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The writer is the director of the Eurasia programme at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies<\/p>\n
As Israel and Iran begin a ceasefire after nearly two weeks of war that significantly damaged Tehran\u2019s military and nuclear infrastructure, one might think that Russia is worried about the ramifications for its own military campaign in Ukraine. Russia has had to watch Israel claim control of the skies over Tehran and knock out Iran\u2019s air defences, an achievement that has eluded Moscow in Ukraine. <\/p>\n
Israeli and US strikes have also destroyed or damaged Iran\u2019s uranium enrichment facilities and Israel has impaired Iran\u2019s drone and missile production. Iranian weapons \u2014 especially drones \u2014 have been valuable to Russia\u2019s war effort. Now, having taken such a serious beating, Tehran will need to rebuild and might not be able to aid the Kremlin in Ukraine for quite a while.<\/p>\n
Iran provided Russia with badly needed Shahed 136 combat drones and their production technology early in the Ukraine war. With time, the infamous Shahed (rechristened by Russia as the Geran-2) became the cornerstone of Russia\u2019s deep-strike attack campaign in Ukraine. Iran also supported Russia\u2019s war in other ways, ferrying artillery shells and other ammunition across the Caspian Sea. Signalling a desire to deepen their defence ties, Iran and Russia signed a strategic partnership treaty in January.<\/p>\n
Despite that history of co-operation, a weakened Iran is unlikely to have much of an impact on Russia\u2019s war effort today. That\u2019s because Russia now produces vast quantities of Shahed 136 drones domestically, having received the production technology, blueprints and training from Iran. As Russia localised the production in its Alabuga Special Economic Zone, it span off variations from the original Iranian designs, improving the drones\u2019 engines, warheads and resistance to jamming. <\/p>\n
Similarly, Israel\u2019s degradation of Iran\u2019s missile production will have limited consequences. Last autumn, Russia received a batch of Iranian Fath-360 missiles and it has reportedly requested other models in the past. But it has not even used those Fath-360s in Ukraine. Ukraine estimates that Russia has stockpiled some 13,000 missiles of various ranges and can produce up to 200 per month. Moscow, it appears, has no acute need for Iranian missiles.<\/p>\n
The Kremlin has also branched out, forging new alliances. When it comes to Russian battlefield needs in Ukraine, reliance on Iran reached its zenith one year into the war, and has since been eclipsed by China and North Korea. In 2023, North Korea emerged as a critical enabler of the Russian war machine, sending munitions, missiles and \u2014 more recently \u2014 men. <\/p>\n
At last month\u2019s Victory Day parade in Moscow, President Vladimir Putin publicly hugged and thanked North Korean generals for their country\u2019s support. When it comes to sheer quantities of dual-use goods and weaponry components, China is the most important contributor to Russia\u2019s defence enterprise. <\/p>\n
Indeed, as Russia reduced its reliance on Iran, it increasingly turned to China for parts. Ongoing construction of a Russian-Chinese logistics complex in Alabuga augurs a growing Chinese involvement in Russia\u2019s drone production enterprise, including new models such as the Garpiya-A1 and Garpiya-3.<\/p>\n
The fighting\u00a0between Israel and Iran\u00a0may be over \u2014 for now \u2014 but the future of Iran\u2019s nuclear programme and the whereabouts of its highly enriched uranium remain unclear. As Russia increases its summer offensive\u00a0and unleashes drones on Ukrainian cities, Putin is unlikely to face imminent\u00a0pressure to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine from a distracted US government.<\/p>\n
The Israel-Iran war \u2014 and the US\u2019s direct involvement in it \u2014 was unwelcome news for Russia. It upended Moscow\u2019s strategic calculus in the Middle East and exposed the limitations of its power projection. But this war will not force Russia to ease off in Ukraine.<\/p>\n
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