The European reaction to an American pullback from its leading role in continental defense has sparked a drive to coordinate a pan-European response with a large role for the European Union. But this effort has met resistance from a broadly Euroskeptic ‘sovereigntist’ countercurrent in European politics. <\/p>\n
The Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland (AfD) anticipates a chance to lead \u2014 either alone or in coalition \u2014 at least one of the two state elections in Germany\u2019s east in September. Either of the two potential candidates from France\u2019s Rassemblement National or National Rally (RN) comfortably leads the large field of candidates to succeed Emmanuel Macron next April. <\/p>\n
A Quincy Institute Brief<\/a> published on June 30 examines the potential for and the obstacles to the efforts by the EU and the European members of NATO<\/a> to enhance European defense capabilities, and the choices this presents to American foreign policy. In many EU and NATO countries, populist nationalist parties oppose the centralizing ambitions of the EU and defend the prerogatives of national governments in the realm of defense and security. <\/p>\n These parties generally favor a strong and capable national defense and some increase in defense spending but do not justify this by pointing to an imminent threat of invasion from Russia<\/a>. They tend not to treat the Russia-Ukraine war as an existential contest for Europe<\/a> as a whole. <\/p>\n France\u2019s RN party, led by Marine Le Pen and her prot\u00e9g\u00e9 Jordan Bardella, continues to lead the list of contenders to succeed Emmanuel Macron by a wide margin. A final appeal by Le Pen to be able to run for president decided Tuesday that she will be eligible to run. She announced she will do so, with Bardella campaigning at her side as prime minister in waiting. In an interview<\/a> with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Bardella suggested that he would seek close relations with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to cooperate on economic reforms and the European defense buildup. <\/p>\n The popularity of RN among its core supporters (about a third of French voters) is based on a frustration with the political deadlock of the last several years of Macron\u2019s presidency, immigration policies, and traditional nationalism at odds with the European Union. As leader of the Patriots of Europe faction in the European parliament, Bardella has twice led votes of no confidence in Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, while Macron has been ardently pro-EU. Le Pen is more likely than Bardella to oppose any reinforcement of common foreign and security policy led by the Commission. <\/p>\n The AfD is Germany\u2019s single most popular party, surpassing the ruling CDU-CSU<\/a> by about six points in the most recent polls. A federal election is not required until 2029, but Merz\u2019s approval ratings<\/a> stand at only about 15%. A sluggish economy, high energy costs, and declining competitiveness of German industry are the widely cited explanations for the sour public mood. <\/p>\n The AfD held its national party conference in Erfurt \u2014 capital of the eastern state of Thuringia \u2014 on July 4-5. Some 20,000 demonstrators from across Germany converged on the city to denounce the AfD. The demonstrations were largely peaceful and did not disrupt the conference itself, given the effective police presence outside. <\/p>\n Speakers at the conference avoided polarizing anti-migrant<\/a> rhetoric that justifies \u2014 in the minds of AfD critics \u2014 the drive to ban the party as anti-constitutional. Instead, the AfD wrapped itself in the flag, literally and figuratively, defining itself as patriotic, pragmatic, and prepared to govern. The party leadership emphasized the acceptability of the party as a democratic party of the right, clearly aiming to maximize the chance of winning at least one of the September elections to be held in Saxony-Anhalt (September 6) and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (September 20), both in eastern Germany. <\/p>\n In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD polls at about 40%,<\/a> well ahead of the second-place CDU-CSU. The election arithmetic makes it very unlikely a majority coalition can be formed without AfD. In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, a popular Social Democrat (SPD) incumbent governs with the Linke (Left) party. Polls<\/a> show AfD in the lead, but plausible combinations of SPD with other parties seem likely to be able to form a coalition without AfD. <\/p>\n