{"id":1123784,"date":"2026-08-01T08:47:18","date_gmt":"2026-08-01T08:47:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/1123784\/"},"modified":"2026-08-01T08:47:18","modified_gmt":"2026-08-01T08:47:18","slug":"omnibus-europe-has-bureaucracy-really-been-reduced","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/1123784\/","title":{"rendered":"Omnibus Europe: Has Bureaucracy Really Been Reduced?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The following is an adapted version of an article<\/a> written by Bernadett Petri, a researcher at the Europe Strategy Institute of the University of Public Service, originally published in Hungarian on the\u00a0Five Minutes Europe\u00a0blog of\u00a0Ludovika.hu.<\/p>\n

Over the course of a year and a half, the European Commission has put forward 12 simplification packages, and more than half of the legislative initiatives in the 2026 work programme promise EU regulations that are, in some way, lighter, clearer, or easier to implement. However, the question is no longer whether there is a need to reduce bureaucracy, but whether constant legislative changes actually make the European business environment more predictable.<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

Since the start of the second von der Leyen Commission\u2019s term, there has been a dramatic shift in the European Union\u2019s regulatory policy. While the previous institutional cycle was largely characterized by the adoption of new environmental, digital, corporate governance, and supply chain regulations, one of the key watchwords of the Commission that took office in 2024 has been simplification.<\/p>\n

This shift is driven by more than just political rhetoric. For years, European businesses have been pointing out that the combined application of EU rules\u2014each of which may be justified individually\u2014has created a compliance system that is increasingly difficult to manage. The problem is not necessarily caused by a single regulation or directive, but rather by the cumulative effect of overlapping reporting, data disclosure, auditing, licensing, and documentation requirements. This is compounded by the varying ways in which the rules are transposed and enforced across member states, as well as by so-called \u2018gold-plating\u2019, where a country introduces national requirements that are stricter or more complex than the EU\u2019s minimum requirements.<\/p>\n

The Commission itself acknowledges that the sheer volume and density of EU legislation, as well as the interplay between EU and national rules, can lead to unnecessary complexity, redundant compliance burdens, and legal inconsistencies. The \u2018regulatory deep cleaning\u2019 initiative announced in 2026 is therefore no longer aimed at correcting a few isolated pieces of legislation, but rather at reviewing the entire lifecycle of EU legislation.<\/p>\n

12 Packages over a Year and a Half<\/strong><\/p>\n

An Omnibus is a legislative package that amends several interrelated pieces of EU legislation within a single procedure. In theory, this allows the legislator to address overlaps not on a case-by-case basis but by making an entire policy area more coherent.<\/p>\n

Between February 2025 and June 2026, the Commission put forward 12 such simplification proposals. The packages<\/a> range from corporate sustainability reporting and EU investment programmes to the Common Agricultural Policy, the chemical industry, defence procurement, and digital rules, all the way to environmental permitting, the automotive industry, taxation, and energy and tyre labelling. The Commission aims to reduce administrative costs for businesses by at least 25 per cent by the end of its term, and to achieve a 35 per cent reduction for small and medium-sized enterprises. This would represent annual savings of 37.5 billion euros at the EU level. The Commission currently expects the simplification measures already proposed to yield annual administrative savings of approximately 18 billion euros.<\/p>\n

These are impressive figures, but it is important to distinguish between the savings that have been announced, those adopted by lawmakers, and those that actually materialize in the day-to-day operations of businesses. The pre-calculated reduction in the tax burden is not yet equivalent to the simplification experienced by accountants, lawyers, compliance professionals, and corporate executives.<\/p>\n

The Omnibus packages contain numerous changes that were clearly necessary. These include eliminating paper-based documentation and the need to submit the same data multiple times, establishing obligations that are more proportionate to company size, and harmonizing various data reporting systems. For smaller companies, mitigating the regulatory \u2018ripple effect\u2019 is particularly important. In some cases, a small business was not formally subject to a particular EU reporting requirement. Yet a larger business partner or financier still requested detailed data from it due to its own compliance obligations. As a result, the costs of regulations originally designed for large companies were indirectly passed on to smaller suppliers. One of the explicit goals of the first Sustainability Omnibus<\/a> was to limit this effect.<\/p>\n

\n

\u2018The Omnibus packages contain numerous changes that were clearly necessary\u2019<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Simplifying EU investment programmes is also justified. The amended regulation was adopted in December 2025 and entered into force that same month. The new rules increased the EU guarantee behind InvestEU from 26.2 billion euros to 29.1 billion euros, while also allowing for more flexible use of remaining capacity from the European Fund for Strategic Investments, the financial instruments of the Connecting Europe Facility, and InnovFin\u2014that is, the instrument designed to support financing for small businesses\u2014more flexibly. For smaller operations not exceeding 300,000 euros, the number of indicators subject to reporting has been reduced, and the reporting obligation for InvestEU\u2019s implementing partners has shifted from semi-annual to annual. The Commission estimates administrative savings of approximately 350 million euros and additional public and private investments that can be mobilized of at least 50\u201355 billion euros.<\/p>\n

The first evident step toward implementation in this regard took place a month ago, on 19 June: an agreement between the Commission and the European Investment Bank Group unlocked 22 billion euros in new strategic financing capacity under InvestEU. Together with co-financing, this is expected to generate an investment impact of approximately 70 billion euros by the end of the current EU budget cycle, and the expansion is projected to improve financing opportunities for more than 130,000 small and medium-sized enterprises. However, this does not yet mean that 50 or 70 billion euros in new investment has actually been realized as a result of Omnibus II. For now, these are mobilization targets and preliminary estimates. InvestEU had mobilized a total of approximately 397 billion euros in investments by the end of 2025, but the vast majority of this relates to operations established before Omnibus II took effect. The actual impact of the simplification will therefore be evident later, depending on whether projects reach the financing decision stage more quickly, costs for applicants and intermediary institutions are reduced, and the new guarantee capacity actually triggers investments that would not have been realized under the previous rules.<\/p>\n

When Simplification Itself Creates Uncertainty<\/strong><\/p>\n

The greatest contradiction of the omnibus approach is that, while it promises to restore predictability, rapid and repeated amendments to legislation can themselves result in significant compliance costs. Companies do not begin preparing for a new regulation only when it becomes applicable. Years in advance, they procure IT systems, establish data collection processes, amend supplier contracts, engage consultants, and train employees. If the EU legislature postpones or substantially rewrites the requirements shortly before they take effect, it will undoubtedly eliminate certain burdens, but other costs cannot be reversed.<\/p>\n

The first Sustainability Omnibus Package illustrates this well. The Commission first used the so-called \u2018stop-the-clock\u2019 mechanism to postpone the application of certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence obligations\u2014which had sparked intense debate from the outset\u2014and then substantially amended their scope and content.<\/p>\n

The original goal was justified in and of itself. The Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) sought to make companies\u2019 environmental and social performance more comparable and verifiable. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), meanwhile, would have required the largest companies to identify human rights and environmental risks not only in their own operations but also throughout their supply chains. The problem lay not primarily with these objectives, but with the complexity and proportionality of the regulations. In its original form, the CSRD would have subjected a large number of companies to mandatory reporting, while the applicable sustainability standards were extremely detailed. Companies would have had to assess not only the impacts of their own operations but also the financial risks that environmental and social changes posed to them. This so-called dual materiality assessment is justifiable from a professional standpoint, but in practice it often proved difficult to interpret. It was not always clear what data needed to be collected, what level of detail was required, and how to demonstrate that a particular sustainability issue was not material. As a result, companies often collected more data and prepared more documentation than necessary, just to be on the safe side. Another challenge was the external verification of the reports. Since neither the companies nor the auditors had extensive practical experience, it was unclear what documents were required to support specific claims. This increased consulting, IT, and auditing costs. Moreover, these obligations trickled down to smaller businesses as well. While an SME might formally fall outside the scope of the sustainability reporting directive, its large corporate clients or banks could request detailed data from it for their own reporting purposes. The same small business might have been asked the exact same questions by multiple partners, each in a different format and with varying levels of detail. Thus, the regulation indirectly placed a burden on precisely those businesses it was originally intended to exempt.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the sustainability reporting directive did not operate in isolation. Companies had to interpret the EU taxonomy, the financial sector\u2019s sustainability reporting rules, and corporate due diligence requirements simultaneously. The concepts, scopes, and data requirements of these frameworks did not always align, so the same or similar information had to be prepared for multiple systems.<\/p>\n

In the case of the CSDD, a different type of problem arose. Global supply chains often operate across multiple countries and through numerous intermediaries, so companies frequently lack reliable information about more distant suppliers. There was a risk that, instead of identifying actual risks, an ever-increasing number of questionnaires, declarations, and checklists would be produced. However, more documentation alone does not necessarily mean that human rights or environmental issues actually become more visible.<\/p>\n

\n

\u2018The rapid introduction of a system that is too broad and too complex leads to costs and uncertainty when it is subsequently dismantled\u2019<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

At the same time, it is important to distinguish between the two directives. The implementation of the CSRD has already begun: the first group of companies was required to collect data and prepare reports for the 2024 fiscal year. Subsequent groups of companies were still preparing to meet these obligations when implementation was postponed, and many of them were subsequently exempted from the regulation. In contrast, the CSDDD has not yet been applied to companies in any member state. However, some large companies have already begun preparations and have adapted their existing supplier and risk management systems to the anticipated EU requirements. This did not constitute the legal application of the directive, but rather a proactive corporate adaptation.<\/p>\n

However you look at it, the Omnibus package brought real relief to many businesses; at the same time, companies that had already spent significant sums on data collection, IT developments, consulting, and internal processes were, in part, preparing for rules that were later fundamentally amended. The lesson, therefore, is not that sustainability regulations were unnecessary. Rather, it is that the rapid introduction of a system that is too broad and too complex leads to costs and uncertainty when it is subsequently dismantled. From the perspective of legal certainty, what matters is not only the volume of obligations that must be fulfilled, but also the extent to which the rules are stable, understandable, and predictable.<\/p>\n

Simplification or Deregulation?<\/strong><\/p>\n

One of the strongest criticisms of Omnibus packages is not necessarily their content, but the way they were prepared. For example, the proposals for the first sustainability package were not accompanied by a full impact assessment; the Commission presented the reasons and evidence for the changes in two staff working documents. The European Parliamentary Research Service warned as early as 2025 that the proposals raise both deregulation and legal certainty issues.<\/p>\n

A similar debate has arisen around the Digital Omnibus. According to a 2026 analysis<\/a> prepared for the European Parliament, the lack of full impact assessments and comprehensive public consultation makes it difficult to accurately assess how the economic, social, and fundamental rights consequences of the changes are shared among those affected. The analysis also highlighted that there can be a fine line between administrative simplification and the substantive scaling back of regulatory protection. This is one of the fundamental dilemmas of the method. If the Commission wants to react quickly to competitiveness problems, it shortens the preparatory process. However, if an appropriate impact assessment does not precede amendments, it is easy to see that an obligation removed in one place may create a new legal gap, a dispute over interpretation, or difficulties in implementation in another. Simplification should not mean that the legislation itself becomes simpler for the legislator, while the management of the consequences is left to the businesses and national authorities concerned.<\/p>\n

Clarifying the concepts is also important because not all regulatory changes constitute administrative simplification. It is one thing to eliminate an unnecessary report, merge two databases or standardize a licensing procedure, and another to narrow the personal scope of a regulation, postpone its application or reduce the substantive obligations of companies. The latter decisions may also be politically and economically justified, but they are no longer simple technical corrections. They actually represent a reopening of the original policy compromise.<\/p>\n

If all such changes are discussed under the label of \u2018simplification\u2019, the difference between reducing bureaucracy and the substantive recalibration of previously agreed environmental, consumer, data protection, or social objectives may be blurred. This does not mean that regulations should not be touched. On the contrary: poorly functioning or disproportionate regulations should be amended. However, the correct approach from a democratic and rule-of-law perspective would be for decision-makers to clearly state when they are reducing administrative burdens and when they are changing the regulatory objective itself or the previous balance between different interests.<\/p>\n

What Would Make Europe Truly Simpler?<\/strong><\/p>\n

A significant part of the regulatory burden perceived by European businesses does not stem solely from EU law. Divergent national transposition of directives, different interpretations by authorities, non-communicating national IT systems, and additional national requirements can all increase costs.<\/p>\n

The Commission\u2019s 2026 regulation programme therefore specifically addresses the issue of gold-plating. The Commission is expected to provide assistance in identifying unnecessary additional requirements at an early stage of national transposition, and to address issues through the European Semester Mechanism and the Single Market Enforcement Taskforce. This is particularly relevant from a Hungarian perspective. It is of little consolation to domestic businesses if an EU regulation becomes theoretically simpler, but the related national licensing, inspection, or tendering procedures remain slow, multi-layered, and unpredictable.<\/p>\n

Simplification cannot therefore be treated as a legislative project in Brussels alone. It must also be reflected in member states\u2019 public administrations, local government procedures, the implementation of EU funds, and the everyday practice of authorities dealing with businesses. In the coming years, the success of simplification policy will not be measured by how many directives and regulations have been amended. What will be more important is whether the amount of data submitted by businesses for the same purpose has been reduced, the time taken for authorization has been shortened, national implementation has become more uniform, and the external consultancy, IT, and legal costs required for compliance have been reduced.<\/p>\n

\n

\u2018Member states should commit themselves not to build new layers of national bureaucracy on top of simplified EU rules\u2019<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This requires stable transitional rules, consistent impact assessments, and effective involvement of stakeholders. The EU institutions should ensure consolidated, easily searchable legislation and timely implementation guidance. Member states should commit themselves not to build new layers of national bureaucracy on top of simplified EU rules. The Commission\u2019s new approach\u2014\u2018simplicity by design\u2019\u2014could point in this direction. However, the 2026 reform would also link accelerated procedures to lighter forms of impact assessment, which would require a new balance between speed and legislative quality.<\/p>\n

The European Union undoubtedly needs simpler rules. Excessive administrative burdens divert resources from innovation, investment, and growth, while disproportionately affecting smaller businesses. However, simplification only works if, instead of making rules changeable quickly, it also makes them more predictable in the long term, so that a business can understand and comply with the requirements in less time, with less external assistance, and with greater legal certainty.<\/p>\n

Read more:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Click here<\/a> to read the original article.<\/p>\n

\n At a time when public debate is increasingly polarized and superficial, Hungarian Conservative remains committed to depth, intellectual honesty, and independent conservative thought.\n <\/p>\n

\n Producing high-quality journalism requires resources. Your contribution helps us expand our coverage, reach new audiences, and keep our content accessible.\n <\/p>\n

\"HC<\/p>\n

\n Please consider supporting our mission.\n <\/p>\n


\n Donate Now
\n <\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The following is an adapted version of an article written by Bernadett Petri, a researcher at the Europe…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":1123785,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[5174],"tags":[40846,10959,141054,2000,305813,51427,299,5187,2557,1699,20730,2725,229329,26682,106116,305814,121597,48837,40845,2844],"class_list":["post-1123784","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-eu","tag-bureaucracy","tag-businesses","tag-deregulation","tag-eu","tag-eu-politics","tag-eu-rules","tag-europe","tag-european","tag-european-commission","tag-european-union","tag-european-parliament","tag-law","tag-legal-certainty","tag-legislation","tag-member-states","tag-omnibus-europe","tag-packages","tag-regulatory-policy","tag-simplification","tag-uncertainty"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1123784","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1123784"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1123784\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1123785"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1123784"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1123784"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1123784"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}