{"id":257041,"date":"2025-07-11T20:11:18","date_gmt":"2025-07-11T20:11:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/257041\/"},"modified":"2025-07-11T20:11:18","modified_gmt":"2025-07-11T20:11:18","slug":"how-inflation-linked-debt-costs-us-60bn-a-year","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/257041\/","title":{"rendered":"how inflation-linked debt costs us \u00a360bn a year"},"content":{"rendered":"

Britain is broke. That was the depressing conclusion of the Office for Budget Responsibility\u2019s annual report on the future of the public finances published this week. Of course the fiscal watchdog did not choose those exact words. Instead it used 65,000 other words, but if you were to distil the overall message, it\u2019s hard to come to a different conclusion.<\/p>\n

The watchdog chose to focus its report this year on the ruinous cost of the triple-lock pension promise and the strain that net zero will place on the public purse. But in Westminster, all the talk is about how a little-known policy decision made decades ago is putting the government in an uncomfortably tight fiscal straitjacket.<\/p>\n

That decision was to start promising investors who lent money to the government that their cash would be protected from the ravages of inflation. Or in more technical language, the government started issuing index-linked gilts that were tied to the retail prices index (RPI) measure of inflation. <\/p>\n

This innovation meant investors could lend the government money safe in the knowledge that if inflation rose, the amount of interest they would receive and the amount returned at the end of the term of the loan would rise so the real value of their investment would never fall.<\/p>\n

Conventional gilts offer no such protection. The lender is just paid a fixed amount of interest each year, and a fixed amount of cash is returned at the end of the term.<\/p>\n

The consequences of this policy for the public purse are only now beginning to be felt because of the higher levels of inflation since the pandemic. The numbers are stark. In 2020 the government spent \u00a325 billion a year on debt interest, but in the last tax year it spent \u00a3105 billion. By comparison, it spends \u00a360 billion on schools, \u00a355 billion on defence and \u00a320 billion on the police.<\/p>\n

The rise of \u2018linkers\u2019 under Thatcher<\/p>\n

So who is to blame and how did we get here? The short answer is politicians. The long answer is more complicated. Decisions on the type of debt to issue each year are made by the chancellor but they are informed by officials and subject the demands of the market.<\/p>\n

The record shows that particularly high levels of index-linked gilts were issued under the chancellorships of Gordon Brown and George Osborne. However, the policy itself was first introduced by Geoffrey Howe, who was chancellor in 1981.<\/p>\n

Howe made the decision in part because the early Thatcher government was struggling to borrow what it needed after the economic crises of the 1970s, but also because it signalled that the Treasury was serious about cracking down on inflation.<\/p>\n

By promising to protect the real value of money lent to the Treasury, investors were reassured that the new government would not repeat the reckless and inflationary policies of the previous decade.<\/p>\n

There was also strong demand for this type of government debt from the pensions industry because it helped to fund the inflation guarantees in final salary schemes.<\/p>\n

\u2022 OBR rings alarm on pensions, climate change and the fiscal rule<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n

In the decades that followed, index-linked gilts, or \u201clinkers\u201d as they became known, were hailed as a clever innovation because they met this demand and actually saved the government money. The reason was that investors would accept a lower rate of return on index-linked loans than conventional gilts because of the inflation protection they offered. Provided the RPI rate remained low \u2014 and over the next few decades it generally did \u2014 the government benefited by having to pay less interest on its debts.<\/p>\n

Indeed, an official analysis in 2023 found that the Treasury cumulatively saved \u00a3158 billion by issuing linkers in place of conventional gilts between 1981 and 2022.<\/p>\n

However, the equation dramatically shifted in 2022 when inflation surged to a high of 14.2 per cent. Suddenly, the amount the government had to pay to service its debts ballooned.<\/p>\n

Rachel Reeves v \u2018bond vigilantes\u2019<\/p>\n

Britain\u2019s public finances were hit uniquely hard because over the preceding decades the UK government had issued so much more index-linked debt than anyone else. By 2022, nearly 25 per cent of Britain\u2019s outstanding borrowing was index-lined, more than twice as much as any other G7 country. Italy has the next highest holding at 12 per cent but US debt has only 7 per cent and Germany less than 5 per cent.<\/p>\n

This meant that between 2019 and 2022, debt interest costs increased faster in the UK than in every other OECD country. <\/p>\n

The proportion of this increase that is down to linkers is subject to debate because the pandemic greatly increased government borrowing generally and the interest rates on conventional gilts also increased.<\/p>\n

However, an analysis by The Times of RPI rates and the stock of outstanding government debt, suggests the decision to issue linkers over conventional gilts cost the Treasury \u00a362.8 billion in higher interest payments during 2022 and 2023. To put this in perspective, a penny on income tax raises only about \u00a36 billion.<\/p>\n

These higher borrowing costs are set to continue for years to come as linkers mature and are repaid. It is one of the main reasons why the annual bill for servicing the nation\u2019s debt is set to hit \u00a3132 billion by 2030, according to the OBR.<\/p>\n

Whatever the exact cost of linkers, there can be no doubt that they have severely constrained Rachel Reeves<\/a>\u2019s ability to enact meaningful policy, or borrow to invest in Britain\u2019s creaking public services.<\/p>\n

To make matters worse for the chancellor, investors in the gilt markets are acutely aware of the government\u2019s inflation-based debt problem so they scrutinise her every policy decision. Any move that suggests Labour<\/a> might abandon fiscal responsibility rapidly raises the interest rates they demand to lend to the government. That is a major problem when the Treasury needs to borrow more than \u00a3250 billion this year and why these investors have been nicknamed the \u201cbond vigilantes\u201d. <\/p>\n

The bond market really is an ever-present sword of Damocles hanging over the government. Anyone who doubts its power should remind themselves what happened to Liz Truss following her disastrous mini-budget.<\/p>\n

Who raised the alarm?<\/p>\n

Perhaps understandably, no one is jumping to the front of the queue to take the blame for creating this situation. A Treasury source said that successive chancellors had to decide between the \u201cshort-term attraction\u201d of index-linked gilts and the longer-term risk. The \u201cred hot\u201d demand from the pension industry made those decisions harder. However, the source admitted that, in hindsight, the issuing of index-linked gilts \u201cwent too far\u201d.<\/p>\n

\"Portrait<\/p>\n

Sir Robert Stheeman<\/p>\n

SIMON DAWSON\/BLOOMBERG\/GETTY<\/p>\n

While no politicians have publicly blamed the officials who advised them, questions have been asked about the role of civil servants. The principal official responsible for advising the government through the Brown and Osborne period was Sir Robert Stheeman<\/a>, who was chief executive of the Debt Management Office (DMO), a Treasury agency created in 1998 when the Bank of England became independent. <\/p>\n

The DMO took on the bank\u2019s role of issuing and servicing gilts, with an objective to \u201cminimise financing costs over the long term, taking account of risk\u201d.<\/p>\n

While there is no public record of Stheeman, who was earning \u00a3145,000 a year when he left in 2024, explicitly calling for more linkers, he did repeatedly describe them as a \u201ckey part of the UK financing programme\u201d and emphasised their cost advantages under certain market conditions.<\/p>\n

Last year, his replacement, Jessica Pulay, noted the markets\u2019 robust demand for index-linked gilts.<\/p>\n

\"Portrait<\/p>\n

However, ascribing any blame to officials at the DMO is tricky because they have no decision-making role and are only there to advise and execute government orders. So as successive chancellors were making merry in the bond markets, drunk on the illusion that inflation was a historic problem, did anyone raise the alarm?<\/p>\n

The short answer is very few. There were some warnings but they were muted. For example, in the mid 2010s, the House of Lords economic affairs committee highlighted that the UK\u2019s large share of inflation-linked debt made the public finances unusually vulnerable to inflation shocks \u2014 however it was presented only as a theoretical risk. Given the extended period of low inflation the country had benefited from, few took much notice.<\/p>\n

It was only when the OBR raised the alarm in 2017 that the Treasury decided to act.<\/p>\n

In the 2018 budget, Philip Hammond announced the government would gradually reduce the proportion of index-linked gilts it issued. Over the next five years, the share of government borrowing raised using linkers fell from 23.5 per cent to 12.4 per cent.<\/p>\n

However, it was too little, too late. Decades of much higher levels of issuance, and the fact that the inflation uplift on these debts kept their value rising, meant that by 2022, when inflation surged, more than 25 per cent of all outstanding gilts were still index linked.<\/p>\n

Rumours in Westminster suggest that for years the Treasury did not want to address the risks because linkers were considered a useful tool to constrain excessive departmental spending and the profligacy of No 10. The theory is that having a high proportion of index-linked gilts meant that large increases in public spending would be inflationary and therefore prohibitively expensive.<\/p>\n

Whether that theory is true, remains to be seen. However, what cannot be disputed is that Britain\u2019s debt experiment will handicap chancellors for years to come.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Britain is broke. That was the depressing conclusion of the Office for Budget Responsibility\u2019s annual report on the…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":257042,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3090],"tags":[51,1700,16,15],"class_list":{"0":"post-257041","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-economy","8":"tag-business","9":"tag-economy","10":"tag-uk","11":"tag-united-kingdom"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114836425068068427","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/257041","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=257041"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/257041\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/257042"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=257041"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=257041"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=257041"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}