The following is an adapted version of an article written by Laura Nyilas, a research fellow at the Europe Strategy Institute of the University of Public Service, originally published in Hungarian on the Five Minutes Europe blog of Ludovika.hu.

Today, the Central and Eastern European region is a potential engine of European growth, influencing an ever-increasing share of the EU’s industrial expansion and exports, as well as the dynamic changes in its defence and energy security landscape. In light of this, the question is not whether the region can grow, but whether its growth will align with a coherent, long-term EU strategy. This requires something in which Europe rarely excels: sustained and structured regional dialogue.

The Central and Eastern European region, located on NATO’s eastern flank, has gained significant importance since the start of the 2022 Russia–Ukraine war. On 18 February 2026, the European Commission published a statement on the eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine titled Strong Regions for a Safe Europe. In this document, the European Commission refers to the EU’s eastern border region as the ‘guardian of our security’. Military security, increasingly characterized by cooperation, remains the cornerstone of the security of the Union’s eastern regions and indeed of the European Union as a whole. Cooperation is significant in terms of increasing trust between states and reducing aggression. Those states that are dissatisfied with the current situation—that is, the status quo—pose a major threat to all states and regions. In this context, it is important to mention the development of armed forces capable of serving as a credible deterrent. Emphasizing the rapid development of military capabilities is also essential for conflict prevention, particularly given that current global political events are based on the logic of ‘hard power’.

Given the above facts, it can be concluded that the Visegrád Cooperation could play a key role as an example of regional cooperation within the EU. The Visegrád countries have previously demonstrated how Central and Eastern European states can cooperate in shaping Europe’s agenda: by coordinating their positions, putting forward joint initiatives, and serving as a bridge between Eastern and Western European countries on issues such as economic resilience, security challenges, and integration frameworks.

‘The Visegrád Cooperation could play a key role as an example of regional cooperation within the EU’

In recent years, cooperation has hit a rough patch, with the war in Ukraine driving a significant wedge between the countries. Communication has at times broken down due to disputes and misunderstandings stemming from ideological differences. Despite all this, these rough patches have always been followed by the realization that the relationship between the four countries must be nurtured. This cooperation clearly illustrates how smaller European states can leverage the benefits of collective action to shape a more balanced and effective European political agenda.

Given the emerging new international order, the arguments in favour of deeper cooperation are stronger today than at any time in the past two decades. Security has become an important, if not the most important, factor, as the war in Ukraine has significantly altered the region’s strategic importance.

Concerning defence spending relative to the 2 per cent threshold of gross domestic product (GDP), Poland’s 4.48 per cent expenditure is not only outstanding in the region but also dominant at the NATO level, signalling that Poland is not merely contributing but is striving for a leading role in the defence of the eastern flank. Strategically, this level makes Poland one of the main European pillars of NATO deterrence, granting it ‘frontline state’ status, and politically, it also increases Warsaw’s influence in Washington, Berlin, and Brussels. Following Poland, Hungary at 2.06 per cent, Slovakia at 2.04 per cent, and the Czech Republic at 2.00 per cent are also credible. Their strategic weight, however, does not stem from this, but from how they are able to modernize sustainably and how they can strengthen the Central European bloc as NATO-compatible partners. NATO’s latest document summarizing defence spending thus shows that the latter three countries are actually above NATO’s expectations, meaning they are performing at a level that is politically respectable and acceptable to the alliance.

Within defence spending, the proportion allocated to equipment varies slightly among the four countries, and all four significantly exceed NATO’s 20 per cent benchmark. Poland stands out remarkably with 54.4 per cent, not only within the region but also in comparison with the entire transatlantic alliance. This means that more than half of Poland’s military spending goes not toward maintenance but toward equipment procurement and modernization. This high ratio also carries an important strategic message. It signals the rapid transformation of the military and enhances the actual combat capability of NATO’s eastern flank. Thus, Poland not only spends a lot, but spends based on capability, which is an important measure of strategic significance.

Hungary follows Poland in the V4 rankings with 45.0 per cent. This means that Hungary is also dynamically modernizing and developing its forces, rather than merely meeting ‘administrative defence spending’ requirements. In strategic terms, this places Hungary at the ‘forefront of the modernization pack’ and enhances military interoperability. Slovakia (31.1 per cent) and the Czech Republic (30.7 per cent) also fall into a strong category. For both countries, the graph indicates that a genuine equipment procurement cycle is underway, aligned with NATO expectations and following a sustainable development trajectory.

‘The subregion’s success depends in part on whether the Visegrád countries are able to grow together or merely develop in parallel’

In a study recently published in the journal AARMS, the air forces of the Visegrád countries were examined within the broader context of regional security analysis, with a particular focus on their modernization efforts and strategic significance in Central and Eastern Europe, as initiatives aimed at strengthening air defence—including the protection of EU airspace against Russian drones—are particularly important. Ensuring aviation safety and protecting national airspace is a top priority in a situation characterized by ongoing Russian provocations, which are aimed not solely at intimidating the population and inciting social unrest.

The data above clearly show that the Visegrád countries do not carry equal military weight; a structure centred on Poland is emerging in the region, while the others form a NATO-compatible but smaller-capacity stabilization zone. For the region to fully capitalize on its advantages, a shared vision may be warranted, rather than parallel national strategies. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that the four countries must jointly formulate long- or short-term strategies; however, some degree of coordination—whether minor or significant—could be beneficial for the region.

Europe is currently entering an era characterized by geopolitical competition in the fields of technology, energy, and security. Central and Eastern Europe possesses the geographical advantages and economic foundation that can help the EU respond effectively to these challenges. The subregion’s success depends in part on whether the Visegrád countries are able to grow together or merely develop in parallel.

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