Executive summary
The U.S. is highly dependent on imports of critical minerals that are indispensable for some of the most important manufacturing industries in the country. The vulnerability of supply chains for these critical minerals requires new approaches and partners. Africa is uniquely positioned to be a strong partner of the U.S. in this realignment. This paper reviews the landscape of critical minerals in Africa, the unique opportunities the region offers to U.S. investors, and the benefits possible for both regions given strong critical minerals, energy, and infrastructure investment partnerships.
Critical minerals are defined differently by each country. In the United States, “the Energy Act of 2020 defined critical minerals as those that are essential to the economic or national security of the United States; have a supply chain that is vulnerable to disruption; and serve an essential function in the manufacturing of a product, the absence of which would have significant consequences for the economic or national security of the U.S.” (United States Geological Survey (USGS). As of 2024, 50 minerals are considered “critical” by the U.S. (Mineral Resources Program 2024).
Critical minerals like aluminum have broad uses in many industries. Magnets made out of rare earth elements are used in industrial motors, generators, and wind turbines (IERE 2025). Other critical minerals are used in the defense, energy, electronics, and healthcare industries (Mineral Resources Program 2024).
The U.S. is entirely dependent (100%) on imports for 12 critical minerals. For another 28, it is more than 50% net import reliant. This dependency has existed for the last 20 years (USGS 2025).
Globally, demand for critical minerals is set to grow significantly: For example, lithium demand is projected to grow 4.5 times its current level, graphite 2.3 times, nickel and rare earth elements 1.6 times by 2040 (IEA 2025a). Recent policy and market changes in the U.S. under the second Donald Trump administration make it difficult to project U.S. demand for critical minerals.
On the one hand, increased domestic manufacturing will lead to an increase in demand for critical minerals, particularly from the electronics and heavy industries. On the other hand, changes in tax credits to clean energy projects have led to numerous cancellations (E2 2025a, 2025b). Nevertheless, given the widespread use of critical minerals in diverse industries, the demand will most probably grow. The U.S. should be prepared to have greater control over its supply chains.
For most critical minerals, the concentration of mining production of the top three countries is very high, above 50% (IEA 2025a). This situation is difficult to change rapidly, as the average lead time for new mines to begin production is about 18 years. (Manalo 2025). The geographical distribution of critical minerals processing is even more pronounced than that of mining. China is the dominant producer of critical minerals, except nickel (although it plays a significant role in the ownership of nickel refining facilities in Indonesia) (IEA 2025a).
The challenge of global concentration of mining and processing of critical minerals has not changed much in the last five years. Only lithium mining concentration has seen a significant decrease due to new mines in Argentina and Zimbabwe, and rare earth elements have seen a modest decline in concentration as their production volumes are much smaller. Nickel mining and refining have seen a greater concentration due to recent policies and investments in Indonesia and production declines in other markets (IEA 2025a).
Prices for critical minerals have seen wild swings in recent years, making investors cautious. A portion of this volatility is caused by the rapid ramp-up of production to respond to high prices (IEA 2025a). Another portion is linked to the high concentration of refining and market manipulation practices by China (USTR 2025).
The U.S. continues to take measures to diversify its suppliers of critical minerals. On March 20, 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order aimed at increasing U.S. domestic mineral production (The White House 2025b). These efforts are essential but may be insufficient to cover the current and future demand for critical minerals in the U.S.
Africa can play a critical role in being a reliable partner to strengthen the value chain of critical minerals for the U.S. The region has three important advantages at play for new potential partnerships with the U.S. First, significant reserves of several critical minerals; second, existing mining and refining operations with the potential for expansion; and third, considerable business opportunities in infrastructure and energy with reliable sources of revenue based on expanding mining extraction and potential critical minerals refining. In addition, African countries have made significant progress in the governance of their mining sectors, and there is a political consensus in the region to move forward decisively on a rapid expansion of mining and ancillary business opportunities to respond to the rapid growth in the demand for critical minerals.
Africa is estimated to hold about 30% of proven critical minerals reserves, and several countries are global leaders in reserves (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2022). There are 35 African countries that produce at least one critical mineral (Development Reimagined 2024). In fact, these numbers are probably underestimates, given the low level of exploration, which dropped 3.4% in 2023 as compared to 2022 (except for lithium) (S&P Global 2023).
Africa has shown that it can ramp up mining production quickly. Cases like manganese in Gabon, cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), bauxite in Guinea, and lithium in Zimbabwe can serve as examples to other African countries (Federal Ministry Republic of Austria Finance 2025).
The investment needs in energy and infrastructure in Africa present a unique opportunity when combined with mining development. Mining is a highly energy-intensive industry. In countries like Zambia, 52% of electricity in 2018 was consumed by mining operations, and in the DRC 55% (Imasiku and Thomas, 2020). Investments in energy and transport infrastructure are attractive to the private sector. In 2023, the region closed $3.5 billion of infrastructure investment deals with the private sector, encompassing 66 projects (World Bank 2024b).
Finally, Africa has the political will to establish effective partnerships for the development of its critical minerals sector. The December 2024 African Union Green Minerals Strategy is a testament to this policy commitment, with clear investments identified in mining and the value chain of critical minerals. (African Union 2024).
In a highly competitive global environment for critical minerals mining, Africa should enhance its comparative advantages. The race for critical minerals is global and intense. North American and Latin American existing and prospective mines tend to be viewed as safer investments for U.S. mining companies due to their proximity and familiarity. The comparative advantages of Africa described above should be at the core of Africa’s marketing of its critical minerals.
Today, African countries face a different political environment in the U.S. The new directions under the Trump administration have changed from regional to individual country engagements. The elimination of USAID and the reorientation from aid to trade should inform the approaches to be taken by African governments.
This report proposes five actions for African governments to be better positioned in their negotiations with the U.S. for critical minerals.
First, a single, high-level national coordinator per government is needed for a whole-of-government approach for the critical minerals, infrastructure, energy, and value chain sectors. A single point of entry for engagement and negotiation of specific deals will be highly attractive and efficient. Furthermore, coordinated actions are necessary in value chains and economic activities linked to development corridors around mining and transport infrastructure projects.
Second, an efficient review process and speedy approvals, from exploration to production, are key to competing in the global critical minerals market. The benchmark for the development of new mines is about 18 years. Africa can reduce the initial phase of mine development by several years, and this will position the region as an attractive investment destination.
Third, African governments can identify sub-standard mining operations causing environmental damage and take action by requiring sales to more qualified operators that can comply with the necessary environmental and social standards.
Fourth, regional coordination that leverages the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) is indispensable. With 35 African countries having critical mineral resources, and the strong priority of AfCFTA implementation in the region, regional coordination to continuously expand markets for the integrated development of value chains, skills, and regional infrastructure projects is critical.
Fifth, job generation strategies should be integrated into overall critical minerals projects through a well-designed corridor development plan, regional partnerships, and value chain strategies. Infrastructure corridors and new energy generation also offer opportunities for new export-oriented industries to flourish in the wake of these investments (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 2017). Well-designed special economic zones will generate jobs that align with a given country’s economic vocation and opportunities along the development corridors (Zeng 2021).
In concert with these five recommendations, investment promotion agreements or critical minerals agreements can be explored with the U.S. In addition to continuing engagements for the reauthorization (and expansion to the critical minerals sector) of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), due to expire on September 30, 2025, African governments can also explore individual investment promotion agreements or critical minerals agreements with the U.S. (Egyin 2024).
Conversely, the U.S. foreign policy towards Africa should include a well-organized minerals diplomacy. China has used a multi-pronged engagement in African countries for years. Other countries, such as India, Saudi Arabia (Magid and Dahan 2024), and the European Union (EU) (Acheampong 2024) are beginning to explore entries into the African critical minerals sector. The U.S. cannot be left behind.
A coordinated inter-agency effort from the U.S.’ side is required, including the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) on financing of infrastructure and mining investments, the U.S. Export Import Bank (EXIM) on financing the export of equipment and goods together with the import of minerals, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) on financial support to upstream studies, the USGS on exploratory geological work, the DOE on energy policies and investments, the Treasury on financial and fiscal instruments, the Commerce Department on trade barriers elimination, and the State Department on a range of assistance on trade, energy, and economic development.
The U.S. faces several risks with critical minerals that can be resolved through well-designed partnerships with African countries. Through these partnerships, the U.S. can secure the supply of refined critical minerals independent from supply chains linked to China; have faster access to large deposits of critical minerals; develop new opportunities for U.S. businesses in mining, refining, and infrastructure sectors in Africa; and support stable, growing economies with reduced national and regional conflicts.