Since its creation in 2017, the SCAF program—for Future Combat Air System—has crystallized a singular political and industrial ambition: that of designing, on a European scale, a new-generation combat aircraft, accompanied by its drones and its weapons, all evolving within a system of systems. Presented as a pillar of the construction of a European defense, it was intended to symbolize, in the same way as the A400M or the MGCS, the capacity of the nations of the Old Continent to unite in the face of the security challenges of the XNUMXst century.
But after seven years of laborious negotiations, schedule slippage, and recurring industrial tensions, the SCAF program is at the point of choosing. While Phase 1B was finalized after final industrial and political efforts, structural differences—whether doctrinal, capability-based, or economic—have not disappeared. They are even becoming more acute as the 2045 deadline becomes an essential strategic obstacle for Paris.
Behind the official communication curtain, the fault lines are now visible: the respective weight of manufacturers in the governance of the program, the sharing of critical technologies, the level of capability maturity required by 2045, compatibility with French nuclear and naval constraints… so many parameters that make each step forward more delicate, and each compromise more costly.
In this context, the year 2025 appears to be a decisive turning point. Either the three partners manage to fundamentally restructure the industrial organization of the program, to preserve the commissioning deadline demanded by France; or the SCAF program will implode, victim of the contradictions it has carried within it since its inception.
This lucid observation does not call into question the project’s founding ambition. But it does require a careful examination of its possible trajectories, achievable balances, and the consequences of each future decision. Because at this stage, the status quo is no longer an option.
The SCAF program faces the 2045 deadline
Announced with great fanfare in 2017 by Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program aimed, from the outset, to materialize a common European ambition around the development of a new generation combat aircraft, beyond the Rafale French and Eurofighter Typhoon German-British. In 2018, the signing of the first cooperation protocol between France and Germany confirmed this dynamic, setting a target for commissioning by 2040.
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The logic adopted at that time favored a balanced industrial distribution between the two nations, based more on a political desire to demonstrate Franco-German unity than on a pragmatic analysis of respective industrial skills. Each country was thus to pilot strategic technological pillars, in a so-called “equipotential” logic, that is to say, ensuring each an equivalent role in the governance and design of the program, regardless of the know-how or experience accumulated by the industrialists concerned.
Spain’s entry into the program in 2019, however, led to an initial readjustment of this logic. Indeed, the entire industrial distribution in the upstream phases of the program (Phase 1A, then 1B) had to be renegotiated, which led to a cascade of delays. Added to this were the disruptions linked to the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as a series of industrial blockages, particularly between Dassault Aviation and Airbus DS, around the management of the NGF (Next Generation Fighter) pillar.
A direct consequence: the initial deadline of 2040 automatically slipped to 2045, not without causing tensions in Paris. This slippage was all the more worrying for the French authorities because this deadline is closely linked to the strategic timetable for renewing the airborne component of France’s nuclear deterrent.
Indeed, this component is based on two complementary capabilities: the Strategic Air Forces (FAS), implemented by the French Air and Space Force, and the Nuclear Naval Force (FANu), deployed on board the aircraft carrier Charles-de-Gaulle by the French Navy. However, the Rafale currently in service in these two components will have to be replaced by 2045, otherwise the operational efficiency – and therefore the credibility – of this component will be rapidly eroded in the face of evolving threats and access denial systems.
In other words, where Spain and Germany could tolerate a possible calendar slippage by counting on the Typhoon, or even on the F-35, France had no room for maneuver. This divergence of strategic constraints has profoundly changed the nature of the debate around the SCAF, particularly from the end of 2024.
Faced with this potential impasse, Paris has therefore clearly indicated to its partners that a further shift beyond 2045 would call into question its participation. In return, France has proposed a refocusing plan, based both on a more constrained design of the NGF aircraft, and on a return to an industrial distribution based more on the “Best Athlete” principle, i.e., management by manufacturers with the most advanced expertise on each critical pillar.
Dassault Aviation claimed 80% of NGF pillars to return to the deadline for France
Obviously, Paris did not limit itself to a verbal warning to recall the crucial importance of the 2045 deadline. In accordance with its tradition of structured negotiation, the French authorities presented to their German and Spanish partners an action plan intended to ” return to the line “, in other words, to realign the SCAF program on its initial trajectory, in terms of both timetable and strategic coherence.
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For readers unfamiliar with this language, ” return to the line ” is an expression from air navigation. It refers to the moment when an aircraft, having deviated from its planned route—represented by a graduated line on the air navigation chart—manages to re-enter it, respecting the planned time milestones. A particularly telling analogy, when it comes to a military aviation program.
To do this, France has proposed returning to a tighter configuration, more in line with its own strategic vision, structured around a more compact NGF, and above all industrial management entrusted to the “Best Athletes”, in other words to the most competent and experienced companies in each pillar.
In this dynamic, the initial reactions of the partners were mixed. Spain expressed clear opposition to this refocusing, perceived as a challenge to the balances resulting from Phase 1B. Germany, on the other hand, adopted a more open stance, asking the relevant manufacturers to formalize their recommendations through a consolidated report. The latter was quickly validated by the three states, and the main manufacturers set to work on the task.
It is in this context, and with the clear desire to align the program with the French requirement of 2045, that Dassault Aviation formulated its own proposal: to assume up to 80% of the work on the pillars directly falling under the NGF, namely the airframe, the engine (in partnership with Safran), and the sensors (in conjunction with Thales), based on a consolidated Best Athlete logic.
This figure of 80%, taken up by certain German media as proof of a desire for French capture, is in reality neither a political requirement nor a unilateral French position. It is a figure put forward by Dassault in the context of a report commissioned by the program itself, as a technical recommendation aimed at meeting the 2045 deadline, drawing on the proven skills of the French BITD.
In other words, it is a structured negotiating posture, designed to break the industrial impasse in which the SCAF program seemed to be mired for several years – and not a French diktat aimed at unbalancing cooperation.
A negotiating position to re-establish the balance of the Neuron program
Since the submission of the report mentioning the 80% contribution to the NGF, Eric Trappier has spoken publicly to clarify the underlying logic. According to him, it was not a matter of imposing a unilateral model, but rather of returning to an industrial architecture comparable to that successfully applied within the framework of the Neuron program, launched in 2007.
nEUROn combat drone test campaign
This stealth combat drone demonstrator, conducted under French leadership, remains to this day one of the most successful European benchmarks in advanced industrial cooperation in the field of combat aeronautics. On this program, Dassault Aviation handled 55% of the critical tasks, including the airframe, flight control, and the drone piloting system. This level of responsibility reflected the aircraft manufacturer’s historical expertise in the complete design of combat aircraft.
This balanced organization, driven by real-world expertise, enabled the Neuron program to meet its deadlines, budget, and technological ambitions, while ensuring the seamless integration of several European partners—including Italy, Spain, Sweden, Greece, and Switzerland. In this respect, Neuron sets a structuring precedent, often cited as an example for the rational governance it established in a complex cooperation context.
The objective defended by Dassault Aviation, Safran, and Thales within the framework of the SCAF is in line with this same logic. These three manufacturers are currently the only ones within the program to have the expertise and operational experience in their respective fields: the airframe, the engine, and the sensors. Entrusting each of them with responsibility for the corresponding pillar is therefore not an abuse of a dominant position; it is a requirement for technical consistency and control of calendar risks.
Moreover, the model proposed by France is not at all about a global capture of industrial value. The plan outlined only aims to entrust the management of critical pillars to those capable of carrying them out within the given timeframe. It also provides for a structured and balanced sharing of the other pillars: Germany would be entrusted with responsibility for systems of systems, support drones and munitions, while Spain would take control of the electronic warfare and simulation segments.
In summary, the French proposal is based on a rational management architecture, proven by experience and respectful of the industrial ambitions of each partner – without sacrificing the strategic requirement of the 2045 deadline.
A 30% price reduction for the SCAF program by applying this model
The application of the model proposed by France – based on the principle of skills-based management – would lead to three major structural effects, both on industrial performance, the timetable, and the overall costs of the SCAF program.
The first and most strategic effect would be to guarantee the firm deadline of 2045, essential for the timely renewal of the airborne component of the French deterrent. This deadline, let us remember, does not allow any compromise for Paris, due to the scheduled expiry of the Rafale F5 carriers of ASN4G, both within the Strategic Air Forces (FAS) and the Nuclear Naval Air Force (FANu). Guaranteeing this milestone requires being able to rely on manufacturers who already have mastery of the technologies concerned, without having to go through a gradual increase in skills or uncertain transfers of know-how.
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However, France benefits from a base of experience that is unrivaled among the three partners in the program. It has designed five combat aircraft over the last fifty years — Mirage F1, Super Étendard, Mirage 2000, Mirage 4000, Rafale — four of which have had a full operational career, and three (F1, 2000 and Rafale) were exported in more than 300 copies. Each time, all the critical components (airframe, engine, avionics, sensors, weapons) were of national design and production.
Conversely, Germany and Spain have only participated as co-prime contractors in multinational programs: Tornado for Berlin (20%), Eurofighter for both countries (20% for Germany, around 10% for Spain). In this context, their contribution has often concerned secondary elements or subsystems, without steering the overall architecture, in the hands of Great Britain. These differences in industrial trajectory now weigh heavily on the ability to meet the deadlines for such a complex project.
Especially since, in a trinational program, States cannot unilaterally impose technology transfers between competing industrial companies, even less so when these are listed companies like Dassault Aviation, Safran or Thales, even when the State is a shareholder.
Therefore, an “equipotential” distribution of responsibilities by pillar, regardless of initial skills, mechanically imposes delays: teams must be trained, technological building blocks replicated, interfaces established, etc. All these obstacles could have been avoided by immediately applying a model based on existing skills.
The second effect of such a refocusing would be to produce a lighter, more compact NGF with equal performance, drawing on Dassault Aviation’s recognized expertise in aerostructural optimization. With a comparable configuration, aircraft designed by Dassault – notably the Mirage 2000 or the Rafale — in fact display a performance/weight ratio that is systematically more favorable than their British or American equivalents. This not only reduces development constraints, but also lowers the level of demands placed on the engine.
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A more compact aircraft doesn’t need an 18-ton engine with afterburner. It can make do with a 12- or 13-ton turbojet, which is simpler to design, more robust, and easier to maintain. For example, the F-135’s F35, with its 18-ton thrust, is significantly more maintenance-intensive than the Super Hornet’s F414, which only develops 10 tons, yet is efficient in its field. Reducing the NGF’s weight and drag would therefore make it possible to secure the engine pillar and control its calendar risks.
Finally, and this is a direct consequence of the first two points, such a refocusing would make it possible to reduce the overall design cost of the NGF, and more broadly of the SCAF program, by up to 30%. By reducing lead times, limiting the interfaces to be managed, relying on already mature building blocks, and optimizing weights, the French industry could produce an aircraft more quickly, with fewer risks and lower additional costs.
For France, this streamlining would not necessarily translate into a reduction in its budgetary contribution, since its industrial share would increase from 33% to over 50% in critical areas. On the other hand, Germany and Spain could halve their financial contribution, while maintaining a respectable industrial share—around 25%. This would therefore represent a shared optimization lever, not an exclusive capture by Paris.
This is what made the Neuron program so strong, as it intelligently distributed responsibilities based on skills, while ensuring each partner received consistent industrial development. Similarly, the Tornado and Eurofighter programs relied on variable geometry models, in which industrial contribution was not strictly correlated with funding.
Ultimately, the governance model proposed by France is not hegemonic: it is intended to be pragmatic, efficient, and compatible with current strategic constraints. It is still necessary for its partners to agree to challenge the dogma of mathematical fairness, preferring functional fairness, a sine qua non condition for the SCAF to remain a credible program by the 2045 deadline.
A model that will be difficult to accept for Berlin and Madrid
The fact remains that Germany and Spain’s adherence to the model proposed by Paris remains, at this stage, highly uncertain. For both capitals, participation in the SCAF program has always been part of a logic of technological catch-up and of structuring skills development in their defense industrial and technological bases (BITD), well beyond what had been allowed by previous cooperation.
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This strategic choice is based on an observation shared since the beginning of the 2000s: previous European programs, such as the Tornado and then the Eurofighter Typhoon, were dominated by Great Britain, both financially, technologically and politically. Thus, if the RB-199 turbojet of the Tornado, then the EJ200 of the Typhoon, were indeed co-developed with MTU (Germany), Avio (Italy) and ITP Aero (Spain, EJ100 only), control of the technological heart, in particular the hot section, remained in the hands of Rolls-Royce, without any real transfer of industrial sovereignty.
It was precisely this situation of technological dependence that Berlin and Madrid intended to overcome with the SCAF. In their view, a more balanced distribution of industrial responsibilities would accelerate the transition of their aeronautical industries towards critical skills—airframe design, propulsion, sensors, data fusion—that had previously been partially mastered or absent.
However, the return to a governance model based on the “Best Athlete,” however rational it may be, directly clashes with these ambitions. It presupposes not only a partial abandonment of the initial objectives of increasing the power of their BITD, but also the acceptance of an implicit hierarchy of competences between partners, on which neither Berlin nor Madrid can politically capitalize.
The British GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme) and its combat aircraft, the Tempest fighter, provide a telling counter-model. While the joint venture bringing together London, Rome, and Tokyo is based on tripartite governance (33,3% each), the distribution of funding and, ultimately, industrial benefits, will not be equitable.
Great Britain alone plans to finance £14,5 billion (around €16,8 billion) by 2035, compared to just €8,5 billion for Italy. Japan, for its part, is responsible for nearly 40% of the costs. In fact, the final distribution could be structured around a 40% – 40% – 20% ratio, a far cry from the perfect balance displayed in official statements.
This precedent makes the French model all the more difficult to sell. The British example shows that, to build skills, massive investment is required, including by accepting a minority position in the upstream phases, with the prospect of a more gradual, but potentially more autonomous, industrial return in the long term.
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Added to this is a significant economic factor: both Germany and Spain have embarked on a rapid cycle of rearmament, with investment increases promised over time. Berlin is aiming for a defense effort exceeding 3% of GDP, while Madrid plans to reach 2% this year, compared to 1,3% in 2024. These budget increases are not only aimed at equipping the forces, but also at structuring sustainable industrial ecosystems, capable of producing with increasing autonomy.
In this context, the French proposal appears to be a strategic misstep for both countries. Not only does it relegate Germany and Spain to a peripheral role in the pillars deemed strategic, but it also undermines the main objective of their participation: to accelerate industrial sovereignty in the field of defense aeronautics.
Added to this is a sensitive political dimension. The tensions of recent months, particularly around the issue of technology transfers, particularly concerning Safran, have fueled a growing form of mistrust. In Spain, several political and industrial leaders have publicly expressed their frustration with the French attitude, perceived as reluctant to share certain critical know-how. In this climate, the proposal for increased management by French manufacturers could be interpreted not as a demand for efficiency, but as a unilateral lock-in.
In short, the window of political and industrial acceptability of the French model appears very narrow today, especially at a time when Berlin and Madrid are specifically planning to capitalize on the SCAF to transform their BITD. It is therefore not out of the question that, faced with this fundamental divergence, the two capitals will consider alternative paths, whether it be joining another program or building their own strategy, with other partners.
What alternatives are there for the three participants in the SCAF program?
The question then arises of potential alternatives for Madrid, Berlin and also for Paris, if the SCAF programme were to implode under the pressure of ambitions and imperatives that have become too divergent to constitute a sufficient common base.
France: A purely national SCAF, but less ambitious due to lack of resources
At first glance, France appears to be in a more favorable position than its two European partners if the SCAF program were to implode. It is, in fact, the only country with a complete and sovereign industrial ecosystem—from the airframe to sensors, including engines and munitions—capable of designing a new-generation combat aircraft within a timeframe compatible with national capability requirements.
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This observation is widely shared within French political and industrial circles. For several months, many voices have been heard, within Parliament, in the specialized press, within the defense industry, and within the armed forces, calling for a refocusing of the program on a strictly national basis. According to this line, such a refocusing would ensure compliance with the 2045 timetable for the renewal of the airborne component of the deterrent, while preserving French strategic and industrial interests.
But such a shift would not be without consequences, nor without major sacrifices. Today, the projected budget for the SCAF program, in its tripartite version, exceeds 70 billion euros for all design phases, including approximately 23 to 25 billion to be covered by France by 2045. Spread over 15 years, this commitment represents approximately 2 billion euros per year.
This amount may seem manageable in light of the budgetary projections of the Ministry of the Armed Forces — €50 billion in 2025, €67 billion forecast in 2030 — but it enters into direct competition with other major programs, also considered priorities: launch of the SNLE 3G program, accelerated design and production of the Rafale F5 and UCAV combat drones, launch of the new generation combat tank (MGCS or national equivalent), ramp-up of naval programs (PANG, FDI, Patrollers), increase in the ammunition stockpile, or even the creation of a credible space defense pillar.
For comparison, 2 billion euros per year is the equivalent of two first-rate frigates, a nuclear attack submarine (SNA), 100 heavy tanks, or 20 Rafale Additional F5. However, French budgetary room for maneuver is already severely constrained, and the Ministry of the Armed Forces is struggling to meet the objectives set by the 2024–2030 LPM, particularly regarding production volumes of land equipment and the regeneration of stocks.
Extrapolating, it’s easy to see that a purely national program would cap out at around €3 billion in annual funding, or €45 billion over 15 years. This is roughly the budget envelope of the British GCAP program, but this only concerns the design of a combat aircraft in the strict sense, excluding combat drones, connected effectors, the combat cloud, electronic warfare, or real-time multi-source fusion—all of which are fundamental building blocks in the system-of-systems architecture targeted by the SCAF.
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In other words, by remaining alone, Paris could certainly develop an advanced combat aircraft, but probably not a future air combat system, as initially envisioned by the French capability doctrine. Technological ambition would therefore be mechanically revised downwards, to the benefit of sovereignty and industrial resilience, but to the detriment of an advanced operational integration capacity.
Furthermore, a frequently discussed hypothesis would be to bring in non-European partners to share costs while retaining industrial control of the project. India, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Greece are regularly cited among the potential strategic clients of the sector. Rafale, and could, in an alternative scenario, be called upon to participate in the development of a French NGF.
However, here again, schedule constraints severely limit this option. To ensure initial operational capability by 2045, the design window will close in two to three years, leaving little time to build a balanced cooperation architecture, while simultaneously conducting commercial negotiations on other critical areas, such as the Rafale F5 or drone programs.
In summary, a national FCAS would be technically feasible and politically viable, but financially constrained and technologically less ambitious. It would offer Paris the guarantee of timelines, sovereignty, and the minimum capability required for deterrence. But it would significantly distance it from the idea of an integrated, interconnected, multi-layered system, which nevertheless remains the core of the FCAS operational concept as initiated in 2017.
Germany: a NGAD-Deutschland with Rheinmetall and Lockheed Martin?
Contrary to what one might believe, Germany’s situation is not necessarily worse than France’s if the SCAF program were to fail. It is sometimes suggested that Berlin could then join the British GCAP program, led by the London–Rome–Tokyo trio. However, this hypothesis, while attractive in theory, proves to be highly impractical in practice.
Indeed, the industrial governance of the GCAP is now locked in place. The joint venture created between the three founding countries, involving BAE Systems, Leonardo, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, has already agreed on the distribution of costs for the demonstrator’s development phase, with financial and industrial balances that are difficult to reconfigure.
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Even if an opening to new partners is mentioned—particularly with regard to Riyadh—this would be aimed more at consolidating export outlets than at reorganizing the design chain. In other words, even a German entry could only offer Berlin a very peripheral industrial role, much less than that currently envisaged within the framework of the SCAF.
Should we conclude that Berlin is in a strategic impasse? Not necessarily. Because Germany has a unique, if unusual, alternative: relying on a non-state industrial partner to design its own aircraft. And in this area, one name naturally stands out: Lockheed Martin.
Excluded from American sixth-generation programs (NGAD, B-21, CCA), the American manufacturer nevertheless has recognized expertise in the design of stealth fighter aircraft, as demonstrated by the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II. There is little doubt that Lockheed, currently excluded from major tactical aviation projects in the United States, is actively seeking to rebound internationally to keep its development lines open. As such, the prospect of a strategic partnership with Berlin could represent a valuable opportunity, both industrially and politically.
This hypothesis is not purely speculative. Lockheed Martin’s CEO recently publicly mentioned the project of a “Super F-35,” developed in partnership with international clients, particularly in the Middle East (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia). It would therefore be entirely conceivable that Germany would explore this avenue, within the framework of an NGAD-Deutschland program, based on a modular architecture derived from the NGAD program, but adapted to German industrial and strategic specificities.
In this scenario, Rheinmetall would emerge as Lockheed Martin’s natural industrial partner. Already closely linked to the American group on the F-35A and HIMARS programs, the Düsseldorf-based giant has established itself in just a few years as the central player in the consolidation of the German BITD. It is also no longer hiding its ambitions in aeronautics, with projects for MALE drones, anti-aircraft defense systems, and, of course, the production of parts for the Luftwaffe’s F-35As.
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Conversely, Airbus Defence & Space would likely be marginalized in such a configuration. Due to its binational governance, and especially its strong French component, the company would risk finding itself at odds with German strategic interests in a program partly managed from Bethesda. In reality, a Berlin–Lockheed–Rheinmetall cooperation would constitute a true technological shortcut for Germany, allowing it to cross a critical threshold of competence, without depending on a more experienced… but also more restrictive European partner.
Naturally, the aircraft resulting from such cooperation would only be partially “German.” But the issue for Berlin would not be so much immediate industrial sovereignty as the accelerated rise in power of its technological base, against a backdrop of massive budgetary investment made as part of its post-Zeitenwende strategic reorientation.
Above all, such a strategy would allow Germany to reasonably postpone the capability deadline to 2050, relying in the meantime on the capabilities of the F-35A, of which it has ordered 35, and potentially on a future “Super F-35” version. This would loosen the temporal stranglehold of the SCAF, which has closed under the French constraint of 2045, and which could appear, in Berlin, both premature and unbalanced.
It is therefore legitimate to ask: have exploratory discussions already begun between Berlin and Lockheed Martin? There is no way to say for sure, but everything suggests that alternative scenarios are on the table within the German Ministry of Defense and the Federal Chancellery, so as not to find themselves dependent on French choices or the vagaries of a weakened tripartite program.
Spain: NGAD-D or TAI Kaan to develop the Spanish aeronautical BITD?
With a smaller industrial base than France or Germany, and less budgetary capacity, Spain could appear to be the most vulnerable player in the event of the SCAF program’s failure. However, the recent history of the Spanish defense industry shows that Madrid has considerable resources for recovery and a real capacity to forge partnerships tailored to its objectives.
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A significant precedent can be found in the S-80 submarine program. Designed to succeed the S-70s in service with the Spanish Navy, the S-80 program suffered a critical setback in the early 2010s, with a design error that seriously compromised the buoyancy of the first vessel.
Faced with this impasse, Navantia and the Spanish government called on Lockheed Martin to reevaluate the submarine’s architecture and resize its systems. This salvage partnership, atypical at the time, not only allowed the program to be revived, but also initiated a significant technological transition for the Spanish naval BITD.
This precedent clearly illustrates Madrid’s ability to call on external partners when a critical capability leap is at stake. Therefore, while Spain probably does not have the means to design a new-generation combat aircraft on its own, it could very well consider participating in a program led by another nation. A NGAD-Deutschland scenario, in which Madrid would join Berlin as a junior partner in a project led by Rheinmetall and Lockheed Martin, thus appears plausible. It would allow Spain to maintain a minimal industrial base in the aeronautics sector, while gaining access to cutting-edge technologies.
However, this scenario is neither exclusive nor necessarily the most politically attractive. Madrid also has another strategic lever, much less explored in European discussions: its growing relationship with Turkey. The two countries have indeed strengthened their industrial cooperation in recent years, as evidenced by the construction of the Turkish aircraft carrier. Anadolu, based on the platform of the Juan Carlos I. Furthermore, Spain is currently at the heart of discussions concerning the sale of 40 Eurofighters Typhoon in Ankara, a highly sensitive issue in the current geopolitical context.
Furthermore, Madrid recently announced that it had selected the Turkish Hürjet advanced trainer aircraft for the training of its future fighter pilots, thus ruling out European (Italian M-346, Czech L-39NG) and American (T-7A) platforms. This choice is not insignificant: it reflects an unprecedented level of strategic trust in Ankara, and could foreshadow a more structural rapprochement in the aeronautical field.
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However, Turkey is currently developing its own 5th generation fighter, the TAI Kaan, a program that is progressing rapidly, with a first prototype already in test flights. If this program manages to reach the critical milestones within the announced deadlines, it could become a credible basis for technological cooperation for the Spanish BITD, particularly within the framework of a European Kaan exportable.
In this context, the possibility of Spanish participation in the Kaan program is not unrealistic. Turkish industry, historically open to technology transfers—in proportions far greater than those in the Anglo-Saxon or French context—could offer Spain a platform for accelerated skills development, within a bilateral or trilateral framework that is potentially more flexible than large multinational cooperation programs.
From a capability perspective, the aircraft would offer the Ejército del Aire a credible successor to the F/A-18, while consolidating its industrial autonomy. From a strategic perspective, it would strengthen the diplomatic balance that Madrid seeks to maintain between its European commitments, its transatlantic ties, and a growing ambition to expand into the Mediterranean region.
In other words, abandoning the SCAF would not necessarily lead Spain into a capability or strategic vacuum. Rather, it would lead it to formalize choices that have been peripheral until now, but that are structuring for its industrial future. And while the Turkish option is not without risk—in terms of technological dependence, NATO compatibility, or political stability—it nonetheless remains an opportunity for rapid transformation, at a potentially moderate cost, within a time horizon compatible with Spanish capability needs from 2035 onward.
A firm decision on the future of SCAF must be taken before the end of 2025
The SCAF program has now reached a tipping point. After seven years of negotiations, exploratory phases, and industrial compromises, the period of uncertainty is coming to an end. By the end of 2025, a structural decision will have to be made: either relaunch the program by readjusting its technical and industrial balances to secure the 2045 deadline and strictly perpetuate the program, or acknowledge an irreversible divergence between the partners, each then exploring an alternative consistent with its own interests.
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For Madrid, this deadline is closely linked to the planned replacement of the F/A-18 Hornets, whose retirement is anticipated for 2035, and even more so to that of the AV-8B Harrier II, whose maintenance is becoming increasingly complex. The time window for deciding on future air-naval combat capabilities is therefore limited. In the absence of visibility on the trajectory of the FCAS, the risk of an off-program, or rather extra-European, choice, such as the F-35A/B, is becoming an increasingly tangible hypothesis—with structural consequences for the industrial and strategic coherence of the European partnership.
Berlin, for its part, also has to deal with a scissors effect: on the one hand, current orders for Typhoon and F-35A, although ambitious, are not enough on their own to establish the conventional air supremacy sought by Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his Defense Minister Boris Pistorius; on the other hand, alignment with the growing capability requirements of NATO and Washington, in terms of interoperability and projection, requires rapid and clear choices on 5th and 6th generation capabilities. However, in a favorable budgetary context, persistent uncertainty surrounding the SCAF could encourage Berlin to explore more mature or bilateral alternative options, particularly with the United States.
But it is undoubtedly on the Paris side that the urgency is greatest. In fact, France is the only one of the three nations that cannot tolerate a calendar slippage beyond 2045. Not only does this deadline condition the renewal of the airborne component of nuclear deterrence, in its two versions (FAS and FANu), but it also constitutes a strategic milestone for the entire French air defense posture, both in Europe and in distant areas of interest.
Added to this constraint are two structural requirements: the implementation of a naval-compatible version of the future aircraft, to guarantee the permanence of the fighter component embarked on the successor to the Charles-de-Gaulle; and the native integration of nuclear missions into the NGF architecture, both in terms of doctrine and performance. These parameters, imposed unilaterally by France, are not shared by Berlin and Madrid, and create a gap in strategic constraints that quickly makes any structural inertia unsustainable.
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Clearly, if the SCAF program fails to firmly align itself with the 2045 deadline—in its development phase as well as in its industrial decisions—France will have no choice but to switch to a national alternative, as was already announced for the naval version and nuclear capability, with an obvious risk of tiring, or rather saturating, European partners. Above all, this switch must be confirmed by the end of this year, to ensure the effective start of development before 2027, and to have a fully operational aircraft by 2045.
Indeed, the second half of 2025 will be a moment of reckoning for the SCAF program. Either it manages to reorganize itself around a balanced but demanding strategic compromise; or it will implode, opening the way to divergent and competing trajectories, putting an end, at least temporarily, to the initial ambition of a unified European air combat system.
Conclusion
From its launch in 2017, the SCAF program carried within it as many promises as contradictions. The promise of European technological sovereignty in the face of the rise of American and Asian players; the promise of structuring cooperation between two and then three major nations on the continent; and finally, the promise of a future air combat system capable of competing with the best global standards by 2045. But also profound contradictions: between political ambitions and industrial constraints; between divergent capability logics; and above all, between a display of strategic unity and rarely aligned industrial and doctrinal ulterior motives.
Seven years later, these contradictions have reached a critical threshold. The 2045 deadline, now untouchable for Paris, serves as a revealer of the structural divergences between the three partners. France must imperatively guarantee the renewal of its airborne nuclear component, as well as its embarked air and naval superiority. Germany seeks above all to structure its BITD and strengthen its political and industrial role in Europe. Spain, for its part, intends to take a technological step forward to assert its partial sovereignty in strategic programs.
This tipping point is neither accidental nor sudden. It results from a series of errors and renunciations, fueled in equal measure by the defensive postures of certain industrial players, national political influence games, and faulty programmatic management, systematically avoiding difficult trade-offs.
[Summer 2025] SCAF Program: No, France did not demand 80% of the NGF! 32
Too often, the most structuring decisions have been deferred, in the hope—perhaps illusory—that a cooperative dynamic would eventually emerge on its own. One might wonder whether this planned slide toward an impasse was not, at heart, a political calculation aimed at reaching a point of no return without having to fully assume it.
And here we are. The SCAF program now faces a binary alternative: either a profound reorganization, based on the reality of know-how and strategic timetables, or an inevitable and rapid disintegration, in favor of national or bilateral trajectories. Each of these options will have major consequences, whether in terms of sovereignty, capability coherence, or influence on the international scene.
But whatever happens in the coming months, the SCAF episode will mark a turning point. It will either mark the birth of a European defense finally structured around its strategic and industrial realities, or it will be a clear recognition of the failure of a cooperation model that has long been designed for image, not efficiency.
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