Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Jessica Sobieski, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 23, 2025, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast. 

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on August 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues to spell out Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rejection of a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on US President Donald Trump’s preferred timeline. The Russian MFA rejected on August 22 Western media accusations that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is undermining the peace process with his recent statements, including by rejecting Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[1] The Russian MFA explicitly stated that Lavrov’s statements represent the Kremlin’s position, which the MFA stated is “distinguished by consistency” and has not changed following the August 15 Alaska Summit. The Russian MFA reiterated Lavrov’s statements from August 20 and 21, which stated that any serious discussions about Western security guarantees for Ukraine that do not “take into account” Russia’s own “legitimate concerns” are a “road to nowhere.” The Russian MFA also reiterated Lavrov’s August 21 statement that Russia favors collective security guarantees that are “truly reliable” and cited the Russian demands presented to Ukraine during the 2022 Istanbul Ukraine-Russia negotiations as containing such guarantees. Those demands would have permanently prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed severe limitations on the Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military assistance without imposing any restrictions on the size or capability of Russian forces.[2] The Russian MFA stated that Lavrov’s August 20 and 21 statements are consistent with Putin’s August 15 demand that any peace agreement address the “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has repeatedly defined as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[3] The Russian MFA emphasized that Lavrov’s “statements confirm the theses” about the war in Ukraine that Putin has “repeatedly voiced.” The Russian MFA stated that Putin sets Russian foreign policy and Lavrov, as the foreign minister, implements Russian foreign policy according to Putin’s directive, and that Lavrov is therefore not undermining Russian foreign policy objectives.[4]

The Russian MFA’s statement that Lavrov is not undermining the peace process because Lavrov is executing Putin’s foreign policy directives is an accurate assertion that Putin himself is the impediment to the peace process. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations and maintains his long-standing war aims that amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation.[5]

Putin continues efforts to obtain concessions from the United States in the US-Russian bilateral relationship without meaningfully engaging in the peace process in Ukraine. Putin stated on August 22 that Trump’s assuming the presidency in 2025 was a “light at the end of the tunnel” in US-Russian bilateral relations and that his meeting with Trump in Alaska was “very good and meaningful.” Putin stated that he hopes this meeting is part of “first steps” for the “full-scale restoration” of US-Russian bilateral relations and that the onus is now on the United States to restore relations because the United States is bound by certain international agreements.[6] Putin has long sought to restore bilateral US-Russian negotiations to divert attention from the war in Ukraine, obtain concessions from the United States, and continue his war in Ukraine without further sanctions or other penalties.[7] Putin continues to emphasize the prospects for improving bilateral US-Russia relations even as the Trump administration insists that Putin meet Zelensky to conclude a peace before restoring relations. Putin evidently still hopes that Trump will engage economically with Russia even if he offers no meaningful concessions to make peace. Putin’s concern is likely growing under the threat of further US sanctions on Russia and its allies that could hinder Russia’s war effort.

Trump expressed frustration with the current state of peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Trump stated on August 22 that he is not satisfied with “anything” related to the war in Ukraine and that “we’re going to find out” the Russian and Ukrainian positions about peace negotiations “over the next two weeks.”[8] Trump stated that he will decide whether or not to impose “massive sanctions, massive tariffs, both” or to “do nothing” during this two-week period, but that for now he will wait and ”see what happens next.” Trump added that he told Putin that he is “not happy” about the August 21 Russian strike on the “Flex” US electronics manufacturing company in Mukachevo, Zakarpattia Oblast, which caused a massive fire and injured at least 19 employees.

Ukrainian long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian oil refineries, Western sanctions, and struggling refinery modernization efforts in tandem are impacting Russia’s fuel reserves and could threaten oil revenues. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on August 21 that Russia is on the brink of a gasoline crisis as wholesale gasoline prices have surged since early August 2025 as wholesale gasoline production is down nearly 10 percent since January 2025.[9] Kommersant reported that Russia produced an average of 123,600 tons of gasoline per day in January 2025 but now produces an average of 102,200 tons per day – a 17.3 percent decrease. The Moscow Times reported on August 18 that the national index for AI-92 gasoline (roughly equivalent to regular unleaded gasoline) has increased to 71,500 rubles (roughly $890) per ton and AI-95 gasoline (roughly equivalent to premium unleaded gasoline) rose to 80,430 rubles (roughly $1,000) per ton, 1.3 percent and 2.2 percent increases respectively, within a single day.[10] The Moscow Times reported that AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline prices have risen by nearly 38 percent and 49 percent respectively since the start of 2025. The Kremlin extended a temporary ban on August 14 on gasoline exports through September 2025 for producers and through October 2025 for non-producers in an effort to blunt the price surge.[11]  

Kommersant noted that Russian experts are blaming unscheduled oil refinery shutdowns, likely alluding to the impacts of Ukrainian long-range drone strikes, lengthy oil refinery repairs, and insufficient gasoline reserves in Spring 2025.[12] A source in the oil industry told Kommersant that oil refinery repairs take months to complete, that refineries with imported equipment can require particularly lengthy renovation periods, and that authorities have postponed several oil refineries’ scheduled maintenance due to sanctions limiting the supply of necessary equipment to Russia. Another source in the fuel industry informed Kommersant that authorities expect to conduct maintenance on up to 10 large oil refineries in the Fall of 2025, which will exacerbate gasoline shortages. Kommersant noted that a number of regions in Russia and occupied Ukraine are struggling with fuel shortages. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov told Kommersant that occupied Crimea primarily has a shortage of AI-95 gasoline, due to reduced production rates and logistical disruptions, as most of the gasoline is transported via roadways that are vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky noted that occupied Zaporizhia Oblast is experiencing a shortage of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline due to the threat of Ukrainian strikes against fuel trains. The Kremlin relies on oil revenue to fund its war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s inability to effectively navigate critical energy sector issues challenges Russia’s ongoing narrative that Russia is capable of withstanding Western economic pressures and financing its war effort for the long-term.[13]

The Kremlin is likely escalating its hybrid campaign involving GPS and communications jamming against NATO states bordering Russia. Bloomberg reported on August 23 that European states along Russia’s western border and the Baltic Sea, including the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Sweden, have raised concerns to international transport organizations over sharp increases in GPS and signal jamming and spoofing in recent months as well as an increase in Russian electronic warfare (EW) installations in border areas.[14] Bloomberg obtained a letter that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland sent to the International Telecommunications Union on June 23 about the worsening radio-navigation interference due to increased Russian jamming. Bloomberg reported that an Estonian regulator stated that 85 percent of flights in the country experience signal disruption and there has been a rapid increase in the “spoofing” of faulty coordinates. Bloomberg reported that Lithuania accused Russia of orchestrating a spike in GPS jamming in late July 2025, causing a 22-fold increase in incidents of GPS jamming in the country since about July 2024. Bloomberg reported that the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, and Poland also expressed concern about Russian EW in a letter to the International Civil Aviation Organization in early July 2025, and the organization expressed “grave concerns” about flight safety because of EW jamming. A Lithuanian communications official told Bloomberg that the disruptions from Russian EW jamming are expanding further into these states and that interference is also affecting sea, shipping, and ground communication towers. Pro-Ukrainian investigative outlet Tochnyi reported on August 15 that satellite imagery indicates that Russia is constructing a Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA), a military-grade antenna array designed for radio intelligence or communication, just south of Chernyakhovsk, Kaliningrad Oblast and 25 kilometers from the Polish border.[15] Tochnyi assessed that a CDAA at this location may allow Russia to monitor NATO communications in Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea, communicate with submarines operating in the Baltic Sea or northern Atlantic Ocean, and support passive intelligence gathering. ISW previously observed reports that Russian EW interference significantly impacted flights in the Baltics, Poland, and Finland, particularly in early 2024 including when Russia likely jammed the satellite signal of a Royal Air Force (RAF) jet transporting then-UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, his staff, and select journalists back to the United Kingdom from Poland in March 2024.[16] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is pursuing a hybrid campaign directly targeting NATO states, including using GPS jamming and sabotaging military logistics in NATO members’ territory, and is likely using EW innovations developed in the war in Ukraine against NATO states at this time.[17]

A former Russian servicemember confirmed ISW’s assessment that echelons of the Russian military command on the battlefield are actively ordering subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). Independent Belarusian outlet Vot Tak published an interview with a former servicemember of the Russian Somali Battalion (9th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District) who described his experience executing five Ukrainian POWs in occupied Karlivka, Donetsk Oblast in May 2024.[18] The soldier reported that his assault platoon commander, callsign “Vedma” (“Witch”), issued an order over radio to execute the POWs, and the soldier described the process of removing the armor of the Ukrainian POWs, finding a concealed area to conduct the execution, and executing the POWs from behind. ISW has observed a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs in violation of international law.[19]

 

Key Takeaways:

  • The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues to spell out Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rejection of a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on US President Donald Trump’s preferred timeline.
  • The Russian MFA’s statement that Lavrov is not undermining the peace process because Lavrov is executing Putin’s foreign policy directives is an accurate assertion that Putin himself is the impediment to the peace process.
  • Putin continues efforts to obtain concessions from the United States in the US-Russian bilateral relationship without meaningfully engaging in the peace process in Ukraine.
  • Trump expressed frustration with the current state of peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian oil refineries, Western sanctions, and struggling refinery modernization efforts in tandem are impacting Russia’s fuel reserves and could threaten oil revenues.
  • The Kremlin is likely escalating its hybrid campaign involving GPS and communications jamming against NATO states bordering Russia.
  • A former Russian servicemember confirmed ISW’s assessment that echelons of the Russian military command on the battlefield are actively ordering subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
  • Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued to attack in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 23 but did not advance.[20]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reiterated an August 22 claim that Russian forces, particularly Russian airborne (VDV) and aerospace (VKS) forces, are accumulating near Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo) for future operations.[21]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Sumy City near Stepne, north of Sumy City near Novokostyantynivka and Kindrativka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Varachyne on August 22 and 23.[22]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating near Stepne.[23] Elements of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in northern Sumy Oblast.[24]

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City on August 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks near northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 22 and 23.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk and near Synelnykove.[26]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced roughly 800 meters toward Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[27]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Ambarne on August 22 and 23.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Myrove, Zapadne, and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk toward Kolodyazne; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 22 and 23.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on August 22 and 23.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hrekivka and Novomykhailivka (southeast of Borova).[33]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Hrekivka is a contested “gray zone.”[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Izyumske (southeast of Borova).[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Serednie (northwest of Lyman).[36] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces collapsed a pocket west of Dibrova (east of Lyman).[37]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil on August 22 and 23.[38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Torske.[39]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 23 that there was an explosion at a house where a Russian military transport, including six soldiers, had stopped in occupied Kalynove, Luhansk Oblast on the evening of August 22.[40] The GUR reported that the explosion killed three servicemen, injured two servicemen, and destroyed three Russian military vehicles, including one vehicle transporting ammunition. The GUR implied that unspecified pro-Ukrainian actors deliberately caused the explosion.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces only control roughly 80 percent of Serebryanka (north of Siversk), indicating that Russian forces likely do not completely control the settlement.[41] ISW assessed that Russian forces had seized Serebryanka as of August 16.[42]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; north of Siversk near Serebryanka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne and Fedorivka on August 22 and 23.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Hryhorivka is a contested “gray” zone.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Serebryanka.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne; and west of Chasiv Yar near Mykolaivka and toward Verolyubivka on August 22 and 23.[46]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted a large strike against Ukrainian storage facilities and positions in Kramatorsk (part of the Ukrainian fortress belt northwest of Chasiv Yar) with Geran-2 drones, unguided glide bombs, TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems, and other unspecified weapon systems.[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Chasiv Yar direction.[48]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk) and east of Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[49] Additional geolocated footage published on August 18 indicates that Russian forces advanced northwest of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed on August 23 that Russian forces seized Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[51] Another Russian milblogger rejected this claim and instead claimed that Russian forces have only seized half of Kleban-Byk.[52]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Bila Hora; northwest of Toretsk near Kostyantynivka, Pleshchiivka, Poltavka, Katerynivka, Nelipivka, and Popiv Yar and toward Stepanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 22 and 23.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in and around Kleban-Byk.[55] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[56]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[57]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on August 23 that Russian forces advanced in northern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), east of Myrnohrad, and in Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[58]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Nove Shakhove and Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Mayak, Krasnyi Lyman, Shakhove, and Zapovidne; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk toward Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 22 and 23.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Dorozhnie, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and Kucheriv Yar (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[60]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on August 23 purportedly showing a FAB-500 strike against Ukrainian forces near Bilytske.[61]

Order of Battle: The Russian MoD credited elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) for the seizure of Pankivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), which the MoD claimed Russian forces had seized as of August 20.[62] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrnohrad.[63] Drone operators of the AIRNOMAD Detachment and of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[64]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[65]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka, Zelenyi Hai, and Tovste on August 22 and 23.[66]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 23 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Temyrivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), east of Novoivanivka (south of Velykomykhailivka), and toward Zaporizke.[67]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Olhivske, Vilne Pole, Temyrivka, Zaporizke, and Shevchenko on August 22 and 23.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Zaporizke.[69] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Oleksiivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City) 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Temyrivka, Olhivske, (both northeast of Hulyaipole), and Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[71]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Temyrivka, Olhivske, and Malynivka on August 22 and 23.[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Chervone (east of Hulyaipole).[73] Drone operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA) and BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to the Russian Airborne [VDV] Forces) and assault elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[75]

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, Kamyanske, and Stepove on August 22 and 23.[76]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Stepove is a contested “gray zone.”[77] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that Russian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast are regrouping for further assaults and are conducting strike and reconnaissance operations near Plavni and Kamyanske.[78]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center and elements of the Russian 247th VDV Regiment are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk.[79] Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and artillery and drone elements of the 7th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Orikhiv direction.[80]

  

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on August 22 and 23 but did not advance.[81]

Voloshyn stated that Russian forces increased the number of daily drone operations in the Kherson direction to between 250 and 270 first person view (FPV) and other strike drones, which Voloshyn said is similar to the amount of strike drones Russian forces operate in the Zaporizhia direction per day.[82]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[83]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 49 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primosko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[84] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 36 drones over northern, eastern, and central Ukraine and that 13 drones struck seven locations in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Sumy oblasts.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/publikacii-i-oproverzenia/oproverzenia1/nedostovernie-publikacii/2042660/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/64258

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082025

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525

[4] https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/publikacii-i-oproverzenia/oproverzenia1/nedostovernie-publikacii/2042660/

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625 https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081725

[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77837

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525

[8] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-national-guard-new-york-chicago-august-22-2025/ ; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-russia-putin-zelenskyy-meeting-ukraine-war-tentative-rcna226522 ; https://suspilne dot media/1097222-ce-serjozne-risenna-tramp-vagaetsa-sodo-zaprovadzenna-sankcij-proti-rf/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rB9gbCxb_K0

[9] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7975798?tg

[10] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2025/08/18/drone-strikes-on-refineries-push-russias-gasoline-prices-to-record-highs-a90271

[11] https://t.me/government_rus/23049

[12] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7975798?tg

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025

[14] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-23/baltic-states-seek-to-fight-back-against-russian-signal-jamming

[15] https://tochnyi dot info/2025/08/putins-ears-within-europe-uncovering-kaliningrads-hidden-antenna-array/

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2024

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124

[18] https://vot-tak dot tv/88454002/rossiiski-sturmovik-rasstrelyal-soldat-vsu; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/22/vot-tak-boets-rossiyskogo-batalona-somali-zayavil-chto-po-prikazu-komandovaniya-ubil-pyateryh-plennyh-voennyh-vsu

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102424

[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146

[21] https://t.me/severnnyi/4913; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2025

[22] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32853; https://t.me/rybar/73038; https://t.me/dva_majors/78095; https://t.me/wargonzo/28698; https://t.me/severnnyi/4913

[23] https://t.me/severnnyi/4913

[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32853

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149; https://t.me/dva_majors/78095

[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32840

[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32840

[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/78095; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/332965

[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/28698

[31] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41249

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146

[33] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41236 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41265

[34] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41236

[35] https://t.me/voin_dv/16577 ; https://t.me/Sinkovka_Kupyansk/13724

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/55811; https://t.me/mod_russia/55809 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32876; https://t.me/epoddubny/24500 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66939

[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/78095

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28698 ;

[39] https://t.me/tass_agency/332885

[40] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6699 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/23/vybuh-na-tot-luganshhyni-likvidovano-okupantiv-yaki-skoyily-voyenni-zlochyny-u-buchi/ ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1097456-na-okupovanij-lugansini-vibuhom-zniseni-rosijski-vijskovi-pricetni-do-voennih-zlociniv-u-buci-gur/; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vybukh-na-luhanshchyni-znyshcheno-rosiiskykh-voiennykh-zlochyntsiv-vorozhi-pikapy-ta-bukhanku-z-bk.html

[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41240

[42] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32844; https://t.me/rybar/73043; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32867

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32844

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41240

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66948

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32880; https://t.me/milinfolive/155273; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/22554 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32864; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32884 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98339 ; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28484 ; https://t.me/PROSVETINFORM/16755 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66931

[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32853

[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9852; https://t.me/Legion_W_Bat1/970 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9856 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/312076

[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9854; https://t.me/bbs117_army/77

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/55811 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55810; https:// t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32876; https://t.me/epoddubny/24500 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24816 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66939

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41271

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/78095 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32844 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28698 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66948

[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/28698

[55] https://t.me/tass_agency/333048 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177040

[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/78103; https://t.me/dva_majors/78104

[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9855; https://t.me/jaguar1bop/613

[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/28698; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32239; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41220

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41220; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32836; https://t.me/dva_majors/78095; https://t.me/wargonzo/28698

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32836;https://t.me/wargonzo/28698

[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/55804

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/55822

[63] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14207

[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32865; https://t.me/sashakots/55761

[65] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32248

[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183

[67] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32245; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32838

[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183

[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32838

[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/16584

[71] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32251; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32242

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146; https://t.me/wargonzo/28698; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32881

[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/16581

[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/16579; https://t.me/dva_majors/78114

[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32881

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12879; https://t.me/dva_majors/78095; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32844; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32881; https://t.me/wargonzo/28698;

[77] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41247

[78] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1097102-rf-provodit-peregrupuvanna-svoih-vijsk-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-volosin/

[79] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7492

[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32853

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28183; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28149; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28146

[82] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1097102-rf-provodit-peregrupuvanna-svoih-vijsk-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-volosin/

[83] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/9468

[84] https://t.me/kpszsu/40918