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Aluminium, silicon, titanium, nickel, germanium, copper and tantalum \u2014 all are standard components of a modern main battle tank, and all are scarce in Europe.<\/p>\n
Europe produces just 1% to 5% of the critical raw materials it needs for key civilian and defence technologies \u2014 and demand is set to grow substantially in the years ahead.<\/p>\n
By 2030, the EU anticipates a sixfold increase in demand for rare earth metals, while demand for lithium is projected to rise sevenfold by 2050.<\/p>\n
These concerns aren\u2019t new, but they\u2019ve been intensified by the current geopolitical climate, Europe\u2019s push for an energy transition, and the need for a more technologically advanced industrial base, according to a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).<\/p>\n
In recent months, the EU has ramped up its rhetoric and actions around rearmament \u2014 or, as officials now frame it, \u201cdefensive readiness\u201d in the face of a potential Russian attack on a member state. Still, while defence spending has taken centre stage, the crucial role of critical raw materials (CRMs) in the defence sector remains largely overlooked.<\/p>\n
\u201cWestern states\u2019 potential adversaries have, in some cases, a near-monopoly on the supply of vital materials that either are used in current defence platforms or are necessary to power European digital and industrial development and energy-transition ambitions,\u201d IISS researchers warned.<\/p>\n
From 2016 to 2020, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Russia, South Africa and Turkey were the world\u2019s top producers of 17 raw materials classified as \u201ccritical\u201d by the European Commission last year.<\/p>\n
During the same period, the EU was entirely reliant on China for imports of materials such as lithium, magnesium, phosphorus, scandium, titanium and vanadium.<\/p>\n
China has long been investing in supply chain dominance \u2014 not only in mining, but also in refining and processing capabilities. Combined with ongoing uncertainty over US trade policy, access to critical raw materials \u2014 particularly in usable form \u2014 remains \u201cuncertain\u201d,\u00a0said Rebecca Lucas, senior defence analyst at RAND Europe.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe EU will certainly need to understand what alternatives exist to current sources of critical raw materials and pursue policies that enable them to maximise the diversity of their sources,\u201d Lucas recommended.<\/p>\n
The European aerospace, security and defence industries share\u00a0a similar view. \u201cDiversification is essential, and our industry is actively pursuing alternative sources, strengthening resilience, and reducing single-point dependencies wherever possible,\u201d a spokesperson from the Aerospace, Security & Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) told Euronews.<\/p>\n
In May 2024, the European Commission presented its answer to reducing these dependencies: the Critical Raw Materials Act \u2014 a regulation aimed at boosting domestic capacity, diversifying imports, and promoting recycling.<\/p>\n
By 2030, the EU Commission intends to ensure that 10% of the EU\u2019s annual demand is met through domestic extraction, 40% through domestic processing, and 25% through recycling within the EU. The regulation also aims to limit dependency on any individual third country for a specific CRM to no more than 65%.<\/p>\n
Yet the gap between ambition and supply remains wide \u2014 and the implementation of these plans is where the real challenge lies. \u201cContinuing to ensure a shared understanding of goals and objectives will be a key enabler here \u2014 as will maintaining an accurate mapping of European defence industrial capacity,\u201d Lucas argued.<\/p>\n
According to the ASD, although CRM dependence varies across defence systems and equipment, there is no doubt that secure, predictable access to critical raw materials is \u201cindispensable\u201d to Europe\u2019s defence and rearmament goals.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe evolving geopolitical landscape has significantly increased the exposure and fragility of critical supply chains,\u201d the ASD spokesperson said. \u201cAny disruption to these flows could severely impact defence readiness and industrial output, with potential consequences for European security and resilience.”<\/p>\n
Without secure access to CRMs (including rare earths), supply chains could collapse, production may slow or stop, and capability gaps could emerge.<\/p>\n
The EU is increasingly attempting to diversify both the materials it uses and their sources, Gregor N\u00e4geli, a parliamentary advisor from the European People\u2019s Party, told Euronews. \u201cBut when not possible, we need to diversify \u2014 and diversify also to reliable partners, partners we trust like Australia, Canada, South American partners,\u201d said N\u00e4geli, who also serves on the European Critical Raw Materials Board.<\/p>\n
Is stockpiling the solution?<\/strong><\/p>\n Overdependence on foreign suppliers creates vulnerabilities for European industries \u2014 and could even jeopardise the bloc\u2019s rearmament efforts, according to the analysts, industry representatives and policymakers consulted by Euronews.\u00a0<\/p>\n At the national level, countries like France, Germany and Spain have introduced legislation and strategies to prepare for possible supply disruptions.<\/p>\n France\u2019s 2024\u201330 military programming law makes stockpiling mandatory for companies active in defence and allows all production activities to be redirected to the armed forces in times of emergency. Spain\u2019s 2023 Defence Industrial Strategy also includes recommendations to strengthen supply chains and secure access to raw materials.<\/p>\n But stockpiling at the EU level is far more complex \u2014 and will take time.<\/p>\n \u201cStockpiling would be able to help mediate some of the issues, but this is not a golden bullet for all materials,\u201d stressed N\u00e4geli.<\/p>\n Some materials require very specific grades, quantities, and storage conditions \u2014 and such details are highly sensitive, so companies are often reluctant to share them with any governmental body, including the EU itself.<\/p>\n The European defence and industry sector acknowledges that in the coming years, building up domestic extraction, processing and recycling capacity will be essential \u2014 as will investing in research and innovation to support the substitution of critical raw materials.<\/p>\n \u201cThe key now is to implement the Critical Raw Materials Act in spirit and extend the partnerships we have started establishing with other nations \u2014 and actually implement them,\u201d the EPP policy advisor concluded.\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"ADVERTISEMENT Aluminium, silicon, titanium, nickel, germanium, copper and tantalum \u2014 all are standard components of a modern main…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":252698,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5174],"tags":[81321,81320,2993,2000,299,5187,2557,97343,1116],"class_list":{"0":"post-252697","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-eu","8":"tag-air-defence-system","9":"tag-common-security-and-defence-policy","10":"tag-defence","11":"tag-eu","12":"tag-europe","13":"tag-european","14":"tag-european-commission","15":"tag-raw-material","16":"tag-weapons"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114827361238352211","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/252697","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=252697"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/252697\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/252698"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=252697"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=252697"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=252697"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}