{"id":219248,"date":"2025-06-27T18:16:08","date_gmt":"2025-06-27T18:16:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/219248\/"},"modified":"2025-06-27T18:16:08","modified_gmt":"2025-06-27T18:16:08","slug":"assessing-the-effect-of-the-u-s-strikes-on-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/219248\/","title":{"rendered":"Assessing the Effect of the U.S. Strikes on Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"

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There has been much commentary about the U.S. airstrike last weekend against three key nuclear sites deep inside Iran: Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. The attack\u2014President Donald Trump\u2019s boldest use of military force to date\u2014was designed to stunt if not destroy Iran\u2019s nuclear program and bring Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table in a much weaker position. As the dust settles over the American missile and bomb craters, questions continue to swirl about the effectiveness of the U.S. strikes and their impact on the region more broadly.<\/p>\n

How far back did the U.S. strikes set Iran\u2019s nuclear program?<\/p>\n

More on:<\/p>\n

\n United States<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

\n Iran<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

\n Middle East<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

\n Air Power and Military Aircraft<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

\n Israel<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

Operation Midnight Hammer was designed to destroy and degrade the key bottleneck in Iran\u2019s nuclear program: its enrichment capacity, including its most advanced and large-scale centrifuge cascades. The lion\u2019s share of Iran\u2019s operational IR-6 centrifuges were believed to be housed in the three facilities struck by the United States last weekend. Iran\u2019s near nine-hundred pound stockpile of 60 percent enriched Uranium, which can fit in the equivalence of the trunks of ten cars, remains unaccounted for. But this stockpile will be of little use for any Iranian nuclear weapons program in the near term if their enrichment capabilities were wiped out.<\/p>\n

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The battle damage assessment remains murky. Though Trump has repeatedly claimed the country\u2019s nuclear program is \u201ccompletely and totally obliterated,\u201d comprehensive assessments of the damage take time. Neither the United States nor Israel has released a final assessment on the strikes\u2019 consequences for the nuclear program. It\u2019s still early days. Earlier this week, a preliminary classified report by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Pentagon\u2019s intelligence arm, estimated that the program had been delayed, albeit no more than six months. The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi said that the centrifuges at Fordow are \u201cno longer operational\u201d and that there was \u201cno escaping significant physical damage.\u201d U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan \u201cRazin\u201d Caine also emphasized that the United States had every reason to believe the strike was successful, while adding that the defense department had been preparing to destroy Fordow for more than a decade.<\/p>\n

At a minimum, it\u2019s reasonable to assume that Iran\u2019s capacity to build a nuclear weapon was materially impacted by Operation Midnight Hammer. But it is unclear at this point what it means to dismantle Iran\u2019s entire nuclear weapon program and whether that could be achieved kinetically, at arms length. The question then becomes how much time the strikes will buy the United States and others\u2014and if it does buy meaningful time, what we do with it.<\/p>\n

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What can we make of Iran\u2019s response so far, and what are the prospects for further escalation?<\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s immediate response to the U.S. strikes over the weekend has been muted thus far. On Monday, it fired a wave of missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar\u2014the forward headquarters of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the largest U.S. base in the Middle East where some ten thousand troops are typically stationed. It\u2019s safe to say the attack on the most heavily fortified U.S. military target within reach of Iran was telegraphed and calibrated to allow room for de-escalation while also allowing the regime to save face with domestic constituencies. A limited response so far is unsurprising, especially given the state of Iran\u2019s military enterprise.<\/p>\n

For starters, the Iranian regime\u2019s command and control structure has been degraded significantly, with Israel having killed much of its high command, including the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Quds force, as well as the top brass of the IRGC Aerospace Force, which oversaw Iran\u2019s ballistic missile and drone offensives against Israel. Moreover, Iran\u2019s ballistic missile inventories are shrinking at a rapid clip due to its attacks on Israel and Israeli air strikes on Iranian missile launchers and depots. Over the last several months, Israel has also weakened the power projection capabilities of its regional proxies, namely Hamas and Hezbollah, which it had counted on to function as a \u201csword of damascus\u201d against Israel during prior skirmishes. Israel has also destroyed much of Iran’s air defense network, rendering it extremely vulnerable in \u201ctit-for-tat\u201d escalatory scenarios. Then there is the question of who to trust, which has the potential to slow down strategic decision-making. As Karim Sadjadpour, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, put it, the Ayatollah is effectively leading a \u201cSwiss cheese regime, which has been thoroughly penetrated by Israeli intelligence.\u201d<\/p>\n

More on:<\/p>\n

\n United States<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

\n Iran<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

\n Middle East<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

\n Air Power and Military Aircraft<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

\n Israel<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

Yet, Iran\u2019s woes shouldn\u2019t be cause for complacency. CENTCOM Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper told the Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing on Tuesday that Iran may be \u201cweakened\u201d and \u201cdegraded\u201d but it still retains \u201cconsiderable tactical capability.\u201d In the region, there are still some forty thousand U.S. troops stationed across the region in Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates that may well be subject to physical and cyber threats. In the wake of the assassination of Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani in 2020, Iran similarly fired missiles at U.S. bases but stopped short of causing any loss of life. But in January 2024, an Iranian-backed militia killed three U.S. servicemembers and injured dozens at Tower 22 in northeast Jordan in a drone attack. Then, there is the risk of global acts of terror, putting the United States and others on watch. Iran can take its time to respond. Muammar al-Qaddafi\u2019s Libya took more than two years to retaliate for the United States\u2019 1986 attack on Libya with the downing of PanAm Flight 103.<\/p>\n

Beyond military action, there is an economic card Iran might play: closing the Strait of Hormuz, the world\u2019s most critical oil chokepoint. One-fifth of the world\u2019s oil supply flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Though Iran\u00a0could take steps<\/a>\u00a0to try to cut off the rest of the world\u2019s access to oil and gas, an attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz would have far-reaching implications beyond the United States and risks not just failing but backfiring\u2014rallying the world around decisive actions to get oil flowing again. Moreover, the United States has become far more insulated since the 1973 oil embargo and even the Iraq War in 2003. In 2003, the United States\u2019 net import of petroleum and refined products was about 14 barrels per person. Today, the United States exports 2.5 barrels per person, not to mention its status as the largest seller of liquified natural gas. China, which is the world\u2019s top importer of Iranian oil, would have suffered far more financial pain in the event of a cut-off from their oil. Iran\u00a0likely hasn\u2019t forgotten<\/a>\u00a0the lessons it learned in 1988, during Operation Praying Mantis, when the United States killed dozens of Iranian sailors and sank a top of the line Iranian frigate in response to the IRGC\u2019s mining of the Strait of Hormuz.<\/p>\n

How will these strikes reverberate around the Middle East?<\/p>\n

While Arab countries publicly called for diplomacy, there is private admiration of the Israelis and the United States. As CFR Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa studies Steven Cook noted earlier this week, the statements after the U.S. strikes weren\u2019t a criticism of the strikes so much as they were concerned about what comes next, including the potential for retaliation on their territories: \u201c[D]amage to [Iranians\u2019] ability to be a menace to the region is a good thing. But at the same time, there\u2019s a lot of concern about blowback on them, and what the retaliation will look like, and will it affect\u2014will it affect them? Will there be damage to Dubai? Will there be damage to Dammam?\u201d<\/p>\n

Perhaps the more interesting question is what will happen to the geopolitical balance of power in the region. Key partners in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have sought closer relations and even defense guarantees from the United States in part to address the Iranian threat. If, in a best case scenario, Iran\u2019s nuclear program is dramatically weakened, their ballistic missile capabilities are severely diminished, and their proxies remain shells of their former selves, the question is whether these countries remain interested in deepening their ties to the United States or feel a greater freedom of movement to pursue a more independent geopolitical course. The answer might lie in part in what else the United States has to offer them, such as cooperation on technology and AI. (See last week\u2019s\u00a0This World This Week<\/a>.)<\/p>\n

The same can be asked of China and Russia\u2019s roles going forward. Iran is a key supplier of drones and other munitions for Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine, while China imports roughly 90 percent of all Iranian oil exports. Though both China and Russia have called for peace, received high-level Iranian officials in recent days, and condemned the United States\u2019 strikes, it appears neither have taken concrete actions to support Iran. Is the Axis of Autocracies more brittle and shallow than some imagined? Or might China and Russia step into the fold to provide Iran with sorely needed economic and military assistance? I lean more towards the former.<\/p>\n

What are the prospects for diplomacy moving forward?<\/p>\n

Potential future talks face a number of headwinds, including the perception that Trump has a tendency to change his mind and even cancel existing deals, including his own. He withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Now, as Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle East studies, put it, there\u2019s a \u201cnarrative in Iran today of IAEA perfidy.\u201d In addition to the withdrawal from the JCPOA, he added, \u201cThere\u2019s a lot of discussion that the whole Steve Witkoff negotiations were a ruse and they were designed to essentially establish their predicate for action.\u201d There\u2019s also deep-rooted skepticism of the IAEA and its director general Grossi which have been peddled by Iranian political leaders like former Speaker of the Parliament of Iran Ali Larijani. At the grass-roots level, regime leadership will also need to contend with the tricky optics of reengaging in negotiations with the \u201cgreat satan\u201d who just made mincemeat of Iran\u2019s sovereignty and national defense aspirations.<\/p>\n

Still, given Iran\u2019s weakened negotiating position and the regime\u2019s general inclination to prioritize its own survival, the prospects for a new deal are not trivial. Much may depend on the Trump Administration\u2019s willingness to provide sanctions relief and other economic considerations to the regime. And, of course, the question remains whether such a deal prohibits or simply limits Iran\u2019s enrichment program and if the latter, how much different or better it would be than the JCPOA.<\/p>\n

Alternatively, Iran could decide that the United States\u2019 strikes demand it use all means necessary to cross the nuclear threshold and reestablish some measure of deterrence. Their capabilities for doing so might be very much in question, but by no means zero. Take North Korea going underground as a case in point. Despite widespread condemnation and sanctions, Kim Jong Un\u2019s regime forged ahead with its weapons program, conducted six nuclear tests, and today is thought to possess dozens of operational nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n

Iran may also take note of an example much closer to home. The Ayatollah is old enough to remember Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto\u2019s response should India get the bomb: \u201cWe will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.\u201d Bhutto certainly made good on his vow.<\/p>\n

All of this is to say that, as important as the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran nuclear assets have been, what comes next could be equally important in determining the security and geopolitics of the Middle East going forward.<\/p>\n

We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you\u2019d like me to address next by replying to\u00a0[email\u00a0protected]<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman\u2019s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":219249,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5311],"tags":[86585,774,837,839,37642,49,978,659],"class_list":{"0":"post-219248","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-united-states","8":"tag-air-power-and-military-aircraft","9":"tag-iran","10":"tag-israel","11":"tag-middle-east","12":"tag-military-operations","13":"tag-united-states","14":"tag-us","15":"tag-usa"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114756700398956804","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/219248","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=219248"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/219248\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/219249"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=219248"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=219248"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=219248"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}