Vera Spyrakou argues the pressures of war are driving Europe to act as a political union, even in domains once thought beyond its reach.
The meeting in Brussels on 17 August between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, ahead of Zelensky’s pivotal visit to Washington, was widely reported as another demonstration of solidarity between Ukraine and the European Union.
Yet on closer analysis, the encounter also represents something more profound: a crystallisation of Europe’s increasingly federal mode of collective action. At stake is not merely the question of continued European support for Ukraine in its war against Russia, but the institutional forms through which that support is being coordinated.
For the first time since the war began in February 2022, it appears that all European leaders are moving in lockstep, not as a loose coalition of the willing, but as a united bloc that projects a single voice. In political theory terms, such unity carries the contours of a federal moment, in which the pressure of external conflict compels fragmented polities towards deeper integration.
The Brussels discussions: the priorities
Zelensky and von der Leyen identified three core priorities during their talks in Brussels. First, that a ceasefire should be viewed as the necessary precondition for any subsequent diplomatic negotiations. Second, that there should be the provision of substantive security guarantees for Ukraine, beyond rhetorical support or temporary military aid. And third, that sanctions against Russia must be maintained to erode its capacity for future military aggression.
These points of convergence may appear pragmatic, even minimal. Yet their significance lies in the fact that they were publicly articulated as common ground between Kyiv and the European Commission. That the Commission itself, not merely the Council or individual member states has emerged as a central interlocutor is noteworthy.
The European Commission has traditionally been seen as an economic and regulatory body, not a foreign policy actor. Its visibility in the realm of war, peace and security suggests an institutional stretching of the EU into areas associated with statehood.
US guarantees and Europe’s response
A second element of the Brussels discussions deserves attention: von der Leyen’s endorsement of Donald Trump’s proposal to extend US security guarantees to Ukraine, modelled on NATO’s Article 5 principle of collective defence. Until recently, such a statement would have seemed improbable, not least because Trump himself had been consistently sceptical of making US security commitments in Ukraine.
Zelensky was quick to describe the proposal as a “significant change”, though he also noted the absence of details regarding its implementation and scope. For Europe, what matters is not so much the content of the American proposal than the manner in which it was received.
By publicly welcoming the possibility of American-style guarantees, von der Leyen effectively positioned the EU as an active participant in shaping the transatlantic security architecture. This marks a departure from past practice in which the EU typically deferred to NATO or to bilateral relations between Washington and European capitals. The Commission, in short, is no longer a bystander: it is acting, however incrementally, at the political centre of European security.
From the “coalition of the willing” to EU-wide coordination
Perhaps the most significant development came not in the talks between Zelensky and von der Leyen, but in the subsequent videoconference by the so-called “coalition of the willing” on 19 August. This informal grouping has until now represented the core of European states most committed to supporting Ukraine, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet we are now seeing a transition from an informal coalition to a formalised act of collective leadership.
Since 2022, Europe’s unity on Ukraine has often been described as vulnerable to intra-European disagreements on sanctions, energy dependence or the pace of military assistance. But the trajectory is now towards a Europe that no longer acts through fragmented blocs, but through a single voice.
Such developments resonate with theories of integration that emphasise the role of crises in producing “spillover” effects. What began as coordinated sanctions and emergency financial aid has spilled over into joint procurement of arms, common energy diversification strategies and now potentially into collective security stances. Each step draws Europe closer to acting as a federation in practice, though not yet in law.
The federalising logic of crisis
Political history offers many examples of crises serving as accelerators of integration. In the US, the Civil War consolidated federal authority; in Germany, wars of unification under Bismarck produced the modern state. The European Union, though distinct from these examples, is not immune to this dynamic.
The war in Ukraine has created a set of conditions that both demand and reward federal-style coordination. First, the military threat from Russia is external and existential, transcending the capacity of any single member state. Second, the economic repercussions of the war, particularly in energy markets, are distributed across Europe, necessitating collective solutions. Third, the geopolitical stakes of Ukraine’s survival are such that Europe’s global credibility would collapse in the absence of unity. Together, these conditions render fragmented responses untenable.
Thus, while no formal treaty change has occurred, the EU’s practice increasingly resembles that of a federation: sanctions regimes negotiated and enforced collectively, external representation articulated at the level of the Commission President, and common political positions endorsed by all heads of state and government.
The Trump test
Zelensky’s visit to Washington on 18 August fell short of producing a major agreement. Yet for Europe, the fact that Zelensky arrived in Washington backed by a visibly united Europe was just as significant as the outcome of the discussions.
This unity underpins Zelensky’s bargaining power. While earlier in the war, Ukraine often appeared dependent on fragmented and sometimes conditional European support, today Zelensky can credibly present himself as the representative of a European consensus. That consensus, in turn, strengthens Europe’s own voice in transatlantic deliberations, positioning it not merely as a junior partner but as a bloc capable of shaping outcomes.
A federal Europe?
The EU’s treaties remain intergovernmental in crucial respects, particularly in foreign and security policy, where unanimity still formally prevails. Yet empirically, the events of the last few weeks reveal a Europe that increasingly behaves as if it were federal: acting collectively in matters of war and peace, speaking with one voice on external security and coordinating leadership across all member states.
The pressures of war are driving the EU to act as a political union, even in domains once thought beyond its reach. If, as history suggests, federations are often born not in moments of calm but in crises of survival, then the war in Ukraine may be remembered not only as the struggle for Ukraine’s independence but also as the crucible in which a federal Europe began to take form.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: © European Union
