
“It is impossible to separate economics and defence from the general political structure”, said Churchill — Europe, with Britain and the Commonwealth’s involvement, should form one of the world’s “armies of peace” with the United States and the Soviet Union, safeguarding the United Nations and all the new structures of international law. Churchill may have been nostalgic for Britain’s empire, but he saw no incompatibility between his country and Europe.
Britain’s Rejections from the European Economic Community
In Churchill’s second term as Prime Minister from 1951 to 1955, he left the door open to economic union — something he criticised the post-war Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, for failing to negotiate on coal and steel — and supported unsuccessful efforts to create a defence union. When Harold Macmillan applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961, Churchill wrote to his Conservative Association in support.
Macmillan was a friend of Europe from his appointment as Prime Minister in 1957, calling in one of his earliest statements “to overcome the natural tendency to resist experiment or the inherent skepticism which is one of the dangers of an old civilisation”. His greatest success was in forming the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with Austria, Portugal, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden.
This made it all-the-more disappointing when France’s President, Charles de Gaulle, slammed the door shut on Britain, declaring “non!” to their entry on national television in 1963. Dejected, Macmillan wrote in his diary that “all our policies at home and abroad are in ruins”. He was hospitalised shortly after and deposed by a cabinet which he had fallen out with in the aftermath of the humiliation inflicted by de Gaulle.
When Labour were re-elected under Harold Wilson in 1964, Europe went back in the list of priorities. Then, Labour were the less pro-Europe of the two parties on the basis that free movement may threaten the jobs of its voter base. This argument faded into obscurity when the UK Government had to devalue the pound to prevent an incoming economic catastrophe. Britain applied for the EEC again in 1967, but was vetoed for a second time by de Gaulle.
The Failure to Integrate Britain into Europe
Wilson wisely rejected calls from anti-European campaigners to give up on Europe, and six years later, with de Gaulle out of power, the Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, negotiated Britain’s entry to the EEC. Backed by 67% of voters in the 1975 referendum, the British people overwhelmingly looked to the future and gave a mandate for European integration. This cross-party consensus did not last long.
It was largely forgotten in Britain that the UK Government was given an opt-out from the Euro under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, an opt-out from the Schengen border zone under the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, and vetoed a European Constitution in 2005. It would have continued to be able to exercise its sovereignty in negotiating opt-outs and using its power of veto. The Conservatives from Margaret Thatcher to David Cameron attacked Europe when it was convenient, while Labour shied away from the issue for fear of losing more of its traditional voters.
Support for the EU, the successor to the EEC, went down to 48% of voters in the 2016 referendum. Four years later, following the 2019 general election, British residents lost the rights to the freedom of people, goods, services, and capital across the continent for the first time since joining EFTA in 1960, as well as the representation they had in the European Parliament from 1979. A return to the EU or even the single market remains off the table.
Is Britain’s Destiny Outside of a United Europe?
Studies show that Leave voters prioritised sovereignty over immigration by 67% to 33%, while Remain voters prioritised economic growth over immigration by 84% to 16% — immigration was not the cause of Brexit. There are countries across the EU far more opposed to immigration, yet with no desire whatsoever for independence. The same is true for other policy-based critiques of European integration.
Britain chose to divorce from Europe for a very simple reason: it did not feel valued as a partner. There is nothing inherently nationalist about Britain. It is not intolerant, nor is it a country with a natural opposition to progress. The periods in its post-war history where it could have integrated into Europe were simply at the wrong moments.
By missing the opportunity for economic union in 1950, it got delayed until 1973. The wave of popularity for Europe that this generated was sidelined by domestic issues, and by 1992 the political landscape was no longer welcoming to the common currency. If a European constitution had been proposed in the late 1990s or even the early 2000s, perhaps Tony Blair could have got the British public on board. By the financial crisis, voters were no longer willing to hear about Europe.
There are so many ‘what ifs’ in the post-war history of Britain and Europe that it is impossible to pick just one. Through a series of missed opportunities and unfortunate timing, Britain never fully integrated into Europe. However, with a new Labour government, there is a new opportunity to turn back the clock. Now, there is a new ‘what if’: what if young people in Britain realise that they need Europe — and young people in Europe realise that they need Britain — in order for both to succeed in the future?