What is on offer, seemingly covered in Russian fingerprints, is a bad deal for Ukraine
Donald Trump is offering Ukraine what many people are saying is the world’s worst peace deal.
The deal on offer, seemingly covered in Russian fingerprints, is a bad deal for Ukraine. It cedes large swathes of Ukrainian land – both territory Russia has captured and that it doesn’t yet have, such as western Donetsk. It leaves Ukraine highly vulnerable to a Russian return in future, a limit on its armed forces of 600,000 troops (it currently has an army of around 900,000), the loss of the “Fortress Belt” Russia has been unable to capture, and no foreign troops on its soil or NATO membership or NATO troops on its soil.
And all this in exchange for a weak Russian commitment that “it is expected not [to] invade neighbouring countries”. If you think that sounds like entry-level stakes for a country on the UN Security Council and a former G8 member, you’d be right. Sadly, this isn’t close to being enough – Russia broke similar agreements made in 1994 and 2014-15. Ukraine has learned the hard way that legal promises don’t stop tanks.
So why would Trump push a deal widely seen as disastrous for Ukraine?
First, domestic promises. He campaigned on a pledge to end the war in 24 hours, repeated over 50 times since. A year on, his reputation as a dealmaker is on the line, especially with voters who value his America First policies.
Second, Trump wants the legacy of a peacemaker. He has repeatedly made clear he dislikes bloodshed and “endless wars” and potentially views a provocative initial draft as a way to kick-start negotiations.
Third, Trump has sympathy with strong leaders – think of his warm handshake with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, literally bringing him in from the cold.
Finally, there is a cultural gap: US diplomacy instinctively struggles to empathise with the underdog. As I’ve seen first-hand, even great US diplomats can have difficulty understanding why smaller countries spurn political or economic wins in exchange for pride or saving face.
Given Trump’s personal investment, Ukraine now faces intense pressure to respond positively, possibly as early as Thursday. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky quickly saw the risk that Ukraine stands to lose either “its dignity or a key partner” (the US). He has learned from his disastrous showdown in the Oval Office. He knows he can’t criticise the deal – or, worse, Trump. The best he can do is play for time by sounding positive, buttering up Trump and gumming up the negotiation process in working groups.
So if Zelensky can’t criticise the deal, who can? He will turn to his European allies. They can do what Zelensky can’t – flag critical areas where the deal doesn’t work. The G20 was the ideal forum to show solidarity: the best defence to Trump’s approach of divide and conquer.
This must be Zelensky’s Plan A: encourage European allies to urgently improve the deal before Kyiv is forced to make a choice. On the most optimistic reading, Trump’s plan has brought Russia to the table, a country which typically negotiates by giving nothing away until the final hour. Europe has reportedly drafted its own 28-point counter-proposal, pushing back on key points. Zelensky must be open to a deal that works.
But this is far from guaranteed. On the least optimistic reading, Russia really do believe they are in a position of strength, and have no need for further concessions.
At this point, Zelensky must turn to Plan B – his BATNA (or “best alternative to a negotiated agreement”). It’s a concept I know intimately from working on Brexit as Chief of Staff to the Cabinet Minister for EU Exit. Our job as civil servants was to build up the best credible alternative to a deal if we couldn’t get one.
In this case, there are two potential BATNAs. The best is to ensure Russia emerges with the blame for failure, thus preserving US goodwill – and their critical military and financial support. To achieve this, Zelensky must table a counteroffer good enough for the US to feel Russia should have accepted it (which, in practice, means negotiating in good faith).
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The second version is significantly worse for Ukraine, where Zelensky is judged to be responsible by Trump for derailing the talks. The bar for this is lower than you might think. Trump has repeatedly been clear that Ukraine must accept concessions, implicitly framing Ukraine as the weaker party. In this scenario, Ukraine could lose US economic backing and essential military support like battlefield intelligence, advanced weaponry, and air defences. While Europe has made progress on munitions production, it would require a huge step change in assistance to fill the gap. On some capabilities – like intelligence-sharing – there is simply no replacement.
This matters because either BATNA will require a return to fighting on the battlefield, with the tacit aim of bringing Russia back to the negotiating table under fairer terms (how long this takes will depend on Russia’s tolerance for casualties and financial losses). Without US support, pressuring Russia will be significantly harder to achieve – and maybe impossible. Ukraine losing the war would no longer be unthinkable.
So now, all eyes are on the Europeans. Can they secure Zelenskyy the concessions he needs? If not, can they help him show enough willingness to ensure Russia is seen as the spoiler? And, if not again, are they willing to make the sacrifices required to back Ukraine in the absence of the US? No wonder EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas sees this as a “very dangerous moment” for Europe. The stakes could not be higher. All eyes on Europe.