{"id":218386,"date":"2025-06-27T10:41:14","date_gmt":"2025-06-27T10:41:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/218386\/"},"modified":"2025-06-27T10:41:14","modified_gmt":"2025-06-27T10:41:14","slug":"chinas-relationship-with-the-world-after-the-israel-iran-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/218386\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s Relationship With the World After the Israel-Iran War"},"content":{"rendered":"

Donald Trump\u2019s leadership style<\/a>, at once volatile and commanding, could be both an obstacle and an opportunity for Beijing.<\/p>\n

There might be no better example than the recent events involving the Middle East: After nearly two weeks of traded attacks between Israel and Iran<\/a>, the President made the controversial decision to authorize U.S. strikes<\/a> on three Iranian nuclear facilities, risking prolonged American involvement in yet another unpopular war in the Middle East. Then just two days later, Trump announced that he had brokered a ceasefire<\/a> between Israel and Iran\u2014one that almost collapsed<\/a> but then appeared to hold as Trump let off an expletive-filled rant<\/a> against both countries, warning Israel not to drop more bombs.<\/p>\n

Trump even boasted of the benefits his truce would bring to other countries.<\/p>\n

\u201cChina can now continue to purchase Oil from Iran,\u201d Trump posted<\/a> on Truth Social on Tuesday. \u201cHopefully, they will be purchasing plenty from the U.S., also. It was my Great Honor to make this happen!\u201d<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s comments came after Secretary of State Marco Rubio said<\/a> on Fox News on Sunday that he had encouraged China to advise Iran not to close the Strait of Hormuz<\/a>\u2014the narrow waterway through which much of the world\u2019s oil trade flows through and which Iran had threatened to close in response to U.S. intervention. China relies on crude oil imports from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, which pass through the strait, but is also the largest importer of Iranian oil, which is under economic sanctions by the U.S.<\/p>\n

Reports suggested that Trump\u2019s post indicated possible sanctions relief, but the White House later clarified<\/a> to media outlets: \u201cThe president was simply calling attention to the fact that, because of his decisive actions to obliterate Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and broker a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz will not be impacted, which would have been devastating for China.\u201d<\/p>\n

China, unlike the U.S. with Israel, made no indication that it would step in to militarily assist its longtime friend Iran. Instead, the Asian nation, which has in recent years tried to position itself as a global peacebroker<\/a>, made fervent calls for deescalation, verbal condemnations of Israel\u2019s attacks, and urged the U.S. not to get involved<\/a>. Ultimately, though, China\u2019s offers to mediate were not taken up, and instead it was\u2014at least according to himself\u2014Trump\u2019s strongman stance that managed to bring an end for now<\/a> to the hostilities between Israel and Iran.<\/p>\n

But experts tell TIME it was no surprise to anyone, including China, that only the U.S. could have brought an end to the war.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt is not surprising that Israel signs a cease-fire when the United States applies real pressure, because they could not pursue any conflict, in Iran or in Gaza, without the continual supply of weapons, ammunition, and military tech from the United States,\u201d says William Figueroa, an assistant professor of international relations at the University of Groningen. \u201cWhen the person signing the checks says they really mean it, you listen.\u201d<\/p>\n

While China has deepened its investment in the Middle East over the years and developed close economic ties with Iran while maintaining ties with Israel, it does not hold the same level of either economic or political leverage over either country as the U.S.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u201cIran sees China more as an economic partner than a security ally,\u201d Lin Jing, a research fellow at the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore, tells TIME.<\/p>\n

China has also offered sharp criticisms of Israel\u2019s bombardment of Gaza, and of its attacks on Iran, which would have made it unlikely for Israel to accept it as a mediator. China seemed to know this, Figueroa says, and was instead pushing the U.S. to exert its influence over Israel to end the war.<\/p>\n

Still, experts say, China will learn from how the war and its ceasefire played out, if only to reinforce its view of the U.S. as an unpredictable power.<\/p>\n

And Rubio will meet<\/a> next week with foreign ministers from Australia, India, and Japan to build on \u201cmomentum to advance a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific\u201d\u2014language that suggests the U.S. wants to return focus to countering the regional threat from China.<\/p>\n

Strikes reinforce Chinese view of U.S. instability<\/p>\n

China already saw the U.S. under the Trump Administration as an unstable partner, particularly after Trump slammed the world<\/a> with staggering tariff rates<\/a> before abruptly reversing course<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s tariffs<\/a> \u201cwere accelerating a trend of Chinese businesses looking more and more overseas,\u201d Figueroa says. China exports heavily<\/a> to U.S. markets, and Trump\u2019s tariffs on China<\/a>\u2014which rose to a prohibitive 145% before being temporarily lowered to 30%\u2014left many Chinese and American businesses in a state of uncertainty<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Chinese President Xi Jinping has made attempts to strengthen trade relations with other countries in recent months, assuring the world of its stability as a trading partner in contrast with the U.S. In a meeting with Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong this week, Xi pointed<\/a> to \u201cthe current complex and turbulent international situation\u201d to emphasize the need for closer ties.<\/p>\n

The Middle East too has become an important market and site of diplomacy for China. Figueroa says U.S. backing of Israel \u201cwill only intensify the trend of China leaning towards the Arab states and linking regional instability to the United States and Israel.\u201d<\/p>\n

That the U.S. intervened to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, potentially upending decades of global nuclear diplomacy<\/a>, \u201creinforces [China\u2019s] view of the U.S. as a disruptive power, intent on setting rules, but not following them when inconvenient,\u201d Lin says.<\/p>\n

Isaac Kardon, a senior fellow for China studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told<\/a> the South China Morning Post that the U.S. strikes on Iran might ring alarm bells for China. American escalation showed China that \u201cmassive use of force actually is \u2018on the table\u2019 and may be employed very quickly and even impulsively by a leader who is showing himself to be less gun-shy and more risk-acceptant than his first term,\u201d Kardon said.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s approach to the Israel-Iran war showed that it wanted to \u201cavoid direct confrontation with the U.S.,\u201d Lin, the Singapore-based researcher, adds. While China urged<\/a> \u201ccountries with special influence on Israel\u201d not to fan the flames of the war, it did not explicitly name the U.S. But having seen that the U.S. is willing to engage militarily, China may recalculate its own foreign policy approach, including over Taiwan, Lin says.<\/p>\n

\u201cChina may also look a bit more skeptically at Trump\u2019s efforts to negotiate, having seen where negotiations got Iran,\u201d Figueroa says.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Lin says protracted U.S. involvement in the Middle East, which may result as the U.S. aims to enforce the ceasefire between Tehran and Tel Aviv while reentering diplomatic talks with Iran<\/a> and pushing Israel to end its war in Gaza<\/a>, could advantage China \u201cby drawing its attention away from Asia.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cU.S. power is finite\u2014political bandwidth and strategic bandwidth is also limited,\u201d Mohammed Alsudairi, an international relations lecturer at the Australian National University, told<\/a> the Washington Post. \u201cThe U.S. could be dragged into a quagmire, not of its own making.\u201d<\/p>\n

And Beijing would support such a quagmire, Kardon told SCMP, as it would \u201ckeep U.S. naval and air forces tied up in Western Asia instead of in the Western Pacific where China\u2019s strategic attention is concentrated.\u201d<\/p>\n

Uncertainty around Taiwan<\/p>\n

Tensions around Taiwan have been on the rise in recent years<\/a>. Beijing views Taiwan as part of China<\/a> and has stepped up political and military pressure towards its reunification with mainland China. A majority of countries do not recognize Taiwan as an independent country, including the U.S., although the U.S. opposes the use of force by Beijing to claim Taiwan and provides Taiwan with defensive military capabilities.<\/p>\n

Taiwan\u2019s Defense Minister Wellington Koo said<\/a> Thursday that the island is determined to defend itself, after outlining annual military exercises for July. The defense ministry reported earlier that day another<\/a> Chinese \u201cjoint combat readiness patrol\u201d around Taiwan, involving warships and warplanes. China previously sent<\/a> 46 military aircraft over the Taiwan Strait in the 24 hours before last Friday morning, according to Taiwan\u2019s defense ministry<\/a>, after U.S. lawmakers met<\/a> with Koo in a rare publicly disclosed meeting.<\/p>\n

\"TaiwanNational Airborne Service Corps and military helicopters maneuver, during a joint-forces exercise in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, on June 8, 2025. Daniel Ceng\u2014Anadolu\/Getty Images<\/p>\n

On the morning of June 20, Taiwan detected<\/a> a spike in Chinese movements near the island, after China criticized<\/a> a British navy vessel patrolling<\/a> the Taiwan Strait for the first time since 2021.<\/p>\n

\u201cNo matter what they say or do, they cannot change the fact that Taiwan is part of China,\u201d Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said<\/a>.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s defense ministry said<\/a> on Thursday that its military drills are \u201cnecessary to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a stern warning to \u2018Taiwan independence\u2019 separatists and external interference.\u201d The ministry added<\/a> that U.S. support of Taiwan could \u201cmislead Taiwan into the flames of war.\u201d<\/p>\n

Qi Dongtao, a senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore, tells TIME that Trump\u2019s approach to China makes it difficult to know whether the U.S. would militarily intervene to defend Taiwan. Former President Joe Biden moved the U.S. from \u201cstrategic ambiguity\u201d\u2014the policy of deliberately not clarifying whether the U.S. would militarily defend Taiwan\u2014to \u201cstrategic clarity,\u201d Qi says. On multiple occasions<\/a>, including in an interview with TIME last year<\/a>, Biden said he wouldn\u2019t rule out \u201cusing military force\u201d to defend Taiwan in the case of an invasion.<\/p>\n

But Trump has moved the U.S. position back towards uncertainty<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Trump is, by and large, \u201cnot ideologically driven,\u201d Qi says. Rather, his approach is \u201ctransactional.\u201d<\/p>\n

Trump Administration officials have also demanded<\/a> that Taiwan increase its defense spending to as much as 10% of its gross domestic product, as part of an overall push<\/a> for the U.S.\u2019 partners to spend more on their own defenses.<\/p>\n

Alexander Gray, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and former chief of staff of the National Security Council during Trump\u2019s first term, told<\/a> Nikkei Asia that Israel\u2019s aerial campaign was \u201cthe ultimate example of America First regional burden sharing\u201d\u2014signalling that the Trump Administration expects its regional partners to do a bulk of the fighting.<\/p>\n

\u201cFor Trump, China is mainly an economic threat,\u201d Qi adds. For the most part, \u201cTrump doesn\u2019t want to fight a war with China.\u201d<\/p>\n

World still views China as a security concern<\/p>\n

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said<\/a> Monday that NATO\u2019s Indo-Pacific partners\u2014which includes Japan and South Korea\u2014were \u201cvery, very aware\u201d of China\u2019s \u201cmassive\u201d military expansion, pointing to several Chinese defense companies that rank among the top arms makers globally. He warned that Chinese military expansion could also impact European security.<\/p>\n

\u201cThey don\u2019t do this only because they want to have nice parades in Beijing. I guess it\u2019s there for a reason,\u201d Rutte said. He pointed to \u201cthe situation in Taiwan\u201d and cautioned that should China \u201ctry anything with Taiwan,\u201d Beijing could rely on Russia to \u201ckeep us busy here\u201d in Europe.<\/p>\n

Rutte\u2019s comments signal that the West still views China mainly as a geopolitical security threat, even as Beijing tries to warm ties with Europe.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe firmly oppose NATO using China as an excuse to expand eastward into the Asia-Pacific and urge NATO to reflect on its own behaviors, change course, and contribute more to global security and stability,\u201d Chinese defense spokesperson Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang said<\/a> at a regular press conference on Thursday.<\/p>\n

\u201cChina wants to be seen as a neutral player,\u201d Lin says. But the U.S. is still \u201cthe dominant power in the region\u201d and by most counts the world, whereas China is a \u201crelatively recent entry\u201d diplomatically and economically to the Middle East.<\/p>\n

Even with some upgraded diplomatic ties in the Middle East, China is viewed mainly as an economic player, Lin adds. That informs China\u2019s need to balance its interests in and ties to several countries at once. If China were seen as \u201ctoo passive or too close to Iran,\u201d for example, \u201cit could limit China\u2019s Belt and Road ambitions in the region.\u201d<\/p>\n

With other nations too, China is seen as a major economic player, but taken with a grain of salt with regards to diplomacy.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt is clear that China is one of the largest trading partners, and we have a few issues like climate change where we cooperate, but every relationship requires a dose of realism,\u201d European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told<\/a> reporters Monday after a meeting between E.U. foreign ministers. \u201cChina is the key enabler of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine. It carries out cyberattacks. It interferes in our democracies. It uses coercive trade practices. These aspects strain our relationship and make it increasingly hard to continue as before.\u201d<\/p>\n

Even in the economic arena, China\u2019s relations have faltered. The E.U. earlier this month cancelled<\/a> a flagship economic meeting with China over ongoing trade disputes.<\/p>\n

U.S. sanctions have spurred collaboration between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, including through setting up international collaborative organizations like BRICS as alternatives to a U.S.-led international order. But the global influence of these organizations is hampered by a lack of \u201csufficient critical mass,\u201d Stephen Olson, a visiting senior fellow at the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, told<\/a> Nikkei Asia. In another blow to China\u2019s push to become a regional leader, India on Thursday rejected<\/a> signing a joint statement facilitated by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization\u2014one such grouping set up by China and Russia to counter U.S. influence.<\/p>\n

Israel-Iran conflict was \u201ca stage\u201d for U.S. and China\u2019s contrasting approaches<\/p>\n

China\u2019s continued policy of non-involvement contrasts sharply with what the world has seen from the U.S. in the past week\u2014not to mention decades of its interventionist approach before Trump\u2014which has allowed China to make \u201cgreat strides particularly in the Global South,\u201d Lin tells TIME. That\u2019s intentional, Lin says, lest China lets itself become \u201cindistinguishable from the hegemonic powers it criticizes.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cThis conflict between Iran and Israel has somehow become a stage for China and the U.S. to showcase contrasting visions of global leadership,\u201d Lin says. \u201cThe U.S. has demonstrated its military capabilities, its commitment to allies, and its influence in crisis management. But these are not the metrics by which China measures its global role.\u201d<\/p>\n

Where the U.S. wielded threats and weapons, China offered words.<\/p>\n

\u201cChina\u2019s main stake is stability,\u201d Lin says. \u201cHistory shows that great power involvement often worsens long-term instability. China does not aspire to become a world policeman, nor does it believe any single country should assume that role.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Donald Trump\u2019s leadership style, at once volatile and commanding, could be both an obstacle and an opportunity for…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":218387,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5311],"tags":[1395,28423,77354,49,978,659],"class_list":{"0":"post-218386","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-united-states","8":"tag-china","9":"tag-news-desk","10":"tag-overnight","11":"tag-united-states","12":"tag-us","13":"tag-usa"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114754911267338483","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/218386","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=218386"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/218386\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/218387"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=218386"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=218386"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=218386"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}