On 22 July 2025, the Crown Estate (Wales) Bill passed unopposed through report stage in the House of Lords. The Bill, which seeks to devolve the management of the Crown Estate in Wales, was introduced as a Private Members’ Bill in the Lords by the former leader of Plaid Cymru, Lord Wigley. This is by no means the first attempt at such a scheme – Plaid Cymru introduced an identical Bill in the Commons in 2021, as well as tabling amendments to the Crown Estate Bill 2024-25 to attempt to effect devolution to Wales – but serves as an important moment in recent developments on the devolution of the Crown Estate in Wales. At the time of writing, the UK Government remains opposed to the devolution of the Crown Estate in Wales. This short analysis will consider the increasing territorialisation of the Crown Estate, will assess the arguments for and against its devolution in Wales, and will analyse the scheme for devolution put forward under the Bill.

The Crown Estate and the Territorial Constitution

The Crown Estate refers to the land and property that is owned by the reigning Monarch ‘in right of the Crown’ but which is formally managed as a trust estate by an independent body, known also as the Crown Estate. Prior to the devolution of the management of the Scottish Crown Estate in 2016, the Crown Estate was administered as a single UK-wide entity, under the authority of a Board of Crown Estate Commissioners, who draw their authority from the Crown Estate Act 1961. The Estate in England, Wales and Northern Ireland continues to be administered under this system, whilst the Scottish Crown Estate Act 2019 formally established Crown Estate Scotland to manage the Crown Estate in Scotland on behalf of Scottish Ministers. As a statutory corporation, the Estate is independent from the Monarch and Government, but has the UK Treasury as its sponsor department to answer for its affairs in Parliament. The Treasury also holds general responsibility for oversight of the Crown Estate’s business, including the creation and review of its governance framework. An equivalent duty is held by Scottish Ministers regarding the governance framework of Crown Estate Scotland.

While the Crown Estate continues to be a reserved matter in Wales, recent amendments made to the Board of Commissioners have introduced a degree of territorial representation in its governance structure. Under section 6 of the Crown Estate Act 2025 (amending Schedule 1 of the 1961 Act), the Board now includes an additional three Commissioners with Special Responsibility (hereafter ‘CSR’) for Wales, England and Northern Ireland, respectively. The Act defines their role as to ‘give advice about’ their respective territorial areas, and requires that an individual should not be appointed to the respective roles for Wales and Northern Ireland without the relevant devolved Ministers having first been consulted. This development mirrors the previous example of a CSR for Scotland that was created by the Scotland Act 2012 and which existed until the devolution of the Scottish Crown Estate under the Scotland Act 2016.

While the appointment of CSRs for England, Wales and Northern Ireland serves as an important development in the territorialisation of the Crown Estate’s governance structure, they did not appear in the initial Bill introduced in July 2024. Despite being first recommended in regard to Wales by the Silk Commission Part II report in 2014, the provision for the three territorials CSRs was only included in the Crown Estate Act 2025 as a result of an amendment sponsored by Lord Hain in the House of Lords. While the UK Government agreed to the amendment, its omission from the original Government Bill would suggest that the Government did not see sub-state representation as a priority when constructing that Bill.

The Crown Estate in Wales

The Crown Estate holds a diverse portfolio of assets in Wales which includes 65 per cent of the foreshore, over 50,000 acres of land, and the majority of the seabed out to 12 nautical miles. It also holds general rights over the seabed and subsoil out to 200 nautical miles, including natural resources and the licensing of offshore energy projects, but excluding fossil fuels. In particular, the Estate’s marine assets in Wales are of high importance in the development of the UK’s renewable energy sector, including existing and new offshore windfarms in the Celtic Sea, as well as the UK’s first underwater carbon capture and storage facility in the Irish Sea. The economic importance in the development of these assets is reflected in the recent changes in the stated value of the Crown Estate’s assets in Wales, which increased from £95 million in 2020 to £853 million in 2023.

Under the current framework, revenues gained from Crown Estate assets in Wales are paid into the UK Consolidated Fund. There is no mechanism for this money to be returned to Wales on a proportionate basis. Wales receives funding either where money from the UK Consolidated Fund is spent in relation to reserved matters, or through Barnett consequential funding when money from the UK Consolidated Fund is spent in England on matters that are devolved to Wales. This is different from the position in Scotland, where revenues from Crown Estate Scotland are paid into the Scottish Consolidated Fund which is administered by the Scottish Government. In the period between 2017 and 2024, the operations of Crown Estate Scotland returned £270 million to the Scottish Government.

In reference to the above, the devolution of the Crown Estate has, over the past decade, become an increasingly prominent issue in Welsh politics. In May 2023, a YouGov poll commissioned by YesCymru showed that 58 per cent of respondents supported the devolution of the Crown Estate. In June 2025, Gwent became the last of the twenty-two Welsh Local Authorities to pass a motion in favour of devolving control of the Estate’s assets in Wales. Similar levels of support have been exhibited by some of the main political parties in Wales: Plaid Cymru has included the devolution of the Crown Estate as a manifesto commitment since 2011, and Welsh Labour have added their support in both the Cooperation Agreement (2021) and the subsequent Programme for Government (2021-26).

The decision by Welsh Government to request the devolution of the Crown Estate earlier this year, however, added friction to the relationship between Welsh Labour and the UK party. Despite initial proclamations that political congruency in Cardiff Bay and Westminster would deliver a ‘new partnership based on respect, cooperation and delivery’, the matter of the Crown Estate adds to a series of recent events that have exhibited disagreements between the two governments. Reflecting this divide, earlier this year the First Minister of Wales, Eluned Morgan, sought to refresh Rhodri Morgan’s ‘clear red water’ between Welsh Labour and the UK party by introducing a new slogan: ‘the red Welsh way’. Subsequent developments on the devolution of the Crown Estate in Wales have exposed a growing schism between the two Labour governments, with both parties appearing steadfast in their positions. Ahead of the upcoming Senedd election in May 2026, this will be a matter of heightened concern for Welsh Labour which has until recently sought to promote the benefits for Wales of political congruency between the two governments in Cardiff Bay and Westminster. 

The Arguments For and Against Devolution

The arguments advanced in favour of the devolution of the Crown Estate in Wales are essentially twofold. First, the position set out by the Welsh Government focuses on the ‘necessity’ of holding competence over the management of the Crown Estate and its assets for the delivery of other policy areas. The Welsh Government’s Programme for Government frames it within a wider objective to ‘pursue devolution of powers needed to help reach net zero, including management of the Crown Estate in Wales’. Other recommendations have followed a similar line. For example the Independent Commission on the Constitutional Future of Wales (2024) grouped the devolution of the Crown Estate within its recommendations on energy policy, to ‘ensure Wales can maximise its contribution to net zero and to the local generation of renewable energy’.

Second, there are wider political considerations including the desire for Wales to receive additional powers to manage its natural resources. As observed by Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the essence of this debate is framed more as a ‘hearts-and-minds issue’ and is connected to a much deeper political culture in Wales. On the one hand, there is the comparative element that wishes to match the devolution of the Crown Estate in Scotland. On the other hand, there is also the deeper history of grievance felt by some groups towards resource extraction – historically coal and water – and its political, social and economic impact in Wales.  

Countering these points, the UK Government’s opposition to the devolution of the Crown Estate is centred around the potential economic and political risks of dividing the Estate’s assets. During the House of Commons Public Bill Committee on the Crown Estate Bill 2024-25, the UK Government explained its view that the division of the Estate would ‘risk creating further complexity and delay our drive for energy security and net zero at a time when simplicity and accelerated deployment are essential’. This runs contrary to the Welsh Government’s view outlined above, and draws in theoretical and practical considerations as to which level of government is best placed to manage the Estate’s assets, including its response to net zero.

The Crown Estate (Wales) Bill

The substance of the Bill includes only two clauses, that closely follow the precedent set by Section 36 of the Scotland Act 2016. The similarity between the two frameworks provides an opportunity to use the experience in Scotland to foresee how the scheme for devolution may operate in Wales.

If enacted, the provisions under the Crown Estate (Wales) Bill, in its current form, would amend the Wales Act 2017 to insert a new clause 52A that would do three main things. First, clause 52A(1) would provide for a transfer scheme that would allow the UK Treasury to transfer the existing functions of the Crown Estate Commissioners in Wales to Welsh Ministers. While the Bill specifies that any transfer scheme would require the consent of Welsh Ministers before taking legal effect, it leaves the timescale and initial substance of any transfer scheme to the discretion of UK Ministers. Second, clause 52A(2) would amend Schedule 7A of the Government of Wales Act 2006 to remove the management of the Crown Estate as a general reservation. This would allow the Senedd to pass legislation to regulate the management of a Welsh Crown Estate, similar to the Scottish Parliament’s enactment of the Scottish Crown Estate Act 2019. This would provide the possibility for different management practices and statutory duties to be created in Wales; for example, Crown Estate Scotland now operates under a statutory framework that requires greater consultation with local communities, and a more robust sustainable development duty, relative to the rest of the UK. Third, clause 52A(9)-(11) would amend the Civil List Act 1952 in order to provide that revenues from Crown Estate assets in Wales would be paid into a Welsh Consolidated Fund to be administered by the Welsh Government.  

Returning briefly to consider the transfer scheme in more detail, the provisions in this area would appear to be the more contentious element of the new Bill and are potentially problematic from a Welsh perspective, for three reasons. First, should the UK Government agree to support the Bill, the construction of clause 52A(1) – ‘the Treasury may make a scheme’ – imposes no fixed timescale on when such a scheme would be delivered. While the construction of this clause is a direct copy of section 90B(1) of the Scotland Act 1998, its operation in Wales is potentially problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, it allows considerable discretion to UK Ministers to decide when devolution should occur which, due to the UK Government’s current lack of support for the devolution of the Welsh Estate, may result in such a scheme being delayed indefinitely. In other legislation, Plaid Cymru has attempted to address this issue by (unsuccessfully) attaching a duty to create a transfer scheme within a two year period after the provisions come into force.

On the other hand, as recently acknowledged by the Welsh Government, any transfer scheme would also require the necessary preparatory work in order for it to be successful and to mitigate any economic risks associated with changes to land or marine asset management. Lord Thomas attempted to address this issue through an unsuccessful amendment at Committee Stage which proposed a statutory obligation on the UK Treasury to create a transfer scheme no earlier than three years, and no longer than seven, after the passage of the Bill. While unsuccessful, the construction of this clause would have addressed the risk of delay, as well as also providing sufficient time for a transfer scheme to be agreed and implemented.

Secondly, the provision for a transfer scheme also affords considerable discretion to UK Ministers to determine the substance of any transfer of powers. As Aileen McHarg has explained in reference to the devolution of the Scottish Crown Estate, the nature of the transfer scheme in Scotland excluded certain assets in which the Crown Estate has a partial interest, and still permits UK Crown Estate Commissioners to make commercial investments in Scotland, with the management of such assets continuing to be reserved. While it would be possible to prevent a similar division of assets taking place in Wales by directly amending Schedule 7A of the Government of Wales Act 2006 – automatically devolving all ministerial functions over Crown Estate Commissioners to Welsh Ministers – this would also remove the recognised advantage of a transfer scheme for reducing economic risk, as recognised in the previous paragraph.  

Thirdly, in matching the effect of section 90B of the Scotland Act 1998, the Bill would also create certain constraints on the administration of the transferred assets so that they continue to be managed as an estate (or estates) in land (clause 52A(8)) on behalf of the Crown (clause 52A(5)). Moreover, under clause 52A(12), any transfer scheme must also include such provision as the Treasury consider ‘necessary or expedient’ in regard to national security, defence, telecommunications, or energy infrastructure. Under the Scottish Transfer Scheme, this includes a general duty to notify and/or consult UK Ministers and the Treasury on matters relating to one of the above listed areas. While this clause is necessary for the protection of UK-wide interests, it also demonstrates how the management of a devolved Crown Estate cannot be framed simply as a matter of exclusive competence and would continue to reflect a degree of concurrent interest.

Concluding Remarks

With a Senedd election approaching in May 2026, the question of the devolution of the Crown Estate in Wales is likely to remain a prominent political issue. This short analysis has shown how the devolution of the management of the Crown Estate in Scotland provides a clear precedent should such a scheme be agreed to in Wales. However, it has also been shown how seeking to simply match the approach set out under the Scotland Act 2016 may not be entirely advantageous, and may require some reworking in a Welsh context.  While the future of the Crown Estate (Wales) Bill seems uncertain, its provisions raise a number of interesting points for consideration of how such a scheme may be implemented in Wales.

My thanks to Michael Gordon, Paul Scott and Paul Evans for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Gareth Evans is a Lecturer in Law at Swansea University.

(Suggested citation: G. Evans, ‘The Devolution of the Crown Estate in Wales’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (4th September 2025) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/))