Germans are eagerly engaging in a new national sport. They blame Friedrich Merz, the head of their federal government, for all of the country\u2019s woes. <\/p>\n
That impulse says less about Mr. Merz than about the political maturity of the Federal Republic.<\/p>\n
Who drives the \u201cit\u2019s all Merz\u2019s fault\u201d narrative?<\/strong><\/p>\n Without any question, Mr. Merz certainly has his flaws, whether in terms of his communications or his management style.<\/p>\n The anti-Merz mood is driven by a combination of two forces: First, there are the left-of-center politicians and the large media segment that is sympathetic to them. <\/p>\n They simply bemoan the fact that the previous government, the \u201ctraffic light\u201d coalition with the Social Democrats and Greens, was voted out of office.<\/p>\n The other driving force is that many Germans still idealize Angela Merkel\u2019s long, somnolent time as German Chancellor between 2005 and 2021. <\/p>\n Ducking the hard choices<\/strong><\/p>\n The net effect of this is that this yearning for nostalgia has allowed the German political class both on the left and the traditional right to avoid the more awkward question of tackling the hard choices on governance and reform.<\/p>\n Turning the current chancellor into a national pi\u00f1ata has also produced an unintended consequence. In the polls, it has strengthened precisely the very force which Germany\u2019s mainstream parties profess to contain, the far\u2011right Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland.<\/p>\n Goodbye to hard-headed virtues<\/strong><\/p>\n Germany\u2019s post\u2011war success rested on two estimable virtues: economic realism and a willingness to embrace structural reforms. Over the past two decades, both have eroded. <\/p>\n The symptoms are now visible in faltering growth, chronically weak investment and a policy debate strangely detached from global competitive pressures \u2014 or, at best, unable to translate rhetoric into action.<\/p>\n Angela Merkel\u2019s hand at the tiller<\/strong><\/p>\n Merkel was a neophyte when she took office as Chancellor when it came to the complex issues of economic, fiscal and social policy.<\/p>\n She decided early on to smooth over any of the inescapable conflicts, whether on infrastructure spending, education, digitalization, fiscal sustainability, labor markets, energy or industrial strategy. <\/p>\n Because she was largely unwilling to confront the structural constraints of an ageing, export\u2011dependent economy, the result was stability without direction. In many ways, she chose to reign as the nation\u2019s anesthetist, her projection of calmness covered up what was essentially an escapist act.<\/p>\n Merz\u2019s economic message: Relic from another era?<\/p>\n In today\u2019s Berlin, it is fashionable to dismiss Merz\u2019s economic message as a relic from another era. But is that really so?<\/p>\n Many of the themes he raises \u2014 demographic headwinds, the burden of an ever\u2011expanding welfare state, suffocating regulation \u2014 have become more urgent, not less. <\/p>\n To wave them away as retrograde obsessions is to indulge in Merkel-style self\u2011deception yet again.<\/p>\n Tackling in 2026 what was on the agenda already in 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n Consider this political thought experiment: Had Merz, rather than Merkel, taken the chancellery in 2005, Germany would likely have had its present argument about socio-economic trade\u2011offs and priorities two decades earlier. <\/p>\n Instead, the country used the long upturn of globalization as an excuse to avoid painful debates about competitiveness, social insurance and the state\u2019s role in steering investment.<\/p>\n The problem with \u201ccompetitive overpromising\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n Responsibility for Germany\u2019s current drift is widely shared. After all, all major parties have engaged in what might be called \u201ccompetitive overpromising\u201d \u2014 ever more generous pledges on pensions, benefits, climate spending or tax relief, with little regard for fiscal realities. <\/p>\n Over time, this pattern has systematically fueled voter frustration.<\/p>\n The AfD simply exploits frustration<\/strong><\/p>\n The AfD has exploited that frustration. The response of the established parties to date \u2014 to avoid tackling the underlying issues, from reviving growth to redesigning migration, education and climate policy \u2014 is self\u2011defeating. <\/p>\n The party that most loudly promises to \u201csay what others won\u2019t\u201d inevitably profits when the the economy is turning downward and the political mainstream confines itself to mere posturing.<\/p>\n The \u201cfirewall\u201d against the AfD: An excuse for inaction<\/strong><\/p>\n Germany\u2019s centrist parties have erected what they call a Brandmauer, a \u201cfirewall\u201d against the far right, which translates into a pledge of no co\u2011operation with the AfD at any level. <\/p>\n In practice, ritualized references to this firewall have been abused as an excuse for achieving very little progress in actual policymaking. \u00a0<\/p>\n To the mainstream parties, clinging to the firewall mantra offers a very short-sighted form of mutual reassurance.\u00a0 <\/p>\n While many AfD proposals are half\u2011baked, illiberal or unconstitutional, voters increasingly see the invocation of the firewall as the governing parties\u2019 convenient cover-up for their own paralysis. <\/p>\n How to achieve a fresh start?<\/strong><\/p>\n Escaping this impasse will require more than a new face in the chancellery or another governing coalition. That is a political experience tying the contemporary UK and Germany closely together. <\/p>\n What Germany needs is a leaner, more focused state, a serious assault on bureaucratic obstruction, greater technological openness and a renewed respect for economic reality. <\/p>\n If and when that happens, Germany can deliver better results on competitiveness, defense, digitalization and decarbonization \u2014 and finally rely much less, or so one hopes, on elaborate ideological disputes as a substitute for result-oriented politics.<\/p>\n The hardest task<\/strong><\/p>\n The hardest task for the German people and its political leadership alike will be to accept that their country\u2019s past success relied on a unique constellation of globalization tailwinds that has now faded. <\/p>\n Those benign conditions allowed Berlin to postpone difficult trade\u2011offs for years, and to compensate domestic \u201closers\u201d of policy battles more generously than many of Europe\u2019s \u201cwinners\u201d. <\/p>\n That pattern greatly distorted the mechanics of German politics by allowing decision-makers to avoid making tough decisions. It makes corrective action that much harder today.<\/p>\n More honesty about trade\u2011offs<\/strong><\/p>\n Above all, German politicians need to be more honest with voters about trade\u2011offs. As the AfD\u2019s constant rise in the polls indicates, the permanent incantation of the Brandmauer cannot substitute for finally delivering overdue reforms of the tax system, welfare state, energy transition and migration regime. <\/p>\n The habit of blaming the current chancellor may feel comforting, but it cannot conceal the deeper, collective responsibility for Germany\u2019s near 20 years of political and economic drift.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Germans are eagerly engaging in a new national sport. 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