{"id":326263,"date":"2025-08-07T22:03:11","date_gmt":"2025-08-07T22:03:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/326263\/"},"modified":"2025-08-07T22:03:11","modified_gmt":"2025-08-07T22:03:11","slug":"improving-oversight-of-federal-grantmaking-the-white-house","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/326263\/","title":{"rendered":"Improving Oversight of Federal Grantmaking \u2013 The White House"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and to improve the process of Federal grantmaking while ending offensive waste of tax dollars, it is hereby ordered:<\/p>\n<p>Section 1. \u00a0Purpose. \u00a0Every tax dollar the Government spends should improve American lives or advance American interests.\u00a0 This often does not happen. \u00a0Federal grants have funded drag shows in Ecuador, trained doctoral candidates in critical race theory, and developed transgender-sexual-education programs. \u00a0In 2024, one study claimed that more than one-quarter of new National Science Foundation (NSF) grants went to diversity, equity, and inclusion and other far-left initiatives. \u00a0These NSF grants included those to educators that promoted Marxism, class warfare propaganda, and other anti-American ideologies in the classroom, masked as rigorous and thoughtful investigation.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The harm imposed by problematic Federal grants does not stop at propagating absurd ideologies. \u00a0An unsafe lab in Wuhan, China \u2014 likely the source of the COVID-19 pandemic \u2014 engaged in gain-of-function research funded by the National Institutes of Health. \u00a0The NSF gave millions to develop AI-powered social media censorship tools \u2014 a direct assault on free speech.\u00a0 Taxpayer-funded grants have also gone to non-governmental organizations that provided free services to illegal immigrants, worsening the border crisis and compromising our safety, and to organizations that actively worked against American interests abroad.<\/p>\n<p>Even for projects receiving Federal funds that serve an ostensibly beneficial purpose, the Government has paid insufficient attention to their efficacy. \u00a0For example, a significant proportion of the results of federally funded scientific research projects cannot be reproduced by external researchers. \u00a0Even at Harvard and Stanford, once considered among America\u2019s most prestigious universities, senior researchers have resigned following accusations of data falsification. \u00a0A substantial portion of many Federal grants for university-led research goes not to scientific project applicants or groundbreaking research, but to university facilities and administrative costs. \u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The grant review process itself also undermines the interests of American taxpayers.\u00a0 Writing effective grant applications is notoriously complex, and grant applicants that can afford legal and technical experts are more likely to receive funds \u2014 which can then further support these non-mission functions.\u00a0 In addition, there is insufficient interagency coordination and review by relevant subject matter experts to reduce duplication.\u00a0 As a result, the best proposals do not always receive funding, and there is too much unfocused research of marginal social utility.<\/p>\n<p>In short, there is a strong need to strengthen oversight and coordination of, and to streamline, agency grantmaking to address these problems, prevent them from recurring, and ensure greater accountability for use of public funds more broadly. \u00a0The Government holds tax revenue in trust for the American people, and agencies should treat it accordingly.<\/p>\n<p>Sec. 2. \u00a0Definitions.\u00a0 For purposes of this order:<\/p>\n<p>(a) \u00a0The term <a>\u201c<\/a>agency\u201d has the meaning given to it in section 551 of title 5, United States Code, except that such term includes only agencies that have the statutory authority to award, offer, or manage Federal grants and does not include the Executive Office of the President or any components thereof.<\/p>\n<p>(b) \u00a0The term \u201cagency head\u201d means the highest-ranking official or officials of an agency, such as the Secretary, Administrator, Chairman, Director, Commissioners, or Board of Directors, unless otherwise specified in this order.<\/p>\n<p>(c) \u00a0The term \u201cDirector\u201d means the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).<\/p>\n<p>(d) \u00a0The term \u201cdiscretionary award\u201d or \u201cdiscretionary grant\u201d means a grant that is a \u201cdiscretionary award\u201d as that term is defined in <a>2 CFR 200.1<\/a>. \u00a0It does not include programs where legislation establishes an entitlement to the funds on the part of the recipient, such as block grants; those awarded based on a statutory formula; or disaster recovery grants.<\/p>\n<p>(e) \u00a0The term \u201cfunding opportunity announcement\u201d means a \u201cnotice of funding opportunity\u201d as defined in 2 CFR 200.1, as it pertains to a discretionary award.<\/p>\n<p>(f) \u00a0The term \u201cgrant\u201d means any \u201cgrant agreement or grant\u201d as defined in 2 CFR 200.1, \u201ccooperative agreement\u201d as defined in 2 CFR 200.1, or similar award of financial assistance, including foreign assistance awards.<\/p>\n<p>(g) \u00a0The term \u201cregulation\u201d means an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the procedure or practice requirements of an agency, including, without limitation, regulations, interpretative rules, and statements of policy.<\/p>\n<p>(h) \u00a0The term \u201csenior appointee\u201d means an individual appointed by the President, a non-career member of the Senior Executive Service, or an employee encumbering a Senior Level, Scientific and Professional, or Grade 15 position in Schedule C of the excepted service.<\/p>\n<p>Sec. 3. \u00a0Strengthening Accountability for Agency Grantmaking. \u00a0(a) \u00a0Each agency head shall promptly designate a senior appointee who shall be responsible for creating a process to review new funding opportunity announcements and to review discretionary grants to ensure that they are consistent with agency priorities and the national interest.\u00a0 For the avoidance of doubt, this process shall not guarantee any particular level of review or consideration to funding applicants except as consistent with applicable law. \u00a0As consistent with applicable law, this review process shall incorporate, at a minimum:<\/p>\n<p>(i) \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0review and approval of agency funding opportunity announcements by one or more senior appointees or their designees;<\/p>\n<p>(ii) \u00a0\u00a0continuation of existing coordination with OMB;<\/p>\n<p>(iii)\u00a0 to the extent appropriate to the subject matter of the announcements, review by designated subject-matter experts as identified by the agency head or the agency head\u2019s designee;\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>(iv) \u00a0\u00a0review of funding opportunity announcements and related forms to ensure that they include only such requirements as are necessary for an adequate evaluation of the application and are written in plain language with a goal of minimizing the need for legal or technical expertise in drafting an application;<\/p>\n<p>(v) \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0interagency coordination to determine whether the subject matter of a particular funding opportunity announcement has already been addressed by another agency announcement and, if so, whether one of the announcements should be modified or withdrawn to promote consistency and eliminate redundancy;<\/p>\n<p>(vi) \u00a0\u00a0for scientific research discretionary grants, review by at least one subject matter expert in the field of the application, who may be a member of the grant review panel, the program officer, or an outside expert; and<\/p>\n<p>(vii) \u00a0pre-issuance review of discretionary awards to ensure that the awards are consistent with applicable law, agency priorities, and the national interest, which shall involve in-person or virtual discussion of applications by grant review panels or program offices with a senior appointee or that appointee\u2019s designee.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>(b)\u00a0 Agency heads shall designate one or more senior appointees to review discretionary awards on an annual basis for consistency with agency priorities and substantial progress. \u00a0Such review shall include an accountability mechanism for officials responsible for selection and granting of the awards.<\/p>\n<p>(c) \u00a0Until such time as the process specified in subsection (a) of this section is in place, agencies shall not issue any new funding opportunity announcements without prior approval from the senior appointee designated under subsection (a) of this section, except as required by law.<\/p>\n<p>Sec. 4. \u00a0Considerations for Discretionary Awards.\u00a0 (a) \u00a0Senior appointees and their designees shall not ministerially ratify or routinely defer to the recommendations of others in reviewing funding opportunity announcements or discretionary awards, but shall instead use their independent judgment.<\/p>\n<p>(b) \u00a0In reviewing and approving funding opportunity announcements and discretionary awards, as well as in designing the review process described in section 3(a) of this order, senior appointees and their designees shall, as relevant and to the extent consistent with applicable law, apply the following principles, including in any scoring rubrics used to assess grant proposals:<\/p>\n<p>(i)\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Discretionary awards must, where applicable, demonstrably advance the President\u2019s policy priorities.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>(ii) \u00a0\u00a0Discretionary awards shall not be used to fund, promote, encourage, subsidize, or facilitate:<\/p>\n<p>(A) \u00a0racial preferences or other forms of racial discrimination by the grant recipient, including activities where race or intentional proxies for race will be used as a selection criterion for employment or program participation;<\/p>\n<p>(B) \u00a0denial by the grant recipient of the sex binary in humans or the notion that sex is a chosen or mutable characteristic;<\/p>\n<p>(C) \u00a0illegal immigration; or<\/p>\n<p>(D) \u00a0any other initiatives that compromise public safety or promote anti-American values.<\/p>\n<p>(iii) \u00a0All else being equal, preference for discretionary awards should be given to institutions with lower indirect cost rates.<\/p>\n<p>(iv) \u00a0\u00a0Discretionary grants should be given to a broad range of recipients rather than to a select group of repeat players.\u00a0 Research grants should be awarded to a mix of recipients likely to produce immediately demonstrable results and recipients with the potential for potentially longer-term, breakthrough results, in a manner consistent with the funding opportunity announcement.<\/p>\n<p>(v) \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Applicants should commit to complying with administration policies, procedures, and guidance respecting Gold Standard Science.<\/p>\n<p>(vi)\u00a0 \u00a0Discretionary awards should include clear benchmarks for measuring success and progress towards relevant goals and, as relevant for awards pertaining to scientific research, a commitment to achieving Gold Standard Science.<\/p>\n<p>(vii) \u00a0To the extent institutional affiliation is considered in making discretionary awards, agencies should prioritize an institution\u2019s commitment to rigorous, reproducible scholarship over its historical reputation or perceived prestige. \u00a0As to science grants, agencies should prioritize institutions that have demonstrated success in implementing Gold Standard Science.<\/p>\n<p>(c) \u00a0Nothing in this order shall be construed to discourage or prevent the use of peer review methods to evaluate proposals for discretionary awards or otherwise inform agency decision making, provided that peer review recommendations remain advisory and are not ministerially ratified, routinely deferred to, or otherwise treated as de facto binding by senior appointees or their designees.\u00a0 Further, nothing in this order shall be construed to create any rights to any particular level of review or consideration for any funding applicant except as consistent with applicable law.<\/p>\n<p>Sec. 5. \u00a0Revisions to the Uniform Guidance. \u00a0(a) \u00a0The Director shall revise the Uniform Guidance and other relevant guidance to streamline application requirements and to further clarify and require all discretionary grants to permit termination for convenience, including when the award no longer advances agency priorities or the national interest, but subject to appropriate exceptions, including agreements entered into in furtherance of international trade agreements or those awarded by the Department of Commerce under title XCIX of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283), the CHIPS Act of 2022 (Public Law 117-167), or division F of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public Law 117-58).<\/p>\n<p>(b) \u00a0The Director shall further revise the Uniform Guidance and other relevant guidance to appropriately limit the use of discretionary grant funds for costs related to facilities and administration.<\/p>\n<p>Sec. 6. \u00a0Implementation and Termination Clauses.\u00a0 (a) \u00a0Within 30 days of the date of this order, each agency head shall review the agency\u2019s standard grant terms and conditions and submit a report to the Director detailing:<\/p>\n<p>(i)\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0whether the agency\u2019s standard terms and conditions for discretionary awards permit termination for convenience and include the termination provisions described in 2 CFR 200.340(a), including the provisions that an award may be terminated by the agency \u201cif an award no longer effectuates the program goals or agency priorities\u201d or, in the case of a partial termination by the recipient, if the agency \u201cdetermines that the remaining portion of the Federal award will not accomplish the purposes for which the Federal award was made\u201d;<\/p>\n<p>(ii)\u00a0 \u00a0whether the agency\u2019s standard terms and conditions for discretionary foreign assistance awards permit termination based on the national interest; and<\/p>\n<p>(iii) \u00a0the approximate number of active discretionary awards at the agency, as well as the approximate percentage of funding obligated under those awards that contains termination provisions allowing for termination under the circumstances described in subsection (i) of this section.<\/p>\n<p>(b) \u00a0Each agency head shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law and consistent with relevant Executive Orders or other Presidential directives, take steps to revise the terms and conditions of existing discretionary grants to permit immediate termination for convenience, or clarify that such termination is permitted, including if the award no longer advances agency priorities or the national interest. \u00a0Each agency head shall ensure that such terms are included in all future discretionary grants and likewise shall take steps to revise all applicable regulations binding on or incorporated in discretionary grant terms and conditions to require such terms. \u00a0Agency heads shall take action to incorporate these new terms and conditions into all future amendments to grant awards.<\/p>\n<p>(c) \u00a0To the extent practicable and consistent with applicable law, agency heads shall insert in future discretionary grant agreements terms and conditions that:<\/p>\n<p>(i)\u00a0 \u00a0prohibit recipients from directly drawing down general grant funds for specific projects without the affirmative authorization of the agency; and<\/p>\n<p>(ii) \u00a0require grantees to provide written explanations or support, with specificity, for requests for each drawdown.<\/p>\n<p>Sec. 7.\u00a0 General Provisions.\u00a0 (a) \u00a0Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:<\/p>\n<p>(i) \u00a0\u00a0the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or<\/p>\n<p>(ii) \u00a0the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.<\/p>\n<p>(b) \u00a0This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.<\/p>\n<p>(c) \u00a0This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.<\/p>\n<p>(d) \u00a0If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.<\/p>\n<p>(e) \u00a0The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Office of Management and Budget.<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 DONALD J. TRUMP<\/p>\n<p>THE WHITE HOUSE,<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 August 7, 2025.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":10012,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5311],"tags":[49,978,659],"class_list":{"0":"post-326263","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-united-states","8":"tag-united-states","9":"tag-us","10":"tag-usa"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114989747753293274","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/326263","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=326263"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/326263\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/10012"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=326263"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=326263"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=326263"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}