{"id":243076,"date":"2025-07-06T16:19:16","date_gmt":"2025-07-06T16:19:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/243076\/"},"modified":"2025-07-06T16:19:16","modified_gmt":"2025-07-06T16:19:16","slug":"chinas-overproduction-is-economic-self-harm","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/243076\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s overproduction is economic self-harm"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In recent months European diplomats have <a href=\"https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/diplomacy\/article\/3315106\/overcapacity-economic-buzzword-fuelling-europes-clash-china\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">intensified<\/a> their complaints about Chinese industrial overcapacity, fearing that their markets will be flooded due to low domestic demand and US tariffs. Yet it is now President Xi Jinping who has signalled his discomfort about China\u2019s price wars, reasoning that are harming the margins of domestic manufacturers.<\/p>\n<p>Xi is not doing this to satisfy the demands of disgruntled Western trade partners, but because the race to the bottom in which Chinese companies are involved threatens to harm what he values most: his country\u2019s long-term technological and industrial development.<\/p>\n<p>Speaking at a high-level economic meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission this week, Xi <a href=\"https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/economy\/china-economy\/article\/3316616\/chinas-top-leadership-takes-aim-disorderly-low-price-competition?module=top_story&amp;pgtype=homepage\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">called out<\/a> \u201cdisorderly low-price competition\u201d. He avoided referencing \u201covercapacity\u201d, a term often used by foreign diplomats, but it\u2019s still a striking shift in tone.<\/p>\n<p>China, thanks to its unmatched industrial muscle and capacity to scale manufacturing, has been able to dominate global markets, flooding them with cheap products in key sectors such as electric vehicles, solar panels, or steel. But what is seen in the West as the main success of Beijing\u2019s industrial policy may now backfire.<\/p>\n<p>The problem isn\u2019t that cheap products swamp overseas markets, angering trade partners already wary of China\u2019s industrial dominance. It\u2019s that this cut-throat competition increasingly holds Beijing\u2019s own economy hostage. If selling at or below cost becomes the main competitive advantage of every company, there are fewer incentives to innovate, improve quality, and invest in advanced production.<\/p>\n<p>Xi may have tolerated overcapacity until now because of the view that China needs to maintain its dominance of global supply chains, despite internal costs. But Beijing is seeing now that endless price wars are hurting its ability to climb the value chain.<\/p>\n<p>Chinese companies which invest in high-quality technology, and which therefore are of value to the state, can suffer the most in a race to the bottom. While these organisations are best equipped to prevail in the long term, they will have to pay a high cost as lowering margins slow down their innovation capacity.<\/p>\n<p>For instance, in the electric-vehicle sector Chinese start-ups proliferated often thanks to local subsidies. However, due to their elevated number, they are squeezing profits, forcing many firms to sell at a loss just to keep factories alive. Given that only <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/kyleichan\/status\/1940381873156301207\/photo\/1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">6% of car sales<\/a> in Europe are Chinese EVs, and America\u2019s market is closed to them, in this sector it is China rather than the West which is now most seriously impacted by overproduction.<\/p>\n<p>What Xi\u2019s words mean is that not every company deserves to survive. To end the current overcapacity, China would need to both boost domestic demand and put an end to the structural incentives, often in the form of local subsidies, that allow uncompetitive players to survive far longer than market forces would otherwise allow. But escaping this dynamic will take time. The incentives to grab market share with cheap products are difficult to ignore for any company, and local political interests will resist painful consolidations that could leave many Chinese without jobs.<\/p>\n<p>While the West envies China\u2019s scaling capabilities and manufacturing export dominance, Beijing\u2019s economy has serious structural problems. It needs to boost domestic consumption and consolidate a more mature industrial ecosystem higher up the value chain. Beyond the headlines about trade wars, Xi\u2019s discomfort with overcapacity shows that every major economy wrestles with problems of its own making.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In recent months European diplomats have intensified their complaints about Chinese industrial overcapacity, fearing that their markets will&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":243077,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3090],"tags":[51,33537,1395,94462,1700,1214,11187,980,285,94463,479,1201,16,15,1773],"class_list":{"0":"post-243076","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-economy","8":"tag-business","9":"tag-ccp","10":"tag-china","11":"tag-chinese-evs","12":"tag-economy","13":"tag-exports","14":"tag-non-classifiu00e9e","15":"tag-optional","16":"tag-politics","17":"tag-row","18":"tag-tariffs","19":"tag-trade","20":"tag-uk","21":"tag-united-kingdom","22":"tag-xi-jinping"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114807201075037781","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/243076","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=243076"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/243076\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/243077"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=243076"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=243076"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=243076"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}