Many have anticipated Trump’s meeting with Putin in Alaska with great attention last week (8/19/2025). After all, it was the first time that both leaders met since Trump assumed office earlier this year, and the meeting was promised to result in a ceasefire agreement. However, both leaders cited ‘great progress’ without explaining what has been achieved. It was clear later on that no agreement had taken place.

One thing for sure, the absence of Ukraine or any other European countries in this meeting is a troubling sign for Europe. Their absence underscores a further marginalization in high-level negotiation, especially on the issue of Ukraine. Europe was left in the dark about the future of its own continent, as Washington and Moscow discussed issues that directly concern its security.

This event is only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of a more alarming problem. Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the primary security guarantor over Europe. While this provided stability during the Cold War, it has also increased Europe’s dependency on the United States. Today, this dependency is put to the test due to Trump pivoting away from Europe while Russia is knocking on their door. With no certainty over the course of their own security, the idea of a ‘European army’ has re-emerged onto the scene once more.

European army: not a new idea

The idea of a European army is not a new idea. The first, and probably the closest time we ever got to a European army, came in the 1950s. After a green light by Eisenhower, the French drew up a proposal to organize European defense on a supranational basis to accommodate Adenauer’s request for German remilitarization. Jean Monnet brought the idea to Rene Pleven, who in turn submitted it to the French National Assembly on 24th October 1950.

This episode led to the signing of the treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC), also known as the Treaty of Paris, on 27th May 1952. It was signed by six countries: France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. However, the idea was not fully ratified by all member states and was vetoed by the French National Assembly in 1954.

Since then, Europe has always relied on NATO, and by extension the US, to fill the gap in their defensive capabilities throughout the Cold War. Even after 1991, NATO has remained the dominant actor over Europe’s security, exemplified by the Yugoslav War in the 1990s, the 2011 Libya no-fly zone, and the 2021 Afghanistan evacuation. This dependence has left Europe numb. Although the EU has made several attempts to coordinate their defense, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), nothing comes close to the supranational proposal once envisioned in 1950.

The need of a ‘European army’ today

This enduring dominance of NATO-US primacy has been criticized by many. In 2019, French president Emmanuel Macron declared NATO as ‘brain-dead’ and that Europe can no longer rely on the US. His remark was controversial, but it captured a hard truth: Europe needs to rely on itself for security. With war happening in their front yard and shifting global power dynamics, a ‘European army’ could provide Europe with several advantages they needed.

First, it will provide Europe strategic autonomy. Europe cannot take US or NATO guarantees for granted. A European army would allow Europe to take care of their own security without being hostage to US electoral cycles. Trump’s presidency highlighted this clearly, as he criticized the alliance multiple times for not meeting the 2% requirements. Furthermore, Trump’s pivot to Asia-Pacific left Europe at a critical time as the Russian army was rolling into Ukraine. A ‘European army’ would ensure Europe’s decisions are based on its own assessment and not dictated by external actors.

Plus, a unified force is essential for projecting strength and would put Europe’s credibility back into high-level negotiation once more. Europe has always championed itself as a global actor, shaping rules on climate, trade, and human rights. Yet without a credible military to back its diplomacy, its influence is limited. A strong and unified military will position the EU as the world’s third-largest defense spender and strengthen Europe’s geopolitical weight in the international arena.

Second, it allows Europe to handle specific EU issues. While NATO is able to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine by reinforcing its eastern flank, the EU continues to face hybrid and non-traditional threats that are not tailored for NATO. Instability in the Mediterranean, waves of migration into Southern Europe, cyberattacks, and the rise of jihadist groups in the Sahel are some of the specific EU issues that are out of NATO jurisdiction. Yet, EU missions such as the European Training Mission (EUTM) and the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) in Mali are often under-equipped, under-funded, and under-manned, and they tarnished EU credibility with its Malian partners, which led to the ending of the mission in 2024. A European army could be the solution for Europe in providing rapid deployment forces swiftly and effectively.

Lastly, a European army would improve efficiency and reduce cost. Europe is the home of some of the finest arms manufacturers in the world. Rheinmetall, Fincantieri, Dassault Aviation, and SAAB all peak in their respective domains. Yet, demand is still largely drawn from national lines, with investments drawn from domestic considerations and based on national programming and not taking into account broader strategic and efficiency considerations. As a result, this scatters the EU’s European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in narrow defense markets, instead of a single integrated and much larger market. This in turn weakens EDTIB, because it foregoes opportunities to mutualize and synchronize investments into common equipment and infrastructure.

Furthermore, this created a fragmentation in the Union’s defense industrial capability. As one case points out, the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet has two parallel programs. France, Germany, and Spain are taking part in the so-called Future Air Combat System (FCAS). Instead of taking part in the program, Italy and the United Kingdom are collaborating for the development of another sixth-generation fighter jet program (also referred to as FCAS), alongside Japan, who later joined to form the Global Air Combat Programme. This in turn led to costly duplication, rendered logistics and transnational cooperation on maintenance efforts more difficult, and hampered interoperability.

A ‘European army’ would pool resources that eliminate these inefficiencies. Shared procurement could decrease costs drastically, while unified training and command structure would increase interoperability. The EU’s European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) is a step in the right direction, as it requires member states to procure at least 40% of defense equipment in a collaborative manner. This precedent shows that a structure for integration already exists, and continuing this path will turn scattered efforts into a coherent force.

In Conclusion

The discussion circling a ‘European army’ is not merely about military organization but also about achieving strategic autonomy. A common army would enable Europe to pursue its own interest without the influence of external actors and reinforce Europe’s importance in world geopolitics.

Still, the path to a real and tangible European army still suffers due to many things, mainly due to the matter of sovereignty. The matter of defense is a highly sensitive topic, often classified as ‘high politics,’ and in high-politics issues, member states are more vigilant about protecting their national sovereignty. In 1985, Jacques Delors once pushed for both economic and defense integration. The former was pursued with much gusto, but the same cannot be said for the latter. This was highlighted during the Iraq War of 1991 and 2003. During the former, Britain and France were on board Operation Desert Shield. During the latter, they were in a disagreement over the US-led coalition to Iraq. This underscores the classic ‘high-politics’ and ‘low-politics’ discrepancies. Member states were more protective over a highly sensitive topic. In relation to this matter, member states right now also face the same division over the perception of a European army.

Aside from that, funding remains the biggest concern of realizing a ‘European army.’ A European army would require massive financing in order to form, equip, and maintain it. French president Emmanuel Macron and the former Estonian PM Kaja Kallas have proposed the creation of EU-wide bonds to fund a European army. However, this initiative doesn’t go down well with countries like Germany and the Netherlands, who are generally more wary of debt sharing. But it’s hard to see how else it would be funded, given that EU member states are struggling to meet the minimum 2% target as stated by NATO.

Ultimately, however, the cost of inaction may be greater than the cost of integration. Europe can continue its dependence on Washington or begin the difficult yet necessary process of building its own military capacity. Macron’s warning should not be ignored, and failing to take the first painful steps risks leaving the continent vulnerable to external shocks and unable to defend its own interests.