{"id":236834,"date":"2025-07-04T07:32:12","date_gmt":"2025-07-04T07:32:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/236834\/"},"modified":"2025-07-04T07:32:12","modified_gmt":"2025-07-04T07:32:12","slug":"why-its-hard-to-know-the-damage-the-us-did-to-irans-nuclear-program","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/236834\/","title":{"rendered":"Why it\u2019s hard to know the damage the US did to Iran\u2019s nuclear program"},"content":{"rendered":"

Editor\u2019s note: This article is republished from The Conversation<\/a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The U.S. Air Force dropped a dozen ground-penetrating bombs, each weighing 30,000 pounds (13,607 kilograms), in a raid on Iran\u2019s nuclear site<\/a> at Fordo on June 21, 2025. The attack was an attempt to reach the uranium enrichment facility buried deep inside a mountain. The target, President Donald Trump declared<\/a>, was \u201ccompletely and totally obliterated.\u201d<\/p>\n

Others were less sure. On June 24, the administration canceled a classified intelligence briefing to members of Congress, leading to frustration among those with questions about White House claims. While Defense Intelligence Agency analysts apparently agree that the strikes did real damage, they dispute the idea that the attack permanently destroyed Iran\u2019s enrichment capability. Reports emerged<\/a> that their initial analysis found that the strikes had only set Iran back a few months.<\/p>\n

Such disagreements are unsurprising. Battle damage assessment \u2014 originally called bomb damage assessment \u2014 is notoriously difficult, and past wars have featured intense controversies among military and intelligence professionals. In World War II, poor weather and the limits of available technology conspired against accuracy<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Battle damage assessment remained a thorny problem decades later, even after radical improvements in surveillance technology. In the first Gulf War in 1990, for example, military leaders argued with CIA officials<\/a> over the effects of airstrikes against Iraq\u2019s armored forces.<\/p>\n

I am a scholar of international relations who studies intelligence and strategy<\/a> in international conflicts, and the author of \u201cFixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence<\/a>.\u201d I know from history that overcoming the challenges of battle damage assessment is especially hard when the target is a facility hidden under hundreds of feet of earth and rock, as is the case at Fordo.<\/p>\n

Tools of the trade<\/p>\n

The intelligence community has a number of tools and techniques that can help with challenges like assessing the damage at Fordo. Imagery intelligence such as satellite photography is the obvious starting point. Before-and-after comparisons<\/a> might reveal collapsed tunnels or topographical changes, suggesting unseen subterranean damage.<\/p>\n

More exotic data collection techniques may be able to help infer the underground effects based on particle and electromagnetic emissions from the site. These platforms provide what is called measurement and signatures intelligence<\/a>. Specialized sensors can measure nuclear radiation, seismographic information and other potentially revealing information from camouflaged facilities. When combined with traditional imagery, measurement and signatures intelligence can provide a more detailed model of the likely effects of the bombing.<\/p>\n

Other sources<\/a> may prove useful as well. Reporting from human intelligence assets \u2014 spies or unwitting informers with firsthand or secondhand knowledge \u2014 may provide information on internal Iranian assessments. These may be particularly valuable because Iranian officials presumably know how much equipment was removed in advance, as well as the location of previously enriched uranium.<\/p>\n

The same is true for signals intelligence<\/a>, which intercepts and interprets communications. Ideally, battle damage assessment will become more comprehensive and accurate as these sources of intelligence are integrated into a single assessment.<\/p>\n

Pervasive uncertainty<\/p>\n

But even in that case, it will still be difficult to estimate the broader effects on Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Measuring the immediate physical effects on Fordo and other nuclear sites is a kind of puzzle<\/a>, or a problem that can be solved with sufficient evidence. Estimating the long-term effects on Iranian policy is a mystery, or a problem that cannot be solved even with abundant information on hand. It\u2019s impossible to know how Iran\u2019s leaders will adapt over time to their changing circumstances. They themselves cannot know either; perceptions of the future are inherently uncertain<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Regarding the puzzle over Fordo, Trump seems to believe that the sheer volume of explosives dropped on the site must have done the job. As White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt put it: \u201cEveryone knows what happens when you drop 14 30,000-pound bombs perfectly on their targets: total obliteration.\u201d<\/p>\n

But the fact that Fordo is buried in the side of a mountain is a reason to doubt this commonsense conclusion. In addition, Iran may have moved enriched uranium and specialized equipment from the site in advance<\/a>, limiting the effects on its nuclear program.<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s instincts might be right. Or the skeptics might be right. Both make plausible claims. Analysts will need more intelligence from more sources to make a confident judgment about the effects on Fordo and on Iran\u2019s broader nuclear efforts. Even then, it is likely that they will disagree on the effects, because this requires making predictions.<\/p>\n

Politicized intelligence<\/p>\n

In a perfect world, policymakers and intelligence officials would wrestle with dueling assessments in good faith. Such a process would take place outside the political fray, giving both sides the opportunity to offer criticism without being accused of political mischief. In this idealized scenario, policymakers could use reasonable intelligence conclusions to inform their decision-making process. After all, there are a lot of decisions about Middle Eastern security left to be made.<\/p>\n

But we are not in a perfect world, and hopes for a good faith debate seem hopelessly na\u00efve. Already the battle lines are being drawn. Congressional Democrats are suspicious<\/a> that the administration is being disingenuous about Iran. The White House, for its part, is going on the offensive. \u201cThe leaking of this alleged assessment is a clear attempt to demean President Trump,\u201d Leavitt declared in a written statement, \u201cand discredit the brave fighter pilots who conducted a perfectly executed mission.\u201d<\/p>\n

Relations between policymakers and their intelligence advisers are often contentious, and U.S. presidents have a long history of clashing with spy chiefs. But intelligence-policy relations today are in a particularly dismal state. Trump bears the most responsibility, given his repeated disparagement of intelligence officials<\/a>. For example, he dismissed the congressional testimony<\/a> on Iran from Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard: \u201cI don\u2019t care what she said.\u201d<\/p>\n

The problem goes deeper than the president, however. Intelligence-policy relations<\/a> in a democracy are difficult because of the persuasive power of secret information. Policymakers fear that intelligence officials who control secrets might use them to undermine the policymakers\u2019 plans. Intelligence officials worry that the policymakers will bully them into giving politically convenient answers. Such fears led to intelligence-policy breakdowns over estimates of enemy strength<\/a> in the Vietnam War and estimates of Soviet missile capabilities<\/a> in the early years of detente.<\/p>\n

This mutual suspicion has become progressively worse since the end of the Cold War, as secret intelligence has become increasingly public. Intelligence leaders have become recognizable public figures, and intelligence judgments on current issues are often quickly declassified. The public now expects to have access to intelligence findings, and this has helped turn intelligence into a political football.<\/p>\n

What lies ahead<\/p>\n

What does all this mean for intelligence on Iran? Trump might ignore assessments he dislikes, given his history with intelligence<\/a>. But the acrimonious public dispute over the Fordo strike may lead the White House to pressure intelligence leaders to toe the line, especially if critics demand a public accounting of secret intelligence.<\/p>\n

Such an outcome would benefit nobody. The public would not have a better sense of the questions surrounding Iran\u2019s nuclear effort, the intelligence community would suffer a serious blow to its reputation and the administration\u2019s efforts to use intelligence in public might backfire, as was the case<\/a> for the George W. Bush administration after the war in Iraq.<\/p>\n

As with military campaigns, episodes of politicizing intelligence have lasting and sometimes unforeseen consequences<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Joshua Rovner is an associate professor of international relations at American University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.<\/p>\n

The Conversation is an independent and nonprofit source of news, analysis and commentary from academic experts.<\/p>\n

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