{"id":106656,"date":"2025-05-16T15:55:08","date_gmt":"2025-05-16T15:55:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/106656\/"},"modified":"2025-05-16T15:55:08","modified_gmt":"2025-05-16T15:55:08","slug":"will-donald-trump-make-european-tech-great-again","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/106656\/","title":{"rendered":"Will Donald Trump make European tech great again?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Following Donald Trump\u2019s election, leaders of the major American tech companies\u2014so-called Big Tech\u2014rushed to embrace the new administration<\/a> as a potential solution to their global, particularly European, regulatory challenges. As Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg explained<\/a>, \u201cthe U.S. government should be defending its companies.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Trump administration\u2019s first 100 days now raise the question whether Big Tech made the right bet in assuming Donald Trump would be their international savior. The global chaos created by President Trump has stimulated the rest of the world\u2014especially Europe\u2014to look beyond the United States for autonomy in digital products and services.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Waving a big stick<\/b>\u00a0<\/p>\n

It started out well for Big Tech. Three days after taking office, President Trump used the stage<\/a> at the World Economic Forum in Davos to denounce European digital rules as a \u201cform of taxation.\u201d Less than a month later, he issued<\/a>\u00a0a presidential memorandum directing the appropriate officials to develop tariffs and \u201cother responsive actions\u201d against \u201cregulations imposed on United States companies by foreign governments that could inhibit the growth or intended operation of United States companies.\u201d \u202fThe fact sheet<\/a> accompanying the memorandum specifically identified the European Union\u2019s (EU) Digital Markets Act (DMA), focused on competition, and Digital Services Act (DSA), focused on online harms, for \u201cscrutiny from the Administration.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

Despite the memorandum\u2019s aggressive tone, the tariffs announced on April 2 fell short<\/a> of penalizing the EU for its regulatory activities. Three weeks later, on April 23, the European Commission (EC)\u2014the administrative arm of the EU\u2014announced fines<\/a> of \u20ac500 million ($570 million) against Apple and \u20ac200 million ($230 million) against Meta for violating the DMA. Meta described<\/a> the penalties in Trumpian terms as \u201ca multi-billion-dollar tariff.\u201d A spokesperson for the White House National Security Council said<\/a> the EU\u2019s actions \u201cwill not be tolerated.\u201d \u00a0<\/p>\n

While some inferred<\/a> the EC\u2019s delay in announcing the penalties on Apple and Meta signaled the Trump-tech alliance had paid off, EC president Ursula von der Leyen was unequivocal<\/a> that the DMA and DSA are \u201cuntouchable\u201d in trade negotiations with the United States. \u00a0<\/p>\n

President Trump has confidently predicted<\/a> he will have \u201cvery little problem\u201d making a new trade agreement with the EU. Whether that potential agreement will deal with Big Tech\u2019s regulatory requests remains uncertain. What is clear is that the transatlantic relationship is now defined by much more than digital regulation.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Europe-US security foundation shifts<\/b>\u00a0<\/p>\n

Big Tech\u2019s battle with European regulators may ultimately be overshadowed by the Trump administration\u2019s destabilization of the broader Europe-U.S. security relationship. President Trump\u2019s threat of using tariffs as retaliation for EU tech regulatory policy is not happening in a vacuum. His questioning of NATO\u2019s value<\/a>, ambiguity over Ukraine, threats to reduce<\/a> U.S. troop strength in Europe, warming relations with Vladimir Putin, and castigation of Europe\u2019s commitment to its own defense have also created a new ambiguity about America\u2019s commitment to European security.\u00a0<\/p>\n

European leaders are responding. French President Emmanuel Macron has called for<\/a> European \u201cstrategic autonomy.\u201d The new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz explained<\/a>, \u201cMy absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step-by-step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

These security concerns are spilling over into the tech sector. In early March the Dutch parliament passed<\/a> eight resolutions with broad support urging the government to replace American-made software and hardware. If there is no stability in our security and trade relationships with the United States, the argument goes<\/a>, is it still possible to rely on American companies for essential digital services?\u00a0<\/p>\n

Europe defending itself<\/b>\u00a0<\/p>\n

The threat of Vladimir Putin and the unpredictability of Donald Trump have converged to redefine European security.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u201cNaturally, Russia\u2019s neighbors are most concerned by Russia,\u201d European Council president Antonio Costa recently explained<\/a>, \u201cBut what is essential is for everyone to understand that this is a collective threat.\u201d Germany\u2019s Merz lamented<\/a>, \u201cAfter Donald Trump\u2019s statements\u2026it is clear that the Americans, at least this part of the Americans, this administration, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

As a result, Europe is mobilizing to reduce its security reliance on the United States. Whether such strategic autonomy is long overdue<\/a> or a strategic mistake<\/a>, Europe has begun to refocus its defense capabilities to lessen the role of the United States and its companies.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The European Commission\u2019s ReArm Europe Plan\/Readiness 2030<\/a> is the centerpiece of this shift. It proposes<\/a> unlocking more than $860 billion for military investment, including approximately $160 billion in EU-backed loans. U.S. defense firms, that have accounted for approximately two thirds<\/a> of EU defense procurements, now face a new reality: 65%<\/a>\u00a0of defense purchases funded by the loans must be sourced within the EU, Norway, or Ukraine. As Politico reported<\/a>, \u201cUnited States arms-makers are being frozen out of the European Union\u2019s massive new defense spending law.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

From hardware to software<\/b>\u00a0<\/p>\n

Europe\u2019s retooling for defense production has begun. In Germany, for example, a former Volkswagen car factory and a railcar plant are being transformed<\/a> into tank production facilities. Yet modern warfare is about more than putting heavy weapons systems on the field. It is also about building the digital ecosystem that makes modern weapons effective. \u00a0<\/p>\n

Modern weapons have become as reliant on digital technology as they are on metal and munitions. If the family car has become a computer on wheels, weapons such as tanks have become computers on treads. Europe\u2019s strategic autonomy is not just about building weapons, but also the algorithms, data, and networks that enable its capabilities.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

There is an important paradigm shift underway. Since the dawn of the digital era, software has been a servant of hardware, whether it was computer mainframes or tanks. In battle tanks, for instance, real time maintenance diagnostics keep the weapons in the field, while software assisted fire control systems deliver precision munitions on target. The tanks being built in the old Volkswagen plant remain a formidable force, but their lethality and survivability rely on the algorithms and networks that support them.\u00a0<\/p>\n

This shift is most starkly illustrated in drone warfare. An estimated 70%<\/a> of casualties on both sides in the Ukraine war have been inflicted by drones\u2014often operating semi-autonomously based on software-defined parameters. Loitering drones wait over the battlefield until their onboard sensors deliver data corresponding to its algorithm\u2019s attack parameters at which time they strike with precision. The drones can, for instance, target the weakest point<\/a> in an armored vehicle\u2014something traditional \u201cdumb\u201d munitions cannot do. Multiple drones, acting in swarms, can share target data, evade defenses, and attack without human oversight. \u00a0<\/p>\n

In December 2024 the Ukrainian army made history<\/a> by launching a large-scale assault conducted entirely by drones. Unmanned aerial vehicles as well as land drones combined to attack a Russian position. They were countered by Russian aerial kamikaze drones.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Software is now less of a support role and more of a combatant. Autonomous European security therefore includes autonomous digital capability.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Geopolitical software\u00a0<\/b>\u00a0<\/p>\n

President Trump\u2019s apparent willingness to use American technology for geopolitical leverage has reinforced European anxieties.\u00a0Reuters reported<\/a> that the Ukrainian government was told it faced the imminent shutoff of Starlink satellite service unless it agreed to terms on critical minerals exports in February. Over 40,000 Starlink terminals are reportedly<\/a> deployed in Ukraine supporting communications, artillery targeting, and drone coordination. \u00a0<\/p>\n

In March, the New York Times revealed<\/a> that the United States suspended Ukraine\u2019s access to satellite imagery used to track the movement of Russian troops. On orders from President Trump, the article explained, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency \u201ctemporarily suspended\u201d the sharing of the data, a move that was \u201cthe latest in a series of steps taken by the administration to pressure Kyiv into peace talks with Russia.\u201d\u00a0 \u00a0<\/p>\n

Such actions have raised the existential question<\/a> whether U.S.-made military software currently used by European nations contains strategic override code\u2014kill switches that Washington controls. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) provided to Ukraine, for example, was reportedly<\/a> software-limited to prevent reaching its full range so it wouldn\u2019t be used deep into Russia.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Sovereignty over the battlefield has evolved to include software sovereignty.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Big Tech had hoped Donald Trump would overpower European efforts to establish behavioral expectations for its products and services. The Trump administration\u2019s activities, however, have turned European attention from rules to tools. \u00a0<\/p>\n

What began as a transatlantic debate about European regulatory sovereignty has evolved into a broader reassessment of technological sovereignty.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Creating European agency<\/b>\u00a0<\/p>\n

Long before the second Trump administration, the EU wrestled with establishing strategic goals for its digital economy. The \u201cDigital Decade Strategy<\/a>\u201d launched in 2021 was not about regulation, but a set of non-binding digital deliverables for all 27 member countries. The strategy was built around four pillars: digital skills, digital infrastructure, digital transformation of business, and the digitization of public services.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The first Digital Decade progress report<\/a> in 2023 revealed Europe\u2019s rhetoric outpaced its achievement. The Trump administration\u2019s provocations, however, have now infused a sense of urgency.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

A 2025 study\u2019s<\/a> finding that 92% of Europe\u2019s cloud infrastructure is controlled by U.S. companies illustrates the digital challenge confronting Europe. Some European efforts to scale up cloud alternatives are being done in conjunction with American companies. Especially significant, however, are pure European initiatives such as Gaia-X<\/a> and Cleura<\/a>\u2014companies that are building a federated cloud of multiple independent and interoperable European clouds seamlessly working together. \u00a0<\/p>\n

An independent European satellite constellation of Starlink-like functionality is being developed. Scheduled for 2027 deployment, Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite<\/a> (IRIS\u00b2)\u00a0joins the already operational Galileo<\/a> alternative to GPS and Copernicus<\/a> climate observation systems.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Perhaps the most intricate and expansive initiative is the EuroStack<\/a>. Rather than a specific product or service, it is a strategic vision for a European-controlled \u201cstack\u201d of the components necessary for digital applications. The goal is to replace the American tech stack dominated by AWS, Google, Microsoft, and Apple with similarly functioning European capabilities. Its ambition is illustrated by the breadth of its scope\u2014from semiconductors to cloud infrastructure, open-source software, and AI applications, all with the appropriate standards for interoperability. \u00a0<\/p>\n

\u201cEurope needs to recover the initiative and become more technologically independent across all layers of its critical digital infrastructure,\u201d warned a March 2025 open letter<\/a> to EU leaders from a broad coalition of European tech executives. Endorsing the EuroStack initiative, the leaders called for \u201cradial action\u201d to promote \u201csovereign digital infrastructure,\u201d beginning with a \u201cformal requirement for the public sector to \u2018Buy European.\u2019\u201d \u00a0<\/p>\n

The existence of these and similar initiatives are an early indication of Europe\u2019s desire for agency over its digital future. It is a vision that will not be easy to implement but has been given new urgency by the Trump administration\u2019s foreign policy. As a Ukrainian drone manufacturer explained<\/a>, \u201cWe don\u2019t want to have any dependence on America\u2019s politics.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

A strategic backfire?<\/b>\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Trump administration was supposed to be a shield against the profit margin impact<\/a> of European regulation. Instead, it may have become the catalyst for Europe beginning to turn its back on American digital technology. What began as a regulatory skirmish has escalated into a campaign for technological self-determination that threatens to cost Big Tech what they value most: growth. \u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Whether Europe succeeds in building a credible alternative to the American tech stack remains to be seen. But it is already clear that the United States is no longer viewed as a neutral steward of digital tools. In betting on Donald Trump, Big Tech may have provoked the very digital decoupling it hoped to avoid\u2014and in doing so, may have helped to make European tech great again.\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Following Donald Trump\u2019s election, leaders of the major American tech companies\u2014so-called Big Tech\u2014rushed to embrace the new administration…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":106657,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5311],"tags":[3907,48836,48841,25910,29691,8095,9056,18541,1699,40740,9330,48842,300,32996,48837,48838,48839,48840,5465,25906,25909,49,978,659],"class_list":{"0":"post-106656","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-united-states","8":"tag-article","9":"tag-business-workforce","10":"tag-center-for-technology-innovation-cti","11":"tag-commentary","12":"tag-corporations","13":"tag-defense-security","14":"tag-defense-industry","15":"tag-europe-eurasia","16":"tag-european-union","17":"tag-global-economy-development","18":"tag-global-trade","19":"tag-governance-studies","20":"tag-north-america","21":"tag-presidency","22":"tag-regulatory-policy","23":"tag-technology-information","24":"tag-technology-policy-regulation","25":"tag-techtank","26":"tag-u-s-economy","27":"tag-u-s-government-politics","28":"tag-u-s-states-and-territories","29":"tag-united-states","30":"tag-us","31":"tag-usa"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114518329183369355","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/106656","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=106656"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/106656\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/106657"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=106656"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=106656"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=106656"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}