European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas describes the concerns of Greece and Cyprus regarding Turkey’s possible participation in the bloc’s SAFE defense program as “legitimate,” but considers that the financial instrument is limited by the conditions contained in the relevant regulation regarding its use by third parties. However, she distances herself from the defense cooperation of individual EU member-states with Turkey, emphasizing that defense is a national responsibility.
On the occasion of her visit to Athens and Nicosia this week, Kallas spoke exclusively to Kathimerini about the importance of the European Union having not only a financial role, but also a substantial say in developments in the Middle East, and explained the challenges to making the bloc a geopolitical power and the reasons why Europe must continue its policy of sanctions against Russia – issues that dominated her contacts in the two capitals.
You have set making Europe a geopolitical power as a goal. Given the current rearrangement of the world order, the new US administration, and the various challenges that the Union is facing, how exactly do you envisage accomplishing this aim? Will the Union be able to fill the void of the US in specific regions?
You’re right that the world order is definitely changing, and it’s up to us in which direction it goes. The European Union is a fundamental supporter of the multilateral order and international law, which is under heavy fire right now, but we see around the world that we have a lot of allies, who also see the benefits of international law. So, we have a lot of allies that we need to really build on. Being a geopolitical power can come from two things, one is economic power, and the other is military power. So, we are not yet a military power, although we are increasingly becoming one, as all our member-states are investing more in defense, but we definitely have economic power, and we have to use it wisely, but we are a geopolitical power only if we are acting together. But when it comes to filling the void in terms of financing that the US is leaving behind, then it’s clear that we can’t fill this gap, and we have to be also very strategic about this, because it’s clear, it’s our taxpayers money, and the gap is very enormous that America is leaving behind when they withdraw their aid, for example.
For the time being the EU seems to be just supporting the US president’s peace efforts in Ukraine, which have not produced any tangible results yet. Does the Union with its like-minded allies have any concrete proposals on how Russia’s war against Ukraine could end?
We have had this plan all the time. I mean, that’s why we are acting in accordance with it. It has two sides. One is to support Ukraine so that they can defend themselves, and the other part of it is to pressure Russia through economic sanctions. And this is what we see is the only way to pressure Russia to come to the negotiation table; as long as that is not the case, there is nothing really to talk about. We see that the sanctions are working, that their economy is really in trouble, and wars also end when one party runs out the funds to finance it. So that’s why we need to continue and stay on course with our sanctions policy to deprive Russia of all the funds or the means they have to fund this war. So we have had this strategy and right now we see also that America is imposing sanctions. So, I think we are very on track with our strategy and with our like-minded partners.
You mentioned that the Union is not yet a military power, however, the EU has accelerated the last couple of months in unprecedented ways, decisions to finance and enhance its defense capabilities; however, given the current urgent needs of Ukraine, will the Union eventually end up buying more US weapons, subsidizing US arms programs, instead of producing its own?
There are two sides of it. One is that, yes, all the European countries are investing more in their defense. And of course we would want to see these investments all go to the European defense industry. But the other side of it is that the European defense industry is not able to provide all the capabilities currently that are needed. So considering the money that we bring to the table now, there is actually funding for both our own defense industry, or boosting our own defense industry, so that they would be able to deliver and at the same time, in the short term, also procure from outside. What we have proposed is also to combine member-states’ efforts to procure together, jointly, because there are some capabilities that are too expensive, too large for any member-state to procure on their own. So, we are trying to help that. But of course the ultimate goal is that our own defense industry is so strong that we are able to produce what we need here. Of course, it is not the case in the short term.
At the same time, the EU’s new defense financing instruments have attracted the interest of third countries like Turkey, which has tabled a relevant request to the Commission to participate in the SAFE program; given the non-alignment of Ankara with the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, as underlined again in this year’s progress report, how will the Commission respond to this request?
Well, as you know, in the SAFE program, there are limitations on outside actors participating here, and Greece and Cyprus have been raising this always, when we have discussions, that they have concerns about this. There is a limitation that it’s only 35% that can be bought outside. But I think the SAFE instrument is a very short-term instrument regarding the loans that member-states are taking. So, it is limited to the partners. They are limited to the conditions that have been put forward.
You’ve said that Greece and Cyprus express concerns every time this issue is raised. Are these concerns legitimate? And given the Union’s own foreign policy values and standards, how do you assess efforts by specific member-states to pursue bilateral defense cooperation with Turkey – for instance, the purchase of Eurofighters?
Of course defense is member-states’ competence. So member-states can really choose their own partners and how and from whom they procure when it comes to their own national funding. So it is up to the member-states to decide. Yes, all the concerns that member-states raise are legitimate because they are the member-states’ concerns. They don’t come from a vacuum and they come from their perspective – history and everything. So, of course, all the concerns that member-states express are taken very seriously.
Both Greece and Cyprus, and especially the latter, ahead of its upcoming EU presidency, will seek to give more attention to the East Med region. Given the numerous current challenges, how feasible is it for the Union to secure a role in the region?
This is extremely important, because the Eastern Mediterranean is our neighborhood, and whatever happens there has a direct effect on us. I think it was a Greek philosopher who said that our neighbor’s problems today are our problems tomorrow. So that’s why we definitely seek a role there, and the role can’t be paying for everything because the challenges are really enormous. We have to also be the ones who are around the table when it comes to discussions regarding Syria, regarding the future governance of Gaza, what happens in Iran. I think it’s clear that we have also a clear role in the Middle East, that it’s much larger than only being the ones who are paying for reconstruction, for example. So yes, the 360-degree approach for security is exactly that the threats can come from all sides, and we need to approach this together.
Since you mentioned that threats can come from all sides, will a Mediterranean flank be possible, as it is the case of the Eastern flank?
When we discussed with the defense ministers and we put together the defense roadmap, then we also identified four flagship projects. These were the projects that member-states really flagged and said that these are the priorities. It’s not limited, and that’s why, for example, the Drone Defence Initiative that was first supposed to be only for the Eastern flank is actually for all Europe, because we see drones being a problem in every region. I mean, the drones can take off from ships, for example, and disturb airplanes or airports, for example. So that’s why we actually expanded to this. The European drone wall actually covers all the other member-states. And, like I said, it is not limited to the flagship projects. When we had the discussion, it was also that all the member-states could propose additional flagships that they want to see as well, European projects.