Ursula von der Leyen and President Trump shook hands on the Turnberry Accord, named after his Scottish golfing resort
EVELYN HOCKSTEIN/REUTERS
It was symbolically potent that Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, made a trip across the Channel to wrap up trading hostilities between the EU and US. The agreement, which President Trump, with characteristic understatement, declared was “the biggest deal ever struck by anybody”, has placed a headline 15 per cent tariff on EU exports to America — a significant rise in trading barriers. It does, however, end months of uncertainty and avoids the prospect of even greater levies being slapped on the bloc.
By any account, the so-called Turnberry Accord (named after Mr Trump’s Scottish golfing resort) is not a good deal for Europe. It may have avoided the devastating threat of 30 per cent levies, but there is little else to celebrate. According to this newspaper’s analysis, the effective US tariff rate on eurozone goods will rise from an average of 2 per cent to 16 per cent. The EU will see its growth estimates revised further downwards thanks to the agreement.
Criticism has been significant: François Bayrou, the prime minister of France, described the signing as a “dark day” and suggested the bloc had “resigned itself into submission”; Alternative for Germany, the hard-right party, described it as a “slap in the face” for European consumers and producers.
This surrender contrasts with the EU commission’s self-proclaimed negotiating prowess and its unyielding stance towards Britain during the protracted Brexit negotiations. The cave-in is the result of the need to keep the EU’s 27 members on the same page. There are differing priorities on trade and this disunited stance forced the European Commission into accepting the lowest common denominator. The harsh reality is that a bad deal with the US is ultimately better than no deal.
What is particularly striking about the US-EU pact is how it compares with the one struck with the UK back in May. Whereas the bloc will face a 15 per cent general tariff, Britain’s is 10 per cent. On steel and aluminium Mr Trump has placed a 50 per cent tariff on the EU, double that applying to imports into the US from Britain.
Additional demands on the EU are significant: some $750 billion of energy purchases from the US are included in the settlement, as well as $600 billion of promised EU investment in the US. The latter is particularly galling as Europe is already the largest foreign investor in the US. Such arrangements were not included in the UK deal. The US will also be pleased that extra European defence spending will translate into lucrative new orders for its arms manufacturers.
History may have played some part in Mr Trump’s more lenient treatment of the UK. Much has been made of his family’s Scottish roots and his affection for his Scottish golfing properties, and the deft diplomacy has helped. But the most significant factor may have been the UK’s position outside of the EU. Endowed with the flexibility to define its own trade policy, London was able to move more swiftly than Brussels to protect its interests. Jonathan Reynolds, the business secretary, acknowledged this when he said the government was “absolutely clear this is a benefit of being out of the European Union, having our independent trade policy”. As the politician most responsible for promoting a second referendum, Sir Keir Starmer may now be coming to recognise the upside of Brexit.
That said, Mr Trump’s trade agenda is deeply misguided. At a time when trade barriers should be dismantled, the president is determined to strengthen them. Eventually, all parties involved will suffer from increased levies. Global growth, which has so benefited from the spread of free trade, will be impeded. The UK may end up in a marginally better position than the EU, but it will still be poorer as a result of Mr Trump’s protectionism. Recent history shows that, once imposed, US tariffs have a habit of lodging in the bunker.