{"id":288465,"date":"2025-07-24T17:37:15","date_gmt":"2025-07-24T17:37:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/288465\/"},"modified":"2025-07-24T17:37:15","modified_gmt":"2025-07-24T17:37:15","slug":"iran-prepares-to-resume-nuclear-talks-with-europe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/288465\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran prepares to resume nuclear talks with Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"
    \n
  1. Eastern coordination ahead of the European meeting<\/a>\n<\/li>\n
  2. Europe toughens its tone and threatens automatic sanctions<\/a>\n<\/li>\n
  3. Nuclear programme as a matter of state<\/a>\n<\/li>\n
  4. Regional risks and strategic consequences<\/a>\n<\/li>\n
  5. A turning point in Istanbul<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    In a climate fraught with diplomatic tensions and threats of isolation, Iran<\/a> and the so-called European troika \u2014 France, Germany and the United Kingdom \u2014 will meet again this Friday in Istanbul to resume stalled talks on Iran’s nuclear programme. <\/strong>The meeting, scheduled at the deputy ministerial level, marks the first direct contact after months of military hostilities, rhetorical escalations and warnings of sanctions. The backdrop is clear: if there is no substantial progress by the end of August, Europe will activate the \u2018snapback\u2019 mechanism, automatically reimposing the international sanctions agreed in 2015.\u00a0<\/p>\n

    Eastern coordination ahead of the European meeting<\/p>\n

    On the eve of the Istanbul meeting, Iran has stepped up its contacts with Moscow and Beijing. <\/strong>On Tuesday, representatives of the three countries held a summit in Tehran to coordinate positions on a possible reactivation of sanctions. According to Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei, the aim was to \u2018prevent or mitigate\u2019 the consequences of a snapback. Russia and China, still signatories to the 2015 nuclear agreement, have reiterated their support for a diplomatic solution, although without openly committing to blocking Europe in the Security Council.\u00a0<\/p>\n

    Diplomatic pressure also shifted to Moscow, where Russian President Vladimir Putin received Iranian envoy Ali Larijani on Sunday. According to the Kremlin, both leaders agreed on their assessment: the Middle East is going through a \u2018critical\u2019 moment, and only a political solution can prevent further escalation.\u00a0<\/p>\n

    Europe toughens its tone and threatens automatic sanctions<\/p>\n

    The European troika has made it clear that patience is running out. <\/strong>In a joint statement, Paris, Berlin and London warned that if Iran does not show a concrete willingness to return to full compliance with the agreement, they will activate the automatic reactivation of sanctions \u2014 the so-called \u2018snapback\u2019 \u2014 provided for in UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This legal instrument, designed to ensure compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), allows any signatory to reimpose previous sanctions without formal approval by the Council. \u00a0<\/p>\n

    The \u2018snapback\u2019 has historically been a point of friction. In 2020, the United States attempted to reactivate it unilaterally after withdrawing from the 2015 agreement, but the other signatories, including the Europeans, rejected the move, arguing that Washington no longer had the legal legitimacy to invoke the mechanism. Now, the threat comes precisely from European allies, which has set off alarm bells in Tehran.\u00a0<\/p>\n

    Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi reacted harshly in a letter to UN Secretary-General Ant\u00f3nio Guterres: \u2018The European parties have no legal, political or moral legitimacy to resort to this measure,\u2019 he said. In the same vein, Baghaei stated that \u2018the Europeans have been negligent in their obligations\u2019 and that the use of the mechanism would only damage the credibility of the multilateral system.<\/p>\n

    \"El
    \nIranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (left) on 11 May 2025 in Muscat – PHOTO\/Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Nuclear programme as a matter of state<\/p>\n

    Since the US withdrawal in 2018, Iran has gradually resumed several activities prohibited by the agreement, including uranium enrichment to 60%, which puts it one technical step away from reaching the 90% threshold required for weapons use. <\/strong>Although Tehran insists that its programme is for peaceful purposes, the current levels have raised concerns even among its eastern allies.\u00a0<\/p>\n

    \u2018Giving up enrichment would be giving up our scientific sovereignty,\u2019 Araqchi recently declared, describing nuclear development as \u2018a matter of national pride\u2019. According to data from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran already has more than 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60%, enough to manufacture up to ten warheads if refined beyond the critical threshold.\u00a0<\/p>\n

    Cooperation with the IAEA has also been frozen since June, following the withdrawal of inspectors’ access to several facilities affected by bombing. In fact, permission for IAEA agents to access Iranian nuclear sites depends on the approval of the Iranian state following the latest law promoted by President Masoud Pezeshkian and endorsed by the Parliament of the Islamic Republic. Although \u2018considerable damage\u2019 has been reported at key complexes such as Fordow and Natanz, the agency has not been able to verify how much of the sensitive material remains in the country or in what condition.<\/p>\n

    \"El
    \nIran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian meets with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi in Tehran, Iran November 14, 2024 – PHOTO\/PRESIDENCY OF IRAN via REUTERS<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Regional risks and strategic consequences<\/p>\n

    Beyond the diplomatic standoff, the eventual collapse of the nuclear agreement would have serious consequences for regional stability. <\/strong>Iran has already hinted that it could abandon its security commitments in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, which would open up a front of instability in one of the most important arteries for global oil transport.\u00a0<\/p>\n

    There are also fears that some of the nuclear material could escape international control. The combination of sanctions, opacity and isolation could lead Tehran to hide part of its strategic arsenal or diversify its storage network, making future monitoring difficult. Nuclear analysts warn that such a scenario would open the door to a new regional arms race, with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey re-evaluating their own nuclear capabilities.\u00a0<\/p>\n

    Internally, the tightening of sanctions could exacerbate Iran’s economic crisis, putting even more pressure on the regime. In this context, the government could choose to radicalise its foreign policy or intensify domestic repression to contain social unrest.\u00a0<\/p>\n

    \"Una
    \nA satellite image shows the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran in this January 24, 2025 image – PHOTO\/ Maxar Technologies via REUTERS<\/strong><\/p>\n

    A turning point in Istanbul<\/p>\n

    Friday’s meeting represents much more than a simple technical round. While the parties arrive with opposing positions, there is still room\u2014albeit narrow\u2014to get the agreement back on track.<\/strong> The reactivation of IAEA verification protocols and a partial moratorium on the nuclear programme would be minimal but necessary steps to avoid a point of no return.\u00a0<\/p>\n

    The alternative is clear: resorting to the \u2018snapback\u2019 would seal the break-up of the JCPOA and could push Iran towards a path of prolonged confrontation. In an increasingly fractured world, the outcome of these negotiations could define not only the future of the Middle East, but also the credibility of the multilateral order.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Eastern coordination ahead of the European meeting Europe toughens its tone and threatens automatic sanctions Nuclear programme as…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":288466,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5174],"tags":[1395,107697,9191,2000,299,5187,1699,774,6490,107696,12963,26943],"class_list":{"0":"post-288465","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-eu","8":"tag-china","9":"tag-energia-nuclear","10":"tag-estados-unidos","11":"tag-eu","12":"tag-europe","13":"tag-european","14":"tag-european-union","15":"tag-iran","16":"tag-l","17":"tag-onu","18":"tag-rusia","19":"tag-union-europea"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114909429446575341","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/288465","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=288465"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/288465\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/288466"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=288465"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=288465"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=288465"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}