{"id":1010633,"date":"2026-06-07T06:08:21","date_gmt":"2026-06-07T06:08:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/1010633\/"},"modified":"2026-06-07T06:08:21","modified_gmt":"2026-06-07T06:08:21","slug":"moscows-forces-are-exhausted-is-the-war-in-ukraine-finally-turning-against-putin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/1010633\/","title":{"rendered":"‘Moscow’s forces are exhausted’ Is the war in Ukraine finally turning against Putin?"},"content":{"rendered":"

While the bloodletting intensifies, some nevertheless believe there has never been a better moment to press for a ceasefire. Foreign Editor David Pratt examines the evidence<\/strong><\/p>\n

Throughout more than four years of fighting there has often been talk of a \u201cturning point\u201d.<\/p>\n

More often than not, though, Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine has then settled back into a familiar pattern with the ebb and flow of ground offensives and counter-offensives.<\/p>\n

As the conflict has dragged on, another familiar but no less vicious pattern has emerged too as both sides exchange drone and missile strikes deep inside each other\u2019s territory.<\/p>\n

Just this past month the intensity of that air war increased again with two consecutive Russian aerial attacks on the Ukrainian capital Kyiv and other cities that were the largest since the start of the war.<\/p>\n

Last week, it was Russia\u2019s turn to again feel the \u201cdeep strike\u201d reach of Ukrainian drones, when just hours before the opening of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum an attack set ablaze an oil terminal in the city and also hit a nearby naval base.<\/p>\n

The attack on his home city cast a cloud over president Vladimir Putin\u2019s showcase economic gathering and brought an unusually frank admission from the Russian leader.<\/p>\n

\u201cTo our regret, some of them break through,\u201d Putin said of the drone strikes. \u201cRussia has an air defence system, we need to improve it, strengthen it, and we will do that.\u201d<\/p>\n

But despite these ongoing tit-for-tat aerial attacks between the two sides, the talk yet again among many military and diplomatic analysts is of a significant \u201cturning point\u201d in Europe\u2019s largest, bloodiest conflict since the Second World War.<\/p>\n

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself appears to sense what appears to be a shift in the war\u2019s dynamics and these past few days has sought to revive dormant peace talks by writing an open letter to his Russian counterpart.<\/p>\n

In the letter, published late on Thursday, Zelenskyy offered a face-to-face meeting and a ceasefire during negotiations on a broader peace deal.<\/p>\n

It was the first such missive from the Ukrainian leader to Putin since Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion in February 2022.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe see that the United States is fully focused on the issue of Iran, and it would be wrong to simply wait until the war in Europe returns to the centre of its attention,\u201d Zelenskyy wrote. \u201cUkraine proposes ending this war through direct engagement between us \u2013 and you. I am proposing a meeting.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addresses the press at an informal meeting of European Union leaders on April 23, 2026 in Ayia Napa, Cyprus. The EU heads of state and government are meeting over two days to discuss the conflict in Iran and the Middle East, including freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, the effects of high fuel prices, and how Europe may contribute to de-escalation and a peace agreement. (Photo by Byron Smith\/Getty Images) (Image: Byron Smith)<\/p>\n

\u2018The letter\u2019s author\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n

ASKED whether he would meet Zelenskyy, whom the Kremlin chief was careful not to name but to refer to only as \u201cthe letter\u2019s author\u201d, Putin was blunt.<\/p>\n

\u201cI don\u2019t see the point in meeting. The only point is for the Ukrainian side to halt the advance of our armed forces. But we need agreements \u2013 not for six months, not for three months, but for the long term.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cLet the experts get to work and come up with some solutions. After that, we can meet,\u201d the Russian leader insisted.<\/p>\n

Russian war bloggers were equally dismissive of Zelenskyy\u2019s letter, casting it as a malicious public relations stunt to stir up discontent inside Russia rather than end the war.<\/p>\n

But even if such a cynical interpretation of Zelenskyy\u2019s letter had a modicum of truth behind it, then the Ukrainian leader would only be capitalising on the growing evidence that Russian discontent with the war is in fact real. Analysts attest that it\u2019s those very signs of discontent, along with others, such as a growing optimism in Kyiv that it can fight Russia to a ceasefire, that has fuelled the latest speculation of an inflection point having been reached this time around.<\/p>\n

Read more<\/strong><\/p>\n

Such is the resonance of that point having been reached that some analysts like research fellow Jack Watling, of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), maintain that a ceasefire \u201cis now a realistic possibility\u201d.<\/p>\n

\u201cUkraine\u2019s mood shift is not the result of a radical transformation of how the war is being fought but rather stems from a subtle turn in several trends that together point to a major change in the war\u2019s trajectory,\u201d wrote Watling recently in the pages of Foreign Affairs magazine.<\/p>\n

So just what are these trends and the impact they are having on the war? Perhaps more importantly, do they have the capacity to bring about that elusive durable ceasefire?<\/p>\n

One of the first factors in attempting to answer such questions is to examine the issue of manpower and territorial gains.<\/p>\n

As several studies have shown, Russia is now paying more for less ground than at any point in the course of the war. Its monthly casualty rates now reportedly above 30,000 are said to have exceeded its recruitment rates since 2025.<\/p>\n

As Watling points out, for all of 2024 and most of 2025, Russia was able to muster more recruits than it was losing.<\/p>\n

This effectively allowed Russian forces to double down on the intensity of frontline assaults even though they were suffering high casualties.<\/p>\n

By contrast, Ukraine was suffering more casualties than it could replace with fresh troops.<\/p>\n

Black smoke rises after Ukraine reportedly launched unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks on the opening day of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, one of Russia’s most prominent organizations, in St. Petersburg, Russia, on June 03, 2026. (Photo by Ali Cura\/Anadolu via Getty Images) (Image: Anadolu via Getty Images)<\/p>\n

Complacent belief<\/strong><\/p>\n

WATLING and other analysts say that this led to the complacent belief in the Kremlin \u201cthat even if progress was slow, the Russian military would eventually occupy the entirety of the Donbas, the contested region in eastern Ukraine that Russia laid claim to in 2022\u201d.<\/p>\n

Such confidence allowed Moscow at that time to dig its heels in over any moves towards peace negotiations brokered by the Trump administration.<\/p>\n

This confidence was borne out of the assumption that should talks fail, then time would then tell in Russia\u2019s favour on the battlefield.<\/p>\n

Related to the manpower and personnel factor is the evidence also that Russia\u2019s rate of advance is collapsing.<\/p>\n

According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russia\u2019s forces gained 9.76 square kilometres per day in the first four months of 2025, but only 4.6 over the same period this year \u2013 less than half last year\u2019s pace.<\/p>\n

\u201cFor the very first time since 2023, the Ukrainians have actually managed to take back more terrain than the Russians did,\u201d said George Barros, a long-time analyst on Russia at the ISW.<\/p>\n

While slowing Russia\u2019s advance on the battlefield, Kyiv\u2019s drones and aerial abilities, meanwhile, have also transformed Ukraine\u2019s fightback by taking the war to Russia.<\/p>\n

The mass production of UAVs \u2013 vastly increased since last year \u2013 allows Kyiv to wage the long-range drone war and maintain a shorter-range \u201ckill zone\u201d along the frontline.<\/p>\n

This has largely compensated for Ukraine\u2019s shortage of troops, further slowing Russian offensives many feared would accelerate last year and this spring.<\/p>\n

Strikes deep into Russia are also having a significant impact on the war\u2019s trajectory.<\/p>\n

These days \u2013 in contrast to the early stages of the war \u2013 Ukraine is prosecuting a sustained air barrage against targets more than 1,000 kilometres behind Russian lines.<\/p>\n

This has been brought about by new domestically produced long-range strike drones and cruise missiles.<\/p>\n

Last week\u2019s hit on St Petersburg during the Economic Forum \u2013 sometimes dubbed \u201cPutin\u2019s Davos\u201d \u2013 is a stark point in case.<\/p>\n

Backed by some \u20ac90bn in EU loans, Kyiv is pouring resources into domestic arms production in a bid to reduce dependence on Western weapons and the political constraints that often accompany them.<\/p>\n

Ever since the war became bogged down in its earlier stages, Ukrainian policymakers have recognised the importance of bringing the war home to Russia.<\/p>\n

Kyiv, however, has also been under no illusions about the deep reluctance of Ukraine\u2019s allies to authorise strikes against targets inside the Russian Federation using Western weapons.<\/p>\n

This has left Ukraine with little choice but to prioritise the development of domestically produced long-range drones and missiles capable of penetrating deep into Russia.<\/p>\n

This satellite image provided by Vantor shows the aftermath of the reported drone attacks that struck an oil terminal in St. Petersburg, Russia, Wednesday, June 3, 2026. (Satellite image \u00a92026 Vantor via AP) (Image: AP)<\/p>\n

Tactics evolving<\/strong><\/p>\n

AS Peter Dickinson of the Atlantic Council\u2019s Eurasia Centre recently pointed out, Ukraine\u2019s bombing tactics are also evolving, especially with regard to key logistical hubs.<\/p>\n

\u201cUkrainian attacks on Russia\u2019s oil industry have proved particularly effective.<\/p>\n

\u201cDuring spring 2026, a series of spectacular drone strikes against port terminals succeeded in disrupting Russian exports, while attacks on refineries led to reports of significantly reduced capacity,\u201d Dickinson observed last month.<\/p>\n

Ukrainian officials, he says, believe that by targeting Russia\u2019s energy industry, they can deprive the Kremlin of a vital economic lifeline that funds the ongoing invasion.<\/p>\n

All of this has meant that in Russia, resentment is deepening over a war that has crept ever closer to home.<\/p>\n

According to Russia\u2019s state-owned polling institution the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre, its index of \u201cpersonal protest potential\u201d, an indicator of respondents\u2019 willingness to take part in demonstrations, rose to 25 % in April \u2013 its highest level since the war began.<\/p>\n

But there is another factor also playing into this shift in the war \u2013 geopolitics and diplomacy.<\/p>\n

Some analysts say that the Trump administration\u2019s dubious \u201cpeace-making\u201d efforts marked the start of this.<\/p>\n

In effect, Trump\u2019s efforts, they say, amounted to de facto pressure on Ukraine to acquiesce to a bad deal that would have allowed Russia to keep the territories it had unlawfully seized.<\/p>\n

The fact that Zelenskyy baulked at this cast Ukraine adrift from much US support, but in turn might just have played to Kyiv\u2019s longer-term advantage, say observers.<\/p>\n

For not only did such moves consolidate support from European allies, but set Ukraine into a \u201cgo-it-alone\u201d mindset from which it has benefited.<\/p>\n

All of this has led some to interpret the Trump administration\u2019s handling of relations with Ukraine as a gross strategic and diplomatic miscalculation.<\/p>\n

That said, efforts to maintain US support have not dried up completely. That much was evident last week when 18 Republicans defied their leaders to join Democrats in support of a bill that runs counter to Trump\u2019s agenda.<\/p>\n

In a House vote they approved new aid for Ukraine and moves to impose a fresh round of sanctions targeting the industries fuelling Russia\u2019s war economy.<\/p>\n

The bill now heads to the Senate where, admittedly, Trump\u2019s opposition has stopped similar attempts at new penalties on Russia and its allies.<\/p>\n

And even if it were to clear both chambers, it would likely be vetoed by the president who has repeatedly baulked at legislation that seeks to constrain his ability to negotiate on foreign policy matters.<\/p>\n

Still, backers of the measure said the vote last Thursday sent a strong bipartisan message to the president that significant support remains in Congress for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

So, where does this leave the war and the prospects for a ceasefire and peace? Viewed from a battlefield perspective, some senior Ukrainian military chiefs are convinced that this is indeed a pivotal moment.<\/p>\n

Speaking to Reuters, Andriy Biletsky, a senior Ukrainian commander, said recently that \u201cthe next six to nine months are a turning point\u201d.<\/p>\n

Biletsky, who commands Ukraine\u2019s revered Third Army Corps, told the news outlet he believes Moscow\u2019s forces are exhausted and unable to make any significant battle wins.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe lack of personnel no longer allows them to advance the way they did, for example, a year ago,\u201d Biletsky maintains.<\/p>\n

Inevitable defeat?<\/strong><\/p>\n

ALL of this, of cours, flies in the face of what for so long has been the prevailing narrative of Ukraine\u2019s inevitable defeat.<\/p>\n

It was a narrative, too, that the Trump administration itself tirelessly pushed with the US leader insisting that Zelenskyy and Ukraine don\u2019t \u201chave any cards\u201d and, in any case, Russia always wins its wars.<\/p>\n

What is clear right now, though, is that the strategic and geopolitical landscape of this war has changed.<\/p>\n

According to George Barros, the analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, this is the moment outside countries should seize on Ukraine\u2019s current advantages and help it exploit the gains which he warns are not going to be permanent.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhat the United States and international partners supporting Ukraine are looking at is an extremely rare, ephemeral opportunity to lean into helping Ukraine exploit this advantage that they have while they still have it,\u201d Barros recently told US political website The Hill.<\/p>\n

\u201cI\u2019m not prepared to argue that it\u2019s going to be here nine months from now. So we really have to look at this window for what it is,\u201d Barros added.<\/p>\n

As it stands, Ukrainian resilience it would seem has given it a rare modicum of leverage right now.<\/p>\n

Whether with its allies it can fully harness that to its ultimate advantage remains to be seen, and anyway, Vladimir Putin under pressure as he is like never before, will doubtless see it differently.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"While the bloodletting intensifies, some nevertheless believe there has never been a better moment to press for a…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":1010634,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[7654],"tags":[2000,299,332,279075,59961,657,43717,333,2601,335],"class_list":["post-1010633","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-ukraine","tag-eu","tag-europe","tag-russia","tag-st-petersburg-international-economic-forum","tag-turning-point","tag-ukraine","tag-ukrainian-president","tag-vladimir-putin","tag-volodymyr-zelenskyy","tag-war-in-ukraine"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/116707335229736672","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1010633","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1010633"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1010633\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1010634"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1010633"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1010633"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1010633"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}