<\/p>\n
Russia launched the satellite Kosmos-2558 from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in\u00a0August 2022. Nearly three years later, on\u00a0June 28, 2025, the spacecraft \u201csplit in\u00a0two,\u201d shedding a\u00a0sub-satellite that American space trackers cataloged as\u00a0Object\u00a0C. This seemingly unremarkable event, according to\u00a0U.S. military officials and experts, represents another act in\u00a0Russia\u2019s\u00a0preparation for space warfare, if\u00a0not an\u00a0act of\u00a0war itself. Russian \u201cnesting dolls\u201d and their unusual maneuvers have repeatedly prompted U.S. accusations that the Kremlin is\u00a0militarizing space. Washington\u2019s\u00a0rhetoric now echoes complaints Moscow made in\u00a0the 1980s about Ronald Reagan\u2019s\u00a0Strategic Defense Initiative, better known as\u00a0the \u201cStar Wars\u201d program. Four decades later, concerns have shifted from America\u2019s\u00a0orbiting super-lasers to\u00a0Russia\u2019s\u00a0\u201cinspector satellites\u201d that can monitor U.S. spacecraft and carry out acts of\u00a0sabotage.<\/p>\n
A\u00a0crash course in\u00a0orbital duels<\/strong><\/p>\n The current escalation in\u00a0rhetoric between the United States and Russia doesn\u2019t\u00a0mean they\u2019re\u00a0about to\u00a0start fighting in\u00a0space. Star Wars-style battles and World War II-era dogfights are fundamentally impossible in\u00a0orbit. Space travel follows strange rules: to\u00a0overtake a\u00a0target, you actually have to\u00a0slow down and drop to\u00a0a\u00a0lower orbit, where you\u2019ll\u00a0circle Earth faster.<\/p>\n Spacecraft have very limited maneuverability once in\u00a0orbit. After being launched at\u00a0a\u00a0particular inclination angle relative to\u00a0Earth\u2019s\u00a0equator, you are essentially stuck in\u00a0that orbital path forever. A\u00a0satellite can fire its engines to\u00a0raise its orbital altitude (as\u00a0the International Space Station does regularly), lower it, or\u00a0change its shape from elliptical to\u00a0circular, but it\u00a0is\u00a0virtually impossible to\u00a0make a\u00a0major change to\u00a0the inclination angle (such as\u00a0transitioning from polar to\u00a0equatorial orbit). Such a\u00a0maneuver would require more fuel than the original launch.<\/p>\n In\u00a0other words, spacecraft orbits are highly predictable. This is\u00a0exactly why Soviet military leaders panicked about the theoretical capability<\/a> of\u00a0U.S. shuttles to\u00a0perform \u201ccrossrange\u201d maneuvers by\u00a0leveraging atmospheric drag to\u00a0deviate from an\u00a0initial trajectory and drop a\u00a0nuclear bomb somewhere unexpected.<\/p>\n If\u00a0you decide to\u00a0attack a\u00a0hostile spacecraft in\u00a0near-Earth orbit using your own craft (assuming an\u00a0anti-satellite missile launch<\/a> is\u00a0not an\u00a0option for some reason), you would need to\u00a0ensure that your spacecraft reaches an\u00a0orbit with the same inclination as\u00a0your intended target. This makes your intentions obvious to\u00a0outside observers, military and civilian alike.<\/p>\n What an\u00a0inspector satellite inspects<\/strong><\/p>\n In\u00a0February 1960, at\u00a0the dawn of\u00a0the space age, the United States began developing an\u00a0anti-satellite weapon system known as\u00a0Project Saint (SAtellite INTerceptor<\/a>). In\u00a0the project\u2019s\u00a0initial phases, test satellites were designed to\u00a0approach a\u00a0\u201chostile\u201d craft, assess its origins and purpose, conduct inspections (such as\u00a0checking for radioactive materials aboard), and then destroy or\u00a0disable\u00a0it. The project was terminated in\u00a01962, partly because Soviet satellites were known to\u00a0have self-destruct systems that could destroy an\u00a0approaching inspector satellite.<\/p>\n However, the concept of\u00a0inspecting satellites in\u00a0orbit persisted. In\u00a0the late 1960s, American scientists discussed<\/a> the idea of\u00a0incorporating into international treaties the right of\u00a0spacefaring nations to\u00a0examine foreign satellites to\u00a0assess potential environmental hazards, as\u00a0demonstrated by\u00a0the Soviet satellite Kosmos-954, which crashed in\u00a0Canada carrying a\u00a0nuclear reactor aboard.<\/p>\n In\u00a02010, the American military launched the SBSS-1 (Space Based Space Surveillance<\/a>, also known as\u00a0USA 216), an\u00a0orbital system designed in\u00a0part to\u00a0study space debris. In\u00a02014, the United States sent up\u00a0several more satellites to\u00a0monitor geosynchronous satellites<\/a>.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s\u00a0inspector satellite program began to\u00a0attract attention in\u00a02013, thanks in\u00a0part to\u00a0the dedication of\u00a0amateur astronomers who track artificial objects in\u00a0near-Earth orbit.<\/p>\n The primary source of\u00a0satellite orbital data today is\u00a0the catalog maintained by\u00a0the 18th Space Defense Squadron<\/a> of\u00a0the U.S. Space Force. But the catalog omits orbital data for numerous American intelligence and military satellites, and many amateur astronomers make it\u00a0their mission to\u00a0track down this missing information. For example, it\u00a0was hobbyists who identified<\/a> the American Prowler<\/a> satellite in\u00a02011 \u2014 a\u00a0craft that had been left off the Space Force\u2019s\u00a0official records.<\/p>\n In\u00a0December 2013, a\u00a0Russian Rokot launch vehicle placed three satellites into orbit, designated Kosmos-2488, -2489, and -2490. Observers initially classified a\u00a0fourth object as\u00a0space debris, but tracking later confirmed that the object was maneuvering and changing its orbit, leading to\u00a0its designation as\u00a0Kosmos-2491.<\/p>\n Several months later, radio hobbyist Dmitry Pashkov successfully captured<\/a> the Morse-code telemetry transmissions of\u00a0a\u00a0similarly deployed craft, Kosmos-2499<\/a>. The satellite revealed itself as\u00a0a\u00a0likely inspector when it\u00a0later deliberately approached<\/a> the Briz-M upper stage of\u00a0the rocket that deployed it\u00a0into orbit. In\u00a0February 2023, Kosmos-2499 exploded<\/a> while circling the Earth.<\/p>\n In\u00a02017, the Russian military continued its experiments by\u00a0launching Kosmos-2519 into the same orbit as\u00a0the optical reconnaissance satellite Kosmos-2486. Two months later, observers witnessed something unprecedented: Kosmos-2519 released a\u00a0smaller satellite, Kosmos-2521, which eventually approached its parent craft and then released an\u00a0even smaller satellite, Kosmos-2523, that also began actively maneuvering.<\/p>\n Russian military operations escalated in\u00a02019 when the inspector satellite Kosmos-2542 deployed the sub-satellite Kosmos-2543, and then began pursuing<\/a> not a\u00a0Russian rocket booster or\u00a0another Russian satellite, but an\u00a0American spy satellite, USA 245 (also known to\u00a0observers as\u00a0KH-11). General Andr\u00e9 Lanata, then responsible for leading NATO\u2019s\u00a0Allied Command Transformation, denounced<\/a> the Russian spacecraft\u2019s\u00a0actions as\u00a0\u201ca\u00a0threat to\u00a0our allies.\u201d<\/p>\n The scandal intensified further when Kosmos-2543 released a\u00a0third high-speed object \u2014 an\u00a0anti-satellite projectile, U.S. defense officials concluded<\/a>, which meant Russia was testing anti-satellite weapons in\u00a0orbit.\u00a0<\/p>\n Inspector satellites launched by\u00a0Russia<\/strong><\/p>\n approached Briz-KM upper stage<\/p>\n approached Briz-KM upper stage<\/p>\n inclination coincides with Kosmos-2486<\/p>\n separated from Kosmos-2519<\/p>\n separated from Kosmos-2521<\/p>\n approached Kosmos-2536 and Kosmos-2543<\/p>\n Kosmos-2536 (cataloged by\u00a0US\u00a0Space Command as\u00a0Kosmos-2538)<\/p>\n inclination coincides with USA 245<\/p>\n separated from Kosmos-2542<\/p>\n International designation 2019-079E<\/p>\n separated from Kosmos-2543<\/p>\n inclination coincides with USA 326<\/p>\n separated from Kosmos-2570<\/p>\n Kosmos-2536 (cataloged by\u00a0U.S. Space Command as\u00a0Kosmos-2538)<\/p>\n inclination coincides with USA 314<\/p>\n approached Kosmos-2581\/2582<\/p>\n International designation 2025-026F<\/p>\n separated from Kosmos-2583<\/p>\n Russia has continued its experiments in\u00a0space since the start of\u00a0its full-scale invasion of\u00a0Ukraine. Just before the war, Moscow carried out an\u00a0anti-satellite missile test<\/a> that destroyed one of\u00a0its own defunct satellites.<\/p>\n In\u00a0June 2025, a\u00a0small satellite designated Object C\u00a0broke away<\/a> from Kosmos-2558, which Russia had launched almost three years earlier in\u00a0August 2022. The sub-satellite then began raising its orbit to\u00a0bring itself closer to\u00a0the American satellite USA 326.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u201cI\u00a0observed Kosmos 2558 and the newly released Object C\u00a0last night. [\u2026] At\u00a0the time of\u00a0observation, Object C\u00a0was some 143 kilometers [89 miles] distant from Kosmos 2558, passing the camera field of\u00a0view some 16 seconds after it,\u201d Marco Langbroek, a\u00a0lecturer in\u00a0optical space situational awareness at\u00a0the Aerospace Faculty of\u00a0Delft University of\u00a0Technology, noted<\/a> on\u00a0June 29. \u201cThis is\u00a0the third time we\u2019ve\u00a0seen this kind of\u00a0\u2018nesting doll\u2019 behavior from Russian military satellites in\u00a0five years\u2019 time. [\u2026] It\u00a0will be\u00a0interesting to\u00a0see whether any maneuvering between the two objects is\u00a0happening over the coming weeks,\u201d he\u00a0added.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Russia does not disclose the names, mission parameters, or\u00a0onboard equipment specifications of\u00a0its military satellites. Typically, the only thing the public learns is\u00a0that the Russian Defense Ministry has launched another satellite. However, some experts have managed to\u00a0unearth more.<\/p>\n Veteran Russian space program analyst Bart Hendrickx studied scientific papers, government contract records, and corporate social media posts and discovered<\/a> that Moscow\u2019s\u00a0inspector-satellite program is\u00a0called \u201cNivelir\u201d (Surveyor). Russian aerospace reporters at\u00a0Novosti Kosmonavtiki have also corroborated<\/a> this designation. According to\u00a0Hendrickx, the Lavochkin Research and Production Association manufactures the primary platforms, which carry the military designation 14F150. The Central Scientific Research Institute of\u00a0Chemistry and Mechanics (TsNIIKhM) produces the sub-satellites designed for \u201cclose-up inspections of\u00a0satellites and, if\u00a0necessary, their destruction,\u201d says Hendrickx.<\/p>\n But there is\u00a0no\u00a0indication that Russian spacecraft have tried to\u00a0destroy any American satellites. For now, Moscow appears to\u00a0be\u00a0content with surveillance and eavesdropping, and claims about Russia launching nuclear weapons into orbit are premature if\u00a0not groundless.<\/p>\nHow (and why) Russian spacecraft inspect space<\/strong><\/p>\n