Six of Leeds United’s 10 summer recruits are 6ft 1in or taller. As they were announced, one by one, it became clear physical attributes were one way the club’s hierarchy hoped to bridge the chasm to the Premier League.
If the best technicians were believed to be beyond a newly-promoted club’s transfer budget, perhaps taller and stronger athletes would be more attainable. Research carried out by the club’s data and recruitment departments had shown the top brass how much of an impact those physical attributes have had for clubs in the bottom half in the past.
And if set pieces were going to become another of the key ways United would level the playing field this season, bigger aerial threats were only going to help. As manager, Daniel Farke was always going to take the lead on how these new players would be used on the pitch, but there had to be synergy between him and the hierarchy on how they would get the best from the transfer targets they had.
Theoretically, Lucas Perri could be trusted to take command of his own penalty area, particularly under opposition deliveries. Jaka Bijol and Sebastiaan Bornauw, if selected, would provide a meaningful threat in the opposition area and hold their own in the Leeds box too.
Anton Stach had the profile to monster more diminutive opposition midfielders in the central battlegrounds where matches are won and lost. Then, in attack, Dominic Calvert-Lewin and Lukas Nmecha were clearly suited to taking in high balls, fighting off centre-backs and offering a launchpad for team-mates around them.
Even if the results had not always been there in the opening nine matches of the season, it’s fair to say Leeds performances ranged from decent to excellent, the clinical Arsenal masterclass aside. In these matches, one of the tenets of United’s success was the influence Calvert-Lewin had at the tip of the attack.
There was rusty promise in his full debut at Fulham, a goal at Wolverhampton Wanderers alongside intelligent, experienced hold-up play, but an almost complete package in the home games against Bournemouth and Tottenham Hotspur. Yes, there were good chances spurned in those Elland Road matches, but his all-around play gave the entire team a pivot to work off in the opposition half.
In previous analysis, The Athletic picked out the impact of this role from Calvert-Lewin, even without goals. It seemed to be the basis for a competitive campaign in the Premier League, but the performances in the last two matches, coupled with the unfortunate prior results, have sparked concern on the terraces.
In Friday’s press conference, ahead of Sunday’s Aston Villa game, Farke admitted his side were in the midst of their poorest run with two displays more than deserving of criticism. The away losses at Brighton & Hove Albion and Nottingham Forest were shadows of the fight shown prior to November.
How does the tactical outlook need to change for Leeds on Sunday at Elland Road? It has felt, in the recent 3-1 losses, like Leeds are not playing to their strengths nor bringing that gritty, aggressive, physically-dominant approach their summer strategy seemed to signal.
It is more complex than sending the ball long to Calvert-Lewin or Nmecha, but is that a simple, initial way to get Leeds back on track, further up the field and competing for second balls? The statistics show how distribution from the team’s goalkeeper has changed.
Leeds United goalkeeper distribution
Everton (h)
14
21.4
36.9
33.8
Arsenal (a)
20
25
40.7
49.1
Newcastle (h)
37
24.3
49.5
56.3
Fulham (a)
21
33.3
41.6
28.8
Wolves (a)
23
26.1
39.6
62
Bournemouth (h)
29
37.9
38.1
45.5
Tottenham (h)
18
22.2
36.4
46.9
Burnley (a)
9
22.2
30.9
9.7
West Ham (h)
27
40.7
42.2
44.3
Brighton (a)
11
18.2
29.6
10.1
Forest (a)
8
12.5
28.9
17.2
You can see how the quantity of launched goalkeeper passes (attempts beyond 40 yards) have declined in recent matches. Against Newcastle United, Fulham, Wolves and Bournemouth, these long balls ranged from 21 to 37 attempts. Then, in the last three away games, they have ranged from eight to 11 tries.
The average length of passes from Perri or understudy Karl Darlow has also dwindled. The average pass went beyond 35 yards until the trip to Burnley, though the West Ham United match, a priceless win, took it beyond 42 yards again.
These are basic insights into how Farke has been using his goalkeeper, but it does show how the behaviour has changed, mirroring the overall impression of how Leeds have played recently. The manager was asked about this distribution in this week’s press conference.
“We have our triggers, we have our principles (of) how to do so and I don’t want to speak too much in public about it because I don’t want to give too much information away to the opponents,” he said. “This was the problem in the last game days.
“Brighton, you normally expect them (to be) a high-intense pressing side, especially away (at The Amex). We made our plans in which moment we want to invite them, to bypass them, to be a bit more direct and then use (the fact) they play man against man in the last row.”
Daniel Farke has admitted Leeds are in poor form (Mike Egerton/Getty Images)
“The problem is, if you are 2-0 down after a few minutes, they change their whole processes. It’s more like they don’t open that much, they sit deeper and if you can’t invite them anymore, and you have to do more for the game, you can’t go more direct than we would perhaps normally do.
“It was the same against Nottingham. We go 1-0 up, I was thinking, ‘Great, this plays into our cards, now Nottingham has to open a bit more’ because they are normally not a side who goes into the pressing, but if you are 1-0 down in a home game, you have to go for it.
“Sadly, after 60 seconds, they equalised and if we could have transported the lead, you stretch them more, they go more for one against one in the last row and then you can go a bit more direct into the striker and bypass a few stages straight away.”
Farke has at least acknowledged how he may have wanted to go longer in these games if the opponent had pressed higher. The Burnley game was not mentioned, but the rationale may be the same because of how rigidly Scott Parker’s side sat back in that match.
On Forest, Farke made the point the hosts were virtually playing five at the back and it made no sense to put long balls into their third, where they would outnumber Leeds. Is there still some logic in going long under these circumstances, or would that be naive?
Could Leeds put more bodies, like the wingers and exterior midfielders, closer to Calvert-Lewin or Nmecha for knock-downs and fight through the crowd for those second-balls? Is that a feasible strategy for the sake of giving Leeds better territory?
Even in the matches where the striker was rarely sought, there was further proof of how it can work. Below, it is Bijol, rather than Perri, who elects to go long with his pass.
To Farke’s point, Brighton are found to be pressing high in this scenario and there is more room for Calvert-Lewin to move. He beats Lewis Dunk to the first contact and his flick is perfect fuel for Noah Okafor to work off.
The Swiss crucially beats Jan Paul van Hecke to the bounce and United are able to get away. Okafor’s cross needed to be better, with Calvert-Lewin attacking the box, but it showed how route one got Leeds into one of their rare, dangerous positions.
In this second snippet from Brighton, Leeds are seen playing short among their defenders, waiting to draw the home press. Sean Longstaff’s bounce pass to Bijol triggers Yankuba Minteh.
As Minteh sprints at the Slovenian, he goes deep into the home half, where Calvert-Lewin has beaten Dunk to the ball. In this instance, the No 9 cannot get the ball under control and it goes out of play, but you can see where Okafor is poised to feed off that ammunition if they get the bounce of the ball.
Nmecha’s goal against Forest also came from a direct pass and the successful fight for second balls that eventually unleashed Brenden Aaronson through the centre before assisting.
Here, Aaronson ends the move by winning a free kick, which comes to nothing, but it does show the way Leeds can benefit from cutting out the middle man. It’s 1-1 and the press is not especially high from the hosts, leaving Bijol the space to pick out his pass to Nmecha.
It’s actually Nikola Milenkovic who wins the header and he guides it towards Elliot Anderson, but Stach, the 6ft 4in German colossus, is there to nip in and win the ball. It’s playing the percentages and here, Stach does his job before feeding Aaronson to win that free kick from Murillo.
It’s not an exact science and Nmecha loses the header, but that long pass puts Leeds in the right areas to win the duels they signed players to win in the centre.
The alternative, as we have seen in the last two matches, is passing around the flanks and in front of the box without any thrust or guile or flair to break a defence down. Is brute force the way? Was this the summer plan they recruited for?