Allies are not offering real security guarantees, but a porcupine strategy could produce an agreement that lasts
As Ukraine’s European allies debate their contribution to a potential settlement of the war, it’s a good moment to learn from past mistakes.
Russia’s attack on Ukraine and capture of Crimea in 2014 showed the perils of a security vacuum. Afterwards, Ukraine relied on Russian goodwill and an assortment of bilateral and multilateral agreements from allies that offered little deterrence against future aggression. Moscow maintained its tradition that only deals backed by hard power or serving its interest are worth respecting – and duly escalated to a full-scale invasion in 2022.
The lesson is clear. Only a deal backed by hard power from the Ukrainian side would have a chance to survive and deliver a stable settlement.
Before considering the substance of a realistic security framework it is helpful to clarify some terminology. Though Ukraine and its partners use the word “guarantees” to describe their future security relations, they are actually discussing commitments.
True security guarantees are based on expectations that other countries would fight for you in case of need. Proper mutual defence clauses are the basis of Nato and bilateral agreements between the US and its Asian partners, Japan and South Korea. Promises to supply weaponry and ammunition, provide intelligence data and training, fund a military-industrial complex, or even station troops in a country as observers – are valuable security commitments that fall short of guarantees.
Ukraine will continue to press for eventual Nato membership, even though the alliance shows no readiness to grant Kyiv admission and risk war with nuclear-armed Russia. But the promise of an open door policy to Nato has value even if it will not realistically be implemented in the short term.
First, this is a sign of real sovereignty that Russia would like to deny within a conflict settlement – just as non-aligned Finland valued the option to join Nato in case of need. Second, the option to join Nato, which Kyiv raises time and time again, is a form of leverage over Western partners. This is our signal that our security should be properly aided – ideally within Nato – or otherwise through aid in the form of weaponry, data, training and money.
With the option of Nato membership preserved but distant, European partners should embrace the porcupine model.
The concept, that Ukraine should be made indigestible for Russia, was raised by the Biden administration in 2023 as an approach to safeguarding the country’s future.
A Tomahawk submarine-launched cruise missile on a test site (Photo: Corbis/Getty)
Ukraine as a true porcupine should be able to exercise deterrence by denial. That means it should have the ability to defeat groups of Russian forces in border battles, which in turn requires capabilities for modern close and deep battles with deep strike capabilities.
The first part requires a peacetime army of 250,000-300,000 with a prepared reserve that could swell the ranks above one million soldiers armed according to the combat experience of 2022-2025, properly trained, and led by competent officers.
The second part is even more critical. Ukraine must possess capabilities to deny Russia rear sanctuary, where it conducts business activity for revenue and generates combat power to direct against Ukraine. Within his Victory Plan unveiled last autumn, President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly asked for Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles with a 2,500km (1,553mile) range that can threaten all of European Russia.
The logic of such a request is straightforward and sound – Ukraine having the ability to credibly target the Russian deep rear would generate hard power. As part of a porcupine strategy, such deep strike capability could be achieved indigenously through partners’ funds and technologies.
A commitment to turn Ukraine into a true porcupine must be credible in both the Ukrainian population’s eyes and in Vladimir Putin’s perception. For Ukrainians to accept any settlement they must know that the chances of another round of Russian land grabs are minimised through an efficient security framework that was missing in 2014 and in 2022. Simultaneously, the Kremlin would finally receive a signal that any new attempt to defeat Ukraine would cost Russia both blood and treasure.
To meet that high bar, any agreements on a future security framework between Ukraine and its Western partners should be ratified by those countries’ parliaments, contains specific financial commitments for the next four or five years, and specify concrete forms of aid – such as weapons, data, training, troops on the ground – they are ready to give.
We should learn from the security deals signed last year between Ukraine and Western countries that offered some assurances over cash flow and weaponry but proved too vague to persuade Russia to cease its aggression.
Ukraine, a country traumatised by Budapest memorandum of 1994 that surrendered its nuclear weapons, and many other failed deals, can’t be expected to accept more vague commitments. Just 0.25 per cent of European GPD would be enough to make Ukraine into a proper porcupine through financing US arms for Ukraine, Ukraine’s military industrial complex, and European weaponry.
The ultimate success of such a scheme cannot be fully guaranteed given Putin’s irrationality. But Europe and Ukraine have no other choice to break the cycle of Russian aggression. Ukraine, which has managed to incur staggering losses on Russia during the war in a vital service to European security, deserves a chance to final build a secure future for itself.