{"id":246277,"date":"2025-07-07T21:39:16","date_gmt":"2025-07-07T21:39:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/246277\/"},"modified":"2025-07-07T21:39:16","modified_gmt":"2025-07-07T21:39:16","slug":"us-backs-natos-latest-pledge-of-support-for-ukraine-but-in-reality-seems-to-have-abandoned-its-european-partners","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/246277\/","title":{"rendered":"US backs Nato\u2019s latest pledge of support for Ukraine,\u00a0but in reality seems to have abandoned its European partners"},"content":{"rendered":"

Recent news from Ukraine has generally been bad. Since the end of May<\/a>, ever larger Russian air strikes have been documented against Ukrainian cities with devastating consequences for civilians<\/a>, including in the country\u2019s capital, Kyiv<\/a>. <\/p>\n

Amid small and costly but steady gains<\/a> along the almost 1,000km long frontline, Russia reportedly<\/a> took full control of the Ukrainian region of Luhansk, part of which it had already occupied before the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. <\/p>\n

And according to Dutch and German intelligence reports<\/a>, some of Russia\u2019s gains on the battlefield are enabled by the widespread use of chemical weapons.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox.<\/strong> Sign up to our daily newsletter<\/a> to receive all The Conversation UK\u2019s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.<\/p>\n

It was therefore something of a relief that Nato\u2019s summit in The Hague produced a short joint declaration<\/a> on June 25 in which Russia was clearly named as a \u201clong-term threat \u2026 to Euro-Atlantic security\u201d. Member states restated \u201ctheir enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine\u201d. While the summit declaration made no mention of future Nato membership for Ukraine, the fact that US president Donald Trump agreed to these two statements was widely seen as a success. <\/p>\n

Yet, within a week of the summit, Washington paused the delivery of critical weapons<\/a> to Ukraine, including Patriot air defence missiles and long-range precision-strike rockets. The move was ostensibly in response to depleting US stockpiles<\/a>. <\/p>\n

This despite the Pentagon\u2019s own analysis<\/a>, which suggested that the shipment \u2013 authorised by the former US president Joe Biden last year<\/a> \u2013 posed no risk to US ammunition supplies. <\/p>\n

This was bad news for Ukraine. The halt in supplies weakens Kyiv\u2019s ability to protect its large population centres and critical infrastructure against intensifying Russian airstrikes. It also puts limits on Ukraine\u2019s ability to target Russian supply lines and logistics hubs behind the frontlines that have been enabling ground advances. <\/p>\n

Despite protests from Ukraine<\/a> and an offer from Germany<\/a> to buy Patriot missiles from the US for Ukraine, Trump has been in no rush to reverse the decision by the Pentagon.<\/p>\n

\"ISW<\/a><\/p>\n

Russia is now claiming to have completed its occupation of the province of Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.
\n Institute for the Study of War<\/p>\n

Another phone call with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on July 3, failed to change Trump\u2019s mind, even though he acknowledged<\/a> his disappointment with the clear lack of willingness by the Kremlin to stop the fighting. What\u2019s more, within hours of the call between the two presidents, Moscow launched the largest drone attack of the war<\/a> against Kyiv. <\/p>\n

A day later, Trump spoke with Zelensky<\/a>. And while the call between them was apparently productive<\/a>, neither side gave any indication that US weapons shipments to Ukraine would resume quickly. <\/p>\n

Trump previously paused arms shipments and intelligence sharing with Ukraine in March, 2025<\/a> after his acrimonious encounter<\/a> with Zelensky in the Oval Office. But the US president reversed course<\/a> after certain concessions had been agreed \u2013 whether that was an agreement<\/a> by Ukraine to an unconditional ceasefire or a deal<\/a> on the country\u2019s minerals.<\/p>\n

It is not clear with the current disruption whether Trump is after yet more concessions from Ukraine. The timing is ominous, coming after what had appeared to be a productive Nato summit with a unified stance on Russia\u2019s war of aggression. And it preceded Trump\u2019s call with Putin. <\/p>\n

This could be read as a signal that Trump was still keen to accommodate at least some of the Russian president\u2019s demands in exchange for the necessary concessions from the Kremlin to agree, finally, the ceasefire that Trump had once envisaged he could achieve in 24 hours.<\/p>\n

If this is indeed the case, the fact that Trump continues to misread the Russian position is deeply worrying. The Kremlin has clearly drawn its red lines<\/a> on what it is after in any peace deal with Ukraine. <\/p>\n

These demands \u2013 virtually unchanged<\/a> since the beginning of the war \u2013 include a lifting of sanctions against Russia and no Nato membership for Ukraine, while also insisting that Kyiv must accept limits on its future military forces and recognise Russia\u2019s annexation of Crimea and four regions on the Ukrainian mainland. <\/p>\n

This will not change as a result of US concessions to Russia but only through pressure on Putin. And Trump has so far been unwilling to apply<\/a> pressure in a concrete and meaningful way beyond the occasional hints<\/a> to the press or on social media. <\/p>\n

Coalition of the willing<\/p>\n

It is equally clear<\/a> that Russia\u2019s maximalist demands are unacceptable to Ukraine and its European allies. With little doubt that the US can no longer be relied upon to back the European and Ukrainian position, Kyiv and Europe need to accelerate their own defence efforts. <\/p>\n

A European coalition of the willing to do just that is slowly taking shape. It straddles the once more rigid boundaries of EU and Nato membership and non-membership, involving countries such as Moldova<\/a>, Norway<\/a> and the UK<\/a>.
\nand including non-European allies including Canada<\/a>, Japan<\/a> and South Korea<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The European commission\u2019s white paper<\/a> on European defence is an obvious indication that the threat from Russia and the needs of Ukraine are being taken seriously and, crucially, acted upon. It mobilises some \u20ac800 billion (\u00a3690 billion) in defence spending and will enable deeper integration of the Ukrainian defence sector with that of the European Union. <\/p>\n

At the national level, key European allies, in particular Germany<\/a>, have also committed to increased defence spending and stepped up their forward deployment of forces closer to the borders with Russia. <\/p>\n

US equivocation will not mean that Ukraine is now on the brink of losing the war against Russia. Nor will Europe discovering its spine on defence put Kyiv immediately in a position to defeat Moscow\u2019s aggression. <\/p>\n

After decades of relying on the US and neglecting their own defence capabilities, these recent European efforts are a first step in the right direction. They will not turn Europe into a military heavyweight overnight. But they will buy time to do so.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Recent news from Ukraine has generally been bad. Since the end of May, ever larger Russian air strikes…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":246278,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7654],"tags":[2000,299,657],"class_list":{"0":"post-246277","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-ukraine","8":"tag-eu","9":"tag-europe","10":"tag-ukraine"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114814121779169087","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/246277","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=246277"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/246277\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/246278"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=246277"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=246277"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=246277"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}