IntroductionSo just how resilient is red, white and blue?

The US-UK relationship is never secure. It is under strain from the Trump administration’s increasingly illiberal approach to global engagement. It is swaying from the Whitehouse’s rejection of multilateral commitments. And it is navigating the choppy waters that accompany the departure from the international rules-based order that have long underpinned transatlantic cooperation.

Needless to say, the alarming ‘America First’ trajectory that the US have taken under Trump has forced the UK government (and its citizens) to reconsider the sustainability of the special relationship. At the same time, deep pre-existing Anglo-American entanglements preclude the possibility of an easy exit.

Since World War II, American and British leaders have continually invoked their “special relationship.” This close partnership has been sustained for decades by the two countries’ shared interests and a mutual commitment to a liberal international order.

The Anglo-American relationship has grown into a deeply rooted framework of cooperation encompassing diplomacy, defence, and intelligence sharing. Some may say it has done so at the expense of the UK’s own sovereignty, forcing us into unwelcome wars and trade compromises, but a shared language and history means the ‘cousins across the sea’ mentality still endures. Trump’s second term, however, increasingly renews questions about the future durability of the special relationship.

Are there any limits to US conduct that could compel Britain to reevaluate its close alignment with Washington?

Given the UK’s asymmetric dependency on the US for defence, that seems unlikely to be the case, at least for now, but this report sets out to investigate what the strains are and what the future might hold with regards to the evergreen ‘Special Relationship’.

Overview of US-UK security cooperation

The security relationship between the US and UK remains one of the most comprehensive and institutionalised defence partnerships among major powers. This cooperation, built upon a dense web of treaties, defence agreements, and shared institutions, spans across military planning, intelligence, nuclear deterrence, cybersecurity, and defence industrial integration.

The UK has been one of the US’s most reliable partners in its overseas military engagements. 

From the Korean War to the Gulf Wars and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the UK has fought alongside the US in a plethora of conflicts since WWII. Beyond merely fighting together, decades of cultivating the special relationship have resulted in an extraordinary depth of military and intelligence integration.

The US has maintained a continuous troop presence on UK soil since WWII, with the US Air Force currently operating out of the 13 Royal Air Force bases (Forces News, 2024). The US has approximately 10,000 military personnel stationed in the UK; in return, the UK frequently sends its military and civilian personnel to train at bases in the US (Bergmann and Linafelter, 2025).

British military officers serving in the US are subject to different levels of integration and some serving as senior advisers and others directly embedded into the American chain of command (Rees and Davies, 2019). This integration, in addition to the two countries’ frequent collaboration in joint military exercises and shared technologies, has strengthened cooperation between the two militaries to the point of the two being interwinable.

Interoperability is particularly strong between US and UK special forces, which have extensively collaborated in joint missions and training, both bilaterally and through NATO (Bergmann and Linafelter, 2025). Both countries also maintain an extensive network of military bases around the world, amplifying their collective reach and geopolitical influence. Among these bases is the Diego Garcia base on the Chagos Archipelago, which is jointly operated by the US and UK. The US made extensive use of this base during Operation Desert Storm, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and other military campaigns in the Middle East (Erickson, Ladwig, and Mikolay, 2010).

Another key area of US-UK security cooperation is intelligence. The two countries collaborate heavily in intelligence sharing, which is institutionalised through the Five Eyes alliance. Born out of the successes of US-UK intelligence collaboration during WWII, the partnership later expanded to include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Many consider the Five Eyes to be one of the most advanced multilateral intelligence-sharing partnerships. It focuses on signals intelligence but also has capabilities in a variety of other intelligence domains (Williams, 2023).

Moreover, the US-UK defence industrial base is highly integrated, with collaboration on over $18.6 billion in joint projects. Most notably, the UK is a first tier partner on the US’s F-35 program, with several British companies playing an important role in manufacturing critical components to support the production of these jets. (Bergmann and Linafelter, 2025).

More than 20,000 jobs in the UK defence industry are with US-owned firms, and another 94,000 are supported indirectly through their supply chains (Cheverton, 2025). Additionally, the UK is a member of the trilateral security partnership AUKUS along with Australia and the US. In addition to its first initiative of helping Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines, AUKUS seeks to deepen integration between the three countries in cutting-edge defence technology, industrial bases, and supply chains (Corben, Patton, and Townshend, 2021).

Perhaps the most unique aspect of the special relationship is the high level of cooperation in the nuclear arena. Nuclear cooperation between the UK and US dates back to the Manhattan Project during the development of the first nuclear weapons. After a temporary pause in nuclear collaboration immediately after WWII, the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) cemented comprehensive nuclear cooperation between the two countries, enabling the exchange of nuclear information, technologies, and material (NIS, 2024).

This degree of cooperation and integration is unparalleled among nuclear powers. The MDA has allowed each country to carry out nuclear tests on each other’s territories, facilitated the transfer of nuclear materials (such as highly enriched uranium, and non-nuclear components) and led to the creation of various joint working groups that collaborate on nuclear research (NIS, 2024).

In November of 2024, the MDA was permanently extended, making US-UK nuclear cooperation a lasting reality (U.S. Department of State, 2024). This agreement has allowed the UK to gain access to US innovations in nuclear technologies, but it has also created a significant dependence on the US.

The UK’s nuclear programme currently consists of a single system: submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Under the Polaris Sales Agreement in 1963, the US provided the UK with Polaris SLBMs, which the UK used in conjunction with its own submarines and warheads (Midekke, 2000). Trident is the current replacement of the Polaris programme. Since the discontinuation of the UK’s free fall WE.177 bombs in 1998, Trident remains the only leg of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme (Erlanger and Castle, 2025). Trident today consists of four Vanguard-class submarines armed with Trident II D-5 ballistic missiles.

The UK utilises a posture of continuous at-sea deterrence (CASD), with one submarine always on patrol. Under the terms of the 1962 Nassau Agreement, the UK commits its Trident nuclear programme to NATO nuclear mission (Midekke, 2000).

Because Trident relies on American SLBMs, the UK remains highly dependent on the US for its nuclear programme. The UK holds possession of Trident missiles from a common pool of missiles shared with the US Navy (Kristensen et al., 2024). The submarines and warheads are UK-made, but the missiles are manufactured and maintained in the US by Lockheed Martin. Furthermore, the UK relies on American-made aeroshells for its warheads, adding another layer of dependence on the US (Messmer and O’Sullivan, 2025).

While the current fleet of Vanguard submarines is soon set to be replaced, the UK nuclear programme’s reliance on the US is not going anywhere. The Royal Navy is working on the new fleet of Dreadnought-class ballistic missile submarines to maintain the UK’s continuous at-sea deterrence. These successor submarines will also utilise Trident II D-5 SLBMs, with their current missiles undergoing a life-extension programme that will keep them in service into the early 2060s (Mills, 2025). Furthermore, Britain’s next generation of warheads, Astraea, is currently being developed alongside the US’s W93 programme, and these two systems will continue to share non-nuclear components, including the Mk7 aeroshell (West, 2025). Britain’s plans for the next generation of its nuclear programme suggests continued entanglement with the US.

Moreover, in June 2025, Prime Minister Starmer announced that the UK would purchase at least 12 US F-35A jets, and that the UK “will make these aircraft able to bear nuclear weapons if necessary” (Beale and James, 2025). Starmer noted that these dual-capable aircraft will join NATO’s nuclear mission. The June 2025 Strategic Defence Review recommended this procurement, citing rising nuclear risks from other states growing and modernising their nuclear arsenals. These F-35A jets are capable of carrying US B61-12 nuclear bombs, which a number of other European states currently host and contribute towards NATO’s airborne nuclear mission.

It is also possible that US nuclear bombs have already returned to the UK for the first time since 2008. Flight data suggests the US may have transported B61-12 bombs from New Mexico to RAF Lakenheath in July 2025, shortly after Starmer announced the UK’s purchase of F-35A jets (Precey, 2025).

This latest addition to the UK’s defence portfolio further entangles the country with the US. With British jets carrying US nuclear weapons, launch authority would likely rest in the hands of the US president, meaning this new capability would be even more dependent on the US than the Trident Programme (Messmer, 2025). This development raises serious concerns about the UK’s sovereignty and control over these weapons. 

As such, the special relationship has afforded the UK several distinct technological and strategic seeming benefits in security matters. Cultivating this relationship with the US allowed the UK, militarily and economically ravaged by WWII, to hold onto power and project global influence. In practice, the relationship is not one of equals, with military and economic might historically overwhelmingly tilted in the US’s favour. This asymmetry has created a power imbalance, and Britain’s deep entanglement with the US limits its willingness to break with its ally, even when US actions contradict British interests.

The Huawei case is a perfect illustration of the constraining effect that these defence entanglements have on Britain. In 2020, Prime Minister Johnson reversed his previous decision to allow Huawei a limited role in developing its 5G network. His government announced a phased removal of the Chinese technology giant’s telecommunications infrastructure equipment by 2027 (Satariano, Castle, and Sanger, 2020). This reversal followed intense pressure by the Trump administration. US officials had expressed concern that allowing Huawei to operate in the British market, even if limited to no more than 35% of the “non-core” market, would lead to major intelligence vulnerabilities.

The US warned that continued cooperation with Huawei would jeopardise intelligence sharing within the Five Eyes alliance. Several factors help to explain why the Johnson government reversed course on Huawei. One was the increasingly sour government and public attitudes towards China due to Beijing’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic and its controversial National Security Law for Hong Kong. A second key factor was US leverage over Britain, thanks to the special relationship. British officials saw a real risk that the Trump administration would downgrade US-UK cooperation over its concerns about Huawei’s presence in the UK.

The material consequences from this might have ranged from decreased intelligence sharing, a reduction in US troops in the UK, or a withdrawal of US RC-135 spy planes (Conley, 2020). Moreover, the British government might have seen Huawei’s continued presence in the country’s telecommunications systems as a significant barrier to securing a trade deal with the Trump administration.

To the Johnson government, the economic boost that a trade deal would give the UK was a particularly important objective in the wake of Brexit (Conley, 2020). The British U-turn on Huawei represents a key moment where the special relationship exerted considerable pressure on the UK’s independent decision-making. This incident highlights Britain’s continued dependence on the US and the power asymmetry embedded within the special relationship. The extensive security, intelligence, and economic benefits the UK derives from this partnership make open confrontation politically and materially difficult. 

Historical cases of US-UK divergence

With growing divergences between the UK and the US under Trump, it is worth assessing the question of the special relationship’s durability. Although the special relationship has long been framed as a seamless partnership, rifts between American and British global outlooks have long been present. An examination of some of these cases of US-UK divergence sheds light on how the special relationship may fare amid the growing distance between the two countries.

The Suez Crisis constituted the first major Anglo-American rift after WWII. Together with France and Israel, Britain invaded Egypt in 1956 after Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal. The intervention faced harsh criticism globally, including from the US. President Eisenhower, concerned that the imperialist move would push non-aligned states towards Moscow, preferred a diplomatic approach. Eisenhower’s administration threatened to devalue the pound sterling, blocked a British request for IMF assistance, and sponsored a resolution at the UN General Assembly condemning the invasion (Costigan, Cottle, and Keys, 2017).

In the end, the Suez Crisis exposed the asymmetry at the heart of the special relationship: while Britain continued to see itself as a global power, it could no longer sustain major military ventures without US backing.

The Vietnam War represents another key point of divergence between American and British foreign policy. Throughout the nearly twenty-year-long conflict, London refused to send its troops into combat in support of the American war effort against North Vietnam. However, despite its refusal to directly participate in the conflict, the British government provided significant support for the US war effort in various forms, both diplomatic and military.

US-UK tensions reached a peak under Harold Wilson’s Labour government during US President Lyndon B. Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War. Facing intense domestic opposition to the conflict by the British public and his own party, Wilson was forced to tread a fine line between maintaining British support for Washington and avoiding inflaming anti-war sentiment at home. While refusing to send British combat troops, Wilson avoided direct criticisms of the American war, instead offering measured diplomatic backing and discreet yet substantial military support. Britain contributed significant military support to the Vietnam war effort, despite recognising that US actions violated the 1955 Geneva Accords, which it co-chaired. Through the ostensibly civilian British Advisory Administrative Mission (BRIAM), the UK quietly supplied counter-insurgency expertise, limited training, and logistical support to the South Vietnamese war effort. The UK also transferred weapons, including napalm and 500 lb bombs, from Hong Kong to Vietnam in secret flights, and shared critical intelligence to inform US air strikes (Curtis, 2022).

One of the UK government’s rare moments of public divergence from US’s position during the Vietnam War occurred after the 1966 bombings of oil installations near population centers in Haiphong and Hanoi, which sparked international criticism (Central Intelligence Agency, 1966). Following the American bombings, Prime Minister Wilson issued a statement distancing Britain from the event and expressing concern for escalation and civilian well-being. Wilson’s statement was carefully calculated, avoiding direct criticism of President Johnson and instead emphasising that Hanoi was to blame for the continuation of fighting. He also reiterated his support for the US’s involvement in Vietnam (New York Times, 1966). However, declassified documents revealed that Prime Minister Wilson’s government privately assured Washington of its continued support, despite publicly disassociating itself from the attacks.

This quiet support for the US was characteristic of the UK’s strategy during the war. Indeed, Britain approved the export of numerous weapons for the American war effort, often on the condition that the deliveries occur outside of Southeast Asia and avoid publicity (Curtis, 2022).

While they might have disagreed with the methods, the UK’s interests aligned greatly with those of the US. Given its colonial holdings in Southeast Asia, the British government remained committed to containing the spread of communism in the region and protecting its commercial interests. At the same time, the British pound was also facing devaluation, and London was reliant on the US to prop up its currency. The US had a strong interest in Britain maintaining its costly military commitments in the far East. While there was no official agreement linking US support for the pound to British support for the US’s foreign policy goals, Washington’s assistance in stabilising the pound at the time likely influenced Britain’s broader strategic and overseas decisions (Colman, 2018).

The UK’s discreet, and often secretive, support of the US during this conflict allowed it to cautiously prioritise these interests while avoiding public opposition. This careful balancing act reflected both Britain’s unease with the war and its deep dependence on the United States. The Vietnam War shows the resilience of the special relationship amidst divergences in foreign policy, particularly due to overlapping interests.

The UK’s silent, hesitant approval was a common theme amidst other legally dubious US foreign engagements, including the Bay of Pigs, the Cambodian Campaign, and other similar conflicts. The US’s 1989 invasion of Panama also demonstrates the constraint that the special relationship put on the UK. At first, Prime Minister Thatcher opposed the use of military force to depose President Noriega, arguing it would not serve US or Latin American interests. However, when the US launched its military operation in Panama, Thatcher voiced her approval of Bush’s decision. Despite widespread international criticism of this intervention as a violation of international law, the UK vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the US and calling for an immediate withdrawal.

The history of the US-UK partnership reveals a persistent pattern: even when Britain faces unease from American actions, its criticism is muted by the constraining power of the special relationship. This reluctance to challenge the US was also tied to a significant overlap in strategic interests. While Britain may have had qualms about American methods, it rarely questioned the underlying objectives. These intersecting interests played a key role in sustaining the special relationship throughout the Cold War and into the 21st century, but their continued effectiveness today remains to be seen. 

The special relationship under Trump

During Trump’s first and second terms in the White House, new rifts have emerged in the Anglo-American partnership. Trump’s ‘America First’ outlook, rejection of multilateralism, and increasingly volatile unilateral military actions have become key points of tension in transatlantic relations.

Trump’s first term saw an American retreat from numerous multilateral institutions and agreements. Shortly after assuming the presidency, in June 2017 Trump announced that the US would withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, downplaying the risks of climate change and citing ‘unfair’ economic burdens  (McBride, 2017). Similarly, Trump has expressed criticism over NATO and repeatedly threatened to withdraw the US from the alliance, complaining that many allies do not pay their fair share in defence spending (Stracqualursi and Acosta, 2019). In 2018, Trump announced the US’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a multilateral agreement designed to limit Iran’s nuclear program.

This trend away from internationalism resumed as soon as Trump returned to the White House in 2025. On the very first day of his second term, Trump withdrew the US from the World Health Organisation (Stolberg, 2025). In February, Trump issued an executive order mandating a review of all the multilateral organisations and treaties to which the US belongs. The purpose is to determine whether any of these commitments conflict with what Trump perceives as American interests and whether the US should withdraw from any of them (Patrick, 2025). While the legality of abandoning these organisations and treaties is unclear, what is clear is that they signal a rejection of the very multilateral international system that the US has helped build.

Trump’s rejection of multilateralism has put significant pressure on the UK, which has benefited from these multilateral frameworks as instruments of British influence. The US’s rejection of multilateralism is particularly straining in the post-Brexit era as it seeks to redefine its global role outside of the EU.

At the same time, Trump has increasingly engaged in more volatile uses of unilateral force, oftentimes in violation of international law, which have put Britain in an uncomfortable position. In 2020, Trump ordered a drone strike resulting in the killing of the Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad, Iraq (Crowley, Hassan, and Schmitt, 2020). After the breakout of the 2025 Iran–Israel war, Trump ordered strikes on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities (Moore and Pratz, 2025). Since September 2025, Trump has authorised a series of military strikes on alleged narco-trafficking vessels in the waters off of South America, which have led to the deaths of 67 individuals (Patil, 2025). In an escalation, Trump said that he is considering striking land targets in Venezuela, and secretary Hegseth has ordered the deployment of the Gerald R. Ford Carrier strike group to the region (Patil, 2025). These strikes likely constitute a violation of both domestic and international law (Lederman, 2025).

Britain’s responses to these strikes have been either cautious or completely absent. Following Trump’s recent attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, Starmer expressed hesitant approval of the attacks, acknowledging the threat that Iran’s nuclear programme poses to the region. He stressed the importance of de-escalation and diplomacy, but made no condemnation of the US’s strikes.

The leaders France, the UK, and Germany also released a joint statement calling on Iran to avoid escalating the situation. (Elgot and Quinn, 2025). Absent from it was any condemnation of US actions as a violation of the UN Charter. Similarly, the UK government has yet to acknowledge any of the US’s illegal strikes on alleged drug-trafficking boats in South American waters.

While the UK has yet to criticise the US directly, the two countries’ domestic politics are drifting apart in ways that could further strain the special relationship. Britain has long disagreed with the US over its use of the death penalty, the latter having over two thousand prisoners on death row (Death Penalty Information Center, 2025).

Moreover, the deteriorating treatment of immigrants in the US is another point of contention. The population of individuals detained by ICE recently reached a new peak of 66,000  (Montoya-Galvez, 2025). Immigrants held at many of these detention centers are often denied due process and subjected to inhumane conditions and human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2025). ICE has increasingly used the cruel practice of third-country deportations, sending individuals to countries other than their countries of origin. Hundreds have been sent to El Salvador’s Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT), which is notorious for its human rights abuses (National Immigration Law Center, 2025).

Trump has pushed forward an aggressive strategy of executive aggrandisement, weakening accountability institutions, tightening control over independent agencies and the civil service, and defying the federal judiciary. (Carrier and Carothers, 2025). He has also openly challenged democratic norms underpinning both American and British democracies. The US’s domestic politics are becoming increasingly incompatible with Britain’s. This divergence in domestic politics will put greater pressure on the special relationship, potentially presenting a new ideological barrier to Anglo-American cooperation.

Despite these strains, Trump’s recent visit to the UK in September revealed that the special relationship persists, even if its foundations look more transactional than ever. During the two-day visit, London showered Trump with royal pageantry. Disagreements between Trump and Starmer were downplayed, and the two leaders reaffirmed the ‘specialness’ of the Anglo-American relationship on numerous occasions. Trump’s visit provided Starmer a platform to bolster trade relations, seek progress on tariffs, and discuss the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East. For the Labour government, this visit required a delicate balance between securing tangible gains from Washington and managing domestic opposition to the American president.

Trump’s state visit reaffirmed Britain’s continued acquiescence in exchange for economic and military benefits. During the visit, the UK government announced it had secured £150 billion in investments from US firms over the next 10 years, including Blackstone and tech companies such as Microsoft, Google, and Palantir (Edwards and Race, 2025). The two countries also reached a memorandum of understanding, the “Technology Prosperity Deal,” which seeks to bolster US-UK cooperation in technological innovation, particularly in artificial intelligence, nuclear energy, and quantum computing (U.S. Mission United Kingdom, 2025). Through this agreement, it appears Starmer is attempting to position Britain as a leader in cutting-edge sectors alongside the US.

During the final press conference of the visit, a rift between the leaders was brought to the surface by a question about what Trump made of Starmer’s intention to recognise Palestinian statehood. Trump voiced his disagreement with the prime minister, though he noted it was only “one of the few disagreements actually” (NPR Washington Desk, 2025).

Starmer’s recognition of the Palestinian state seemed to mark a rare divergence from Washington, but it remains to be seen if this move is anything more than symbolic. The gesture allowed the Labour government to project moral independence and appease domestic opinion. However, Starmer’s government had more forceful tools at its disposal, including terminating arms sales to Israel or even raising sanctions. While Starmer appears to have walked the fine line of appeasing both voters and American leaders for now, it is unclear how sustainable this balancing act is amidst the rise in domestic pressure to meaningfully address the crisis in the Middle East.

If Britain has a red line of what it is willing to tolerate from the US, then that line appears to be moving steadily backward. The British government’s interest in upholding the special relationship seems to overshadow the US’s increasingly volatile and illegal behavior, even when it conflicts with British interests.

What, if anything, would finally push Britain to take a step back from the special relationship?

The answer might lie in security breaches, not just moral ones. A hypothetical “red line” likely lies in the realm of European security. Whereas London has largely tolerated Trump’s disregard for democratic and international norms, a direct threat to European security could finally cross that line. An American administration willing to collaborate with Putin to impose a settlement in Ukraine entailing serious territorial concessions and threatening NATO would represent a profound rupture. Such a move would directly threaten Britain’s immediate security interests and provoke a rethinking of Anglo-American cooperation. Yet even here, it is not certain that London would break ranks: the economic and strategic weight of the United States might still compel acquiescence, as it has in other situations.

While the special relationship has endured thus far, the pressures beneath it are rapidly accumulating. The more Trump pushes aside long established international norms and institutions, opting instead for unilateralism and force, the more the UK has to lose. A complete rejection of multilateralism—from NATO to the UN system and the WTO—not only weakens global governance but also erodes Britain’s strategic leverage that it derives from these multilateral frameworks.

Moreover, balancing public opinion and electoral pressures with upholding the special relationship may prove increasingly difficult. Public pressure has exerted a significant force on the special relationship at various points in its history. It has proved particularly effective in limiting the UK’s willingness to follow its American partners into combat. The British public’s opposition to the Vietnam War was a major factor limiting the UK’s full participation in the conflict.

This pressure likewise emerged during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. While the British government initially supported these US-led interventions, concerns over casualties, unconvincing justifications for war, and the mounting costs of war led to souring opinions on overseas interventions. There has been a dramatic reduction in the British public’s support for military action and intervention overseas since the invasion of Iraq (Holmes, 2020). Indeed, Iraq serves as a striking illustration of the special relationship’s costly price tag. Prime Minister Blair’s fervent support of Bush’s contentious Iraq invasion damaged Britain’s standing at home and in the eyes of many of its European allies.

Especially among an increasingly politicised populace, domestic politics will continue to exert a powerful constraining force on the special relationship. With greater government transparency, London will have to weigh public pressure more carefully against the material benefits it receives from its proximity to Washington.

A Future beyond dependence?

Trump’s second term has served as a long-needed wake-up call for Britain to reassess its special relationship and deep dependence on the US. Washington’s rejection of multilateral frameworks and democratic norms, along with its increasingly volatile use of force overseas, has exposed the fragility of what was once assumed to be a stable partnership. While Britain has long tolerated a significant degree of discord with Washington, its position is becoming increasingly difficult to hold.

In light of these increasing strains on the special relationship, Britain should shift its attention across the Channel. London should leverage existing frameworks—such as NATO, the OSCE, and the EU—to take a lead in key areas such as security, climate change, and economic development. Moreover, by pursuing greater coordination with the European Union, the UK can reaffirm its commitment to the multilateralism the US has abandoned through new forms of collaboration. It can seek to establish itself as an active partner of the EU, striking a balance between guaranteeing closer cooperation while maintaining independence. Britain can also lean into other regional security initiatives such as the Joint Expeditionary Forces (JEF), allowing it to maintain influence and operational capacity while reducing overreliance on a single ally.

With the US stepping out of its traditional role as leader of the free world, the UK should seize this opportunity to reinvigorate multilateralism and become a more active global leader. By revitalising international frameworks for cooperation, Britain can move beyond dependence on the special relationship and lead in global cooperation, with or without Washington. Regardless of the US’s domestic political situation, the reality is that the US and UK will continue to face the same set of external threats and concerns. By maintaining a strong international presence and strengthening global frameworks for cooperation, the UK can be prepared to engage as a more independent partner when the US is ready to embrace multilateralism once again.

References

  • Amnesty International USA (2025) ‘Amnesty International exposes human rights violations at El Paso immigrant detention facility’, Amnesty International USA, 14 May. Available at: https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/amnesty-international-exposes-human-rights-violations-at-el-paso-immigrant-detention-facility/.
  • Bergmann, M. and Linafelter, L. (2025) Making the U.S.-UK special relationship fit for purpose. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/making-us-uk-special-relationship-fit-purpose#h2-mapping-the-special-relationship-on-defense.
  • Carrier, M. and Carothers, T. (2025) U.S. democratic backsliding in comparative perspective. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at:   https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/08/us-democratic-backsliding-in-comparative-perspective?lang=en. 
  • Cheverton, D. (2025) Three things to note in the UK’s new Defence Industrial Strategy. Atlantic Council.  Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/three-things-to-note-in-the-uks-new-defence-industrial-strategy/.
  • Colman, J. (2018) ‘“A battalion would be worth a billion”? May–December 1965’, in A ‘Special Relationship’? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American relations ‘at the summit’, 1964-68. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526137203.00009.
  • Conley, H. A. (2020) The United Kingdom’s policy U-turn on Huawei. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-kingdoms-policy-u-turn-huawei.
  • Corben, T., Patton, S. and Townshend, A. (2021) What is the AUKUS partnership? United States Studies Centre. Available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/explainer-what-is-the-aukus-partnership. 
  • Costigan, T., Cottle, D. and Keys, A. (2017) ‘The US dollar as the global reserve currency: Implications for US hegemony’, World Review of Political Economy, 8(1), pp. 104–22. https://doi.org/10.13169/worlrevipoliecon.8.1.0104. 
  • Crowley, M., Hassan, F. and Schmitt, E. (2020) ‘U.S. strike in Iraq kills Qassim Suleimani, commander of Iranian forces’, New York Times, 2 January. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html.
  • Curtis, M. (2022) Britain’s secret role in the brutal US war in Vietnam. Declassified UK. Available at: https://www.declassifieduk.org/britains-secret-role-in-the-brutal-us-war-in-vietnam/.
  • Death Penalty Information Center (2025) Death Row Overview. Available at:  https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview. 
  • Directorate of Intelligence (1966) Intelligence memorandum: World reaction to the US bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong petroleum installations on 29 and 30 June. Central Intelligence Agency. Available at:  https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A000900460001-6.pdf. 
  • Edwards, C. and Race, M. (2025) ‘US firms pledge £150bn investment in UK as tech deal signed’, BBC, 18 September. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2nllgl3q7o. 
  • Elgot, J. and Quinn, B. (2025) ‘Keir Starmer backs US strike on Iran warns of wider escalation risk’, The Guardian, 22 June. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/22/starmer-backs-us-strike-on-iran-and-calls-for-tehran-to-return-to-negotiations.
  • Erickson, A. S., Ladwig, W. C., and Mikolay, J. D. (2010) ‘Diego Garcia and the United States’ emerging Indian Ocean strategy’, Asian Security, 6(3), pp. 214-237. doi: 10.1080/14799855.2010.507408.
  • Erlanger, S. and Castle, S. (2025) ‘U.K. says it’s buying 12 F-35A stealth jets that can carry nuclear weapons’, New York Times, 25 June. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/25/world/europe/uk-nato-f35-nuclear-jets.html.
  • Forces News (2024) ‘On foreign soil: Find out where the US Air Force’s 13 bases are located in the UK’, Forces News, 27 November. Available at: https://www.forcesnews.com/usa/foreign-soil-why-us-air-force-maintains-several-airbases-across-uk.
  • Holmes, F. (2020) Public attitudes to military interventionism. The British Foreign Policy Group. Available at:  https://bfpg.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Public-Attitudes-to-Military-Intervention-1.pdf.
  • Kristensen, H. M. et al. (2024) United Kingdom nuclear weapons, 2024. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Available at: https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-11/united-kingdom-nuclear-weapons-2024/. 
  • Lederman, M. (2025) The many ways in which the September 2 Caribbean strike was unlawful… and the grave line the military has crossed. Just Security.Available at:  https://www.justsecurity.org/120296/many-ways-caribbean-strike-unlawful/.
  • McBride, J. (2017) The consequences of leaving the Paris Agreement. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/consequences-leaving-paris-agreement.
  • Messmer, M. and O’Sullivan, O. (2025) The UK’s nuclear deterrent relies on US support – But there are no other easy alternatives. Chatham House. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/uks-nuclear-deterrent-relies-us-support-there-are-no-other-easy-alternatives.
  • Midekke, M. (2000) ‘Anglo-American nuclear weapons cooperation after the Nassau Conference: The British policy of interdependence’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 2(2), pp. 69-96. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925063.
  • Mills, C. (2025) Replacing the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent: Progress of the Dreadnought Class. House of Commons Library. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8010/.
  • Montoya-Galvez, C. (2025) ‘ICE’s detainee population reaches 66,000, a new record high, statistics show’, CBS News, 6 November. Available at:  https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ices-detainee-population-reaches-66000-a-new-record-high-statistics-show/.
  • Moore, E. and Pratz, M. (2025) ‘U.S. strikes 3 nuclear sites in Iran, in major regional conflict escalation’, NPR, 22 June. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2025/06/21/nx-s1-5441127/iran-us-strike-nuclear-trump.
  • National Immigration Law Center (2025) Tracking the CECOT disappearances. Available at: https://www.nilc.org/resources/tracking-the-cecot-disappearances/.  
  • New York Times (1966) ‘Text of Wilson statement on bombing’, New York Times, 30 June. Available at:  https://www.nytimes.com/1966/06/30/archives/text-of-wilson-statement-on-bombing.html. 
  • NPR Washington Desk (2025) ‘Trump says he disagrees with Starmer’s decision to recognize Palestinian state’, NPR, 18 September. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2025/09/18/nx-s1-5544343/trump-starmer-press-conference.
  • Nuclear Information Service (2024) US-UK mutual defence agreement: A Nuclear Information Service Briefing. Available at: https://www.nuclearinfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/MDA-Briefing-digital.pdf.
  • Patil, A. (2025) ‘A timeline of Trump’s strikes on vessels he says are smuggling drugs,’ New York Times’, 13 November. Available at:  https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-drug-boat-strikes-timeline.html. 
  • Patrick, S. (2025) The death of the world America made. Carnegie Endowment for Peace. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/02/trump-executive-order-treaties-organizations?lang=en.
  • Rees, W. and Davies, L. (2019) ‘The Anglo-American military relationship: Institutional rules, practices, and narratives,’ Contemporary Security Policy, 40(3), pp. 1-23. doi:10.1080/13523260.2019.1581973. 
  • Satariano, A., Castle, S., and Sanger, D. E. (2020) ‘U.K. bars Huawei for 5G as tech battle between China and the West escalates’, New York Times, 14 July. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/business/huawei-uk-5g.html.
  • Stolberg, S. G. (2020) ‘Trump withdraws U.S. from World Health Organization’, New York Times, 20 January. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/20/us/politics/trump-world-health-organization.html.
  • Stracqualursi, V. and Acosta, J. (2019) ‘New York Times: Trump raised withdrawing US from NATO several times in 2018′, CNN, 16 January. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/15/politics/trump-nato-us-withdraw.
  • United States Department of State (2024) United States and United Kingdom bring amendment to Mutual Defense Agreement into force. Available at: https://2021-2025.state.gov/united-states-and-united-kingdom-bring-amendment-to-mutual-defense-agreement-into-force/.
  • U.S. Mission United Kingdom (2025) ‘The U.S. state visit to the UK: Securing the Technology Prosperity Deal’, 26 September. Available at: https://uk.usembassy.gov/the-u-s-state-visit-to-the-uk-securing-the-tech-prosperity-deal/#:~:text=Trump%20and%20Prime%20Minister%20Keir%20Starmer%20signed%20the%20Technology%20Prosperity,people%20and%20American%20innovation%20globally.
  • West, L. (2025) ‘UK confirms new Astraea nuclear warhead progressing’, UK Defence Journal, 21 October. Available at: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-confirms-new-astraea-nuclear-warhead-progressing/.
  • Williams, B. (2023) ‘Why the Five Eyes? Power and identity in the formation of a multilateral intelligence grouping’,  Journal of Cold War Studies, 25(1), pp. 101-137. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01123.