{"id":273358,"date":"2025-07-19T00:19:09","date_gmt":"2025-07-19T00:19:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/273358\/"},"modified":"2025-07-19T00:19:09","modified_gmt":"2025-07-19T00:19:09","slug":"the-u-s-can-no-longer-stave-off-competition-from-china","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/273358\/","title":{"rendered":"The U.S. Can No Longer Stave Off Competition From China"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Over the past two decades, a distinctive kind of color-coded map has become a staple of economic journalism. These maps were designed to show the leading commercial partner of countries around the world. Gradually at first, and then in an onrush of change, they <a href=\"https:\/\/charts.lowyinstitute.org\/charts\/china-us-trade-dominance\/us-china-competition\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">filled up<\/a> with a new color\u2014usually red\u2014as China surpassed the United States as the top bilateral trader with almost every nation on Earth.<\/p>\n<p>As China became the globe\u2019s dominant trade superpower, largely on the strength of its manufacturing prowess, leaders in the West and Asia wondered how much\u2014and how quickly\u2014Beijing would be able to convert its recent commercial strength into geopolitical advantage. That process has been much slower and more limited than many expected. It turns out that patterns established decades ago, when colonial rule was still widespread, are hard to displace.<\/p>\n<p>Over the past two decades, a distinctive kind of color-coded map has become a staple of economic journalism. These maps were designed to show the leading commercial partner of countries around the world. Gradually at first, and then in an onrush of change, they <a href=\"https:\/\/charts.lowyinstitute.org\/charts\/china-us-trade-dominance\/us-china-competition\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">filled up<\/a> with a new color\u2014usually red\u2014as China surpassed the United States as the top bilateral trader with almost every nation on Earth.<\/p>\n<p>As China became the globe\u2019s dominant trade superpower, largely on the strength of its manufacturing prowess, leaders in the West and Asia wondered how much\u2014and how quickly\u2014Beijing would be able to convert its recent commercial strength into geopolitical advantage. That process has been much slower and more limited than many expected. It turns out that patterns established decades ago, when colonial rule was still widespread, are hard to displace.<\/p>\n<p>The United States was never a major colonial power in the European mode, but it was an unrivaled economic behemoth for most of the post-World War II era. It was also an English-speaking nation in a world heavily shaped by Britain\u2014one that became the international community\u2019s leading rule-maker and enforcer. And it developed a language of virtue and values that seems to have registered with people around the world more than the reality that it often failed to live up to its own ideals.<\/p>\n<p>These attributes helped Washington stave off competition from Beijing even after China began racking up ever larger trade surpluses. Now, however, the United States has allowed these advantages to erode\u2014and worse, even tossed them away.<\/p>\n<p>In the past few weeks, U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration have busied themselves in a frenzy of devaluing these traditional sources of strength. They have signaled that the United States now champions a world where might makes right and the strong can nakedly impose their will on the weak.<\/p>\n<p>The Trump administration has made this clear to longtime foes, such as Iran, which the United States jointly attacked with Israel shortly after <a href=\"https:\/\/abcnews.go.com\/Politics\/trump-giving-iran-window-table-struck-2-days\/story?id=123081689\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">suggesting<\/a> that it would give diplomacy a chance to address Tehran\u2019s nuclear program. More strikingly, though, Washington has applied its rough, my-way-or-the-highway approach to friendly nations, including outright allies. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the area of trade.<\/p>\n<p>In the early months of his second term, Trump boasted that he would be able to quickly reach new trade agreements with a large number of countries, encapsulated in the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2025\/06\/12\/trump-wanted-90-deals-in-90-days-instead-hes-finding-wins-where-he-can-00403638\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">slogan<\/a> \u201c90 deals in 90 days.\u201d Very few of these have come to pass. His administration has announced agreements with just <a href=\"https:\/\/time.com\/7300389\/trump-trade-deals-tariff-letters-deadline\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">four<\/a> countries\u2014Britain, China, Indonesia, and Vietnam\u2014and these have been either bare-bones frameworks or deals with few public details.<\/p>\n<p>After few countries came running to Washington to secure quick deals, Trump switched to an even cruder approach. Last week, he sent <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/07\/07\/business\/trump-tariffs-trade-deals-august-1.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">letters<\/a> to the leaders of a more than two dozen countries, unilaterally announcing new terms for maintaining commercial relations with the United States.<\/p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/trump-tariff-letters-canada-8c296c248b2b0ddd17804be8a686000b\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">language<\/a> from one letter to the next was strikingly consistent. These missives set exorbitant new tariff rates, highlighted the supposed privilege that countries enjoyed simply for being able to sell their goods to Americans, and claimed that the United States had long been taken advantage of. Each bore Trump\u2019s oversized, even megalomaniacal, signature at the bottom.<\/p>\n<p>But the <a href=\"https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/news\/trump-unveils-25-tariffs-on-south-korea-and-japan-nearly-identical-to-his-liberation-day-rates-165556527.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">correspondence<\/a> addressed to South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung particularly caught my eye: \u201cIf for any reason you decide to raise your Tariffs, then, whatever the number you choose to raise them by, will be added to the 25% that we charge,\u201d Trump wrote.<\/p>\n<p>What was most peculiar to me was not Trump\u2019s vulgar and imposing tone or the lack of refinement in official correspondence from a U.S. president. Neither of these is altogether new. Rather, it was how disconnected the letter was from the realities of the U.S.-South Korea trade relationship. Seoul already has a free trade <a href=\"https:\/\/www.msnbc.com\/opinion\/msnbc-opinion\/south-korea-trump-tariffs-trade-deals-rcna217612\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">agreement<\/a> with Washington and imposes <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/07\/08\/business\/trump-tariffs-south-korea.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">almost zero tariffs<\/a> on U.S. goods.<\/p>\n<p>This kind of casual arbitrariness matters for the United States\u2019 future in a world where China dominates international commercial exchanges. If Trump can so thoughtlessly bully treaty allies such as South Korea and Japan\u2014or other countries with traditionally close ties or even a degree of dependence on Washington for their security\u2014then it is time to establish a new countdown: How long will it be before they discount their ties with the United States and build new economic partnerships and security networks instead?<\/p>\n<p>The answer is uncertain, but none of this bodes well for the United States\u2019 long-term position in the world. Eventually, U.S. allies will change course as a matter of their own prosperity and self-preservation. And if even long-standing allies can begin to fundamentally recalculate the advantages of working with Washington, will countries that are less deeply connected to the United States be far behind?<\/p>\n<p>Some early ramifications of Trump\u2019s actions are already clear, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/07\/18\/world\/europe\/macron-starmer-merz-trump-eu.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&amp;referringSource=articleShare\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">beginning<\/a> in Europe. In recent weeks, Britain and France have <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/europe\/france-u-k-suggest-nuclear-protection-could-extend-to-european-allies-1dcc03fd?gaa_at=eafs&amp;gaa_n=ASWzDAjfOS4n-nc4ZfXssZ4F8i8vRz7U5sH3-LPYyS6El2kpZuV8pEPhUGrdByDlQz8%3D&amp;gaa_ts=687a5ff5&amp;gaa_sig=XJHRd9fRor0ORgXMIRz1xi4wxrjJ798MHTUYQ4zGmCLu03x9zujQlEvdhrZnMkFwMEbHufj1y7NXdF8RAPMOxA%3D%3D\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">announced<\/a> that they will coordinate their nuclear weapons arsenals in the event of a foreign attack, while Britain and Germany have seriously <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/germany-and-uk-sign-historic-post-brexit-friendship-treaty\/a-73313982\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">upgraded<\/a> their defense ties. None of these countries\u2019 leaders mentioned U.S. capriciousness and unilateralism as a reason for these moves, but it is hard to imagine that they did not have Washington\u2019s behavior in mind.<\/p>\n<p>In fact, the Trump administration anticipated these kinds of shifts months ago, when it <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/03\/27\/world\/europe\/trump-tariff-threat-canada-eu.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">suggested<\/a> that it would see any moves by Canada and the European Union to draw closer together politically and economically as hostile to the United States.<\/p>\n<p>Yet anticipating these relationships has not prevented Washington from taking further measures that risk dramatically alienating friends and tarnishing its long-standing appeal to others as a champion of supposedly universal values. Unilaterally raising tariffs to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.americanprogress.org\/article\/is-this-what-winning-looks-like\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">levels<\/a> not seen since the early 20th century may be just the first step onto a slippery slope.<\/p>\n<p>So far, Japan and South Korea, which are key to U.S. power in East Asia, have been slower than Europe in finding ways to hedge against the erratic and imperial style on display in Washington. But if Trump continues in this direction, then China\u2019s policies and behavior will gradually become less of a source of concern than those of the United States. As this happens, at some point down the road, Washington will have achieved for China what China could not achieve for itself through trade supremacy alone.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Over the past two decades, a distinctive kind of color-coded map has become a staple of economic journalism.&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":273359,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3090],"tags":[51,1395,1700,103494,19665,300,23783,103495,16,15,49],"class_list":{"0":"post-273358","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-economy","8":"tag-business","9":"tag-china","10":"tag-economy","11":"tag-great-power-politics","12":"tag-homepage_regional_americas","13":"tag-north-america","14":"tag-trade-policy-agreements","15":"tag-trump-transition","16":"tag-uk","17":"tag-united-kingdom","18":"tag-united-states"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114877037551531094","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/273358","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=273358"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/273358\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/273359"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=273358"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=273358"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=273358"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}