The war severely damaged Iran’s defence capacity, nuclear infrastructure, and several military and industrial sites.
At the same time, Iran’s broader regional position has deteriorated. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria deprived Tehran of a key ally, while sustained Israeli attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon eliminated much of the group’s senior leadership.
More recently, US operations in Venezuela and snatching of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, have further narrowed Iran’s options abroad.
These developments have reshaped the regional and international environment for Tehran. Iran now has fewer allies to rely on in regional conflicts and fewer channels to move oil revenues overseas.
This is particularly significant given Iran’s heavy involvement in Venezuela’s oil sector alongside Russia, and its reliance on complex financial arrangements linked to markets believed to be in China.
The disruption of these networks has increased Iran’s economic vulnerability at a time of mounting internal pressure.
Against this backdrop, Iran’s aging supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, appears to be facing one of the most uncertain moments of his rule.
More than three decades of careful planning to build regional proxy forces, sanction-evasion mechanisms, and nuclear infrastructure have been undermined or destroyed in a relatively short period of time.
With Trump back in the White House and Benjamin Netanyahu in power in Israel, there appears to be no clear diplomatic or strategic path out of the current crisis without a hefty price.
For years, Khamenei and his inner circle justified massive spending on regional allies and the nuclear program as necessary investments in Iran’s long-term security and technological advancement.
Today, that argument appears increasingly hollow. As pressure builds both inside and outside the country, security at home, once presented as the ultimate payoff of those policies, seems more distant than ever.