Successful generalship is harder to identify than it appears; even the greatest commanders face critics in their own age, which often continues even after they are dead. Principled and decisive officers are easier to spot, and Ukraine certainly has one of those in Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi.
When Russia struck an army training center on June 1, killing and wounding more than 70 men, he resigned, saying he had worked for “an army in which commanders are personally responsible for people’s lives. An army where no one is responsible for a defeat is dying from within.”
The decision stunned many Ukrainians, and not just because of Drapatyi’s seniority — he was ground forces commander. The highly decorated 42-year-old is the standard-bearer for a younger generation of army officers who joined the military after Ukraine’s independence and have spent most of their careers fighting Russians. Just 48 hours later, on June 3, a government possibly embarrassed by the fuss and aware of his popularity reappointed him to the lesser but more combat-focused role of joint forces commander.
The turmoil has led to questions once again about the division between the new leaders and an older generation, including commander-in-chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, who, like many other senior officers, was Soviet-trained. Relations between Syrskyi and Drapatyi are said to be poor, with each taking an opposed position on how to fight the war.
But the strains are more than personal. The point was underlined in May when Major Oleksandr Shyrshyn, commander of 47 Separate Mechanized Brigade, gave a televised interview criticizing the way the army was fighting, and the often needless casualties he said were suffered. He blamed “clueless generalship” and “stupid missions” given to his unit during the fighting in Kursk.
The Russian army has good reason to fear leaders of the new generation of Ukrainian officers like Drapatyi, who has fought it with considerable energy for 11 years. He became famous in a moment when he shouted “Go!” at the driver of an armored fighting vehicle in Mariupol in 2014, and tore through a Russian barricade on a mission to rescue besieged policemen. His exploits thereafter were equally eye-catching – that same year, he led an encircled force that fought its way through Russian territory to freedom.
After the full-scale invasion, Drapatyi became the go-to commander for areas of the front where the situation was most serious and in need of a swift turnaround. In summer 2024, he stopped a significant Russian incursion in its tracks near Kharkiv, stabilized the frontline, and soon after became the youngest-ever ground forces commander.
In November, when Drapatyi was appointed, there were high hopes for systemic reform. And Drapatyi did replace much of the leadership, prioritized accountability over loyalty, and revamped the recruitment and training systems.
He aimed to move the military from a culture of fear to one of responsibility, where frontline initiative and flexibility was seen as a strength, not a threat. Drapatyi noted when he resigned that he had “been working to break this system.” He is keen to talk to subordinate commanders and understand their problems, but replaces those who don’t meet his standards.
While Russia’s military relies on a rigid top-down command structure and slow decision-making, Ukraine has found success by embracing a more decentralized approach. During the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive, for example, Ukraine’s junior commanders were able to take the initiative and exploit weaknesses in Russian lines without waiting for higher-level approval.
But since the frontlines stabilized a couple of years ago, Ukrainian commanders have complained about a resurgence in old Soviet-style habits, such as top-down decision-making, excessive bureaucracy, the suppression of initiative, and a culture driven more by fear and loyalty than effectiveness.
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One Ukrainian commander told this author that if he takes pre-emptive action and uses extra artillery rounds on any given day, he has to justify it with extensive paperwork, an exercise that wastes enormous amounts of time and hampers initiative.
“Until we implement reforms, until we remove the Soviet mindset from our army and until we start fighting effectively, relying on Western partners is pointless,” an artillery commander said. (Like several military personnel quoted here, he asked not to be named for fear of official retaliation).
Yurii, a drone pilot from 23 Separate Mechanized Brigade, said Drapatyi “has a great deal of trust” from Ukrainian soldiers, while Norman, from 109 Territorial Defense Brigade, said he was “effective and knows his job well.”
Andrii, of 59 Brigade (Da Vinci Wolves), said five units had rotated through neighboring positions over seven months as his own held its ground. Poor, old-style leadership had led to a loss of combat effectiveness, he said.
“You can’t say that just because a commander is young, he’s more effective — but he [Drapatyi] is more flexible,” he said. “The old Soviet training system no longer works, and many older commanders can’t internally adapt.”
And he questioned the motives of Drapatyi’s critics. “He’s currently our most effective general,” he said. “Those who obstruct his work are doing it for their own benefit.”
Rigid, top-down decision-making results in unrealistic or suicidal orders, with dissenting officers often replaced. The system is said to prioritize compliance over initiative, at great human cost. Ukraine will not beat Russia until it rids itself of Soviet-style generals, Mariana Beula, deputy head of the Kyiv parliament’s defense and security committee, has warned.
Ukraine began the process of moving away from Soviet standards and shifting toward NATO-style mission command after Russia annexed Crimea and seized parts of Eastern Ukraine in 2014.
And there are encouraging signs of change. As the open source commentator Artur Rehi has pointed out, the Russians are keenly aware that some new officers with fresh thinking pose an acute frontline threat. Robert Brovdi, the new commander of Ukraine’s huge unmanned aerial systems fleet, has changed tactics and is focusing lethal attacks on Russian drone operators, while aiming to kill or wound 35,000 soldiers monthly, roughly equal to the number of new Russian recruits.
Change is a long, long journey, and it is only fair to recognize that Ukraine is trying to repair an aircraft already in flight; something that’s enormously difficult and fraught with peril. Most people retain a trust in the armed forces and are extremely proud of its extraordinary performance against the Russian military.
But if Ukraine is to win (something that NATO’s new Supreme Commander Europe, US Lieutenant General Alexus Grynkewich says remains possible) it needs to adapt. As the Russians have demonstrated so effectively, the old ways don’t work.
David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Date: June 5, 2025
Time: 9:00 am to 12:00 pm CET
Europe’s Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.