{"id":336916,"date":"2025-08-11T23:11:15","date_gmt":"2025-08-11T23:11:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/336916\/"},"modified":"2025-08-11T23:11:15","modified_gmt":"2025-08-11T23:11:15","slug":"the-united-kingdom-has-joined-c-sipa-who-will-be-next","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/336916\/","title":{"rendered":"The United Kingdom has joined C-SIPA. Who will be next?"},"content":{"rendered":"

MENASource<\/a><\/p>\n

August 11, 2025 \u2022 3:38 pm ET<\/p>\n

Print this page<\/p>\n

The United Kingdom has joined C-SIPA. Who will be next?<\/p>\n

\n By
\n Cassidy McGoldrick<\/a> <\/p>\n

On June 19, the United Kingdom officially joined the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) at the invitation of the agreement\u2019s first signatories\u2014the United States and Bahrain.<\/p>\n

The United Kingdom\u2019s accession, first\u00a0proposed<\/a>\u00a0on the sidelines of the 2024 Manama Dialogue, marks the first expansion of C-SIPA beyond its founding members. With a permanent naval base in Bahrain and a history of defense and intelligence cooperation, the United Kingdom strengthens the deterrent value of the agreement while enhancing its institutional credibility.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Beyond that, bringing the United Kingdom into the agreement is an important step as the United States and Bahrain, through C-SIPA, look to solidify a new model for multilateral security cooperation in the Middle East. The United Kingdom\u2019s accession shifts C-SIPA from a bilateral initiative to a trusted multilateral platform, positioning it to attract additional partners and withstand political transitions in Washington. Additionally, the inclusion of a dependable transatlantic ally affirms C-SIPA\u2019s potential as a foundation for broader regional integration.<\/p>\n

The question now is, as the United States and Bahrain continue to build an integrated defense framework in the Middle East, who will be next to join C-SIPA?<\/p>\n

What the United Kingdom just agreed to<\/strong><\/p>\n

Bahrain and the United States signed C-SIPA just weeks before the October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attack.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The agreement lays the foundation for multilateral cooperation on defense, intelligence sharing, economic initiatives, and emerging technologies. While the United States and Bahrain already maintained strong security cooperation prior to C-SIPA, the agreement formalized their partnership and\u00a0elevated it to a mutual defense partnership that has been given the nickname \u201cArticle 4.5<\/a>,\u201d since C-SIPA is the strongest public security agreement the United States holds outside of NATO\u2019s Article 5.\u00a0C-SIPA accelerated joint efforts and positioned Bahrain as one of the United States\u2019 most reliable regional defense partners.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Bahrain has lived up to its end of the bargain. Notably, in response to Houthi attacks on commercial shipping that escalated in late 2023, Bahrain was the only Arab country to publicly join each US-led military operation,\u00a0including<\/a>\u00a0the multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian. Bahrain continues to purchase advanced US military hardware, including M1A2 Abrams tanks, which it purchased in a\u00a0$2.2\u00a0billion deal<\/a>\u00a0in March 2024.\u00a0Bahrain has also taken steps to ensure its technological ecosystem is aligned with the United States\u2019.\u00a0<\/p>\n

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The\u00a0June escalation between Israel and Iran demonstrated the agreement\u2019s importance to Bahrain. Home to the US Fifth Fleet, Bahrain braced for potential fallout during the clashes, and just days before the United States struck Iran\u2019s nuclear infrastructure, it coordinated with US personnel, prepared thirty-three emergency\u00a0shelters, and conducted nationwide siren tests.\u00a0Expecting it could be in the crosshairs of Iranian retaliation, Bahrain was ultimately spared when Iran\u00a0targeted<\/a>\u00a0Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, yet the potential of a direct incident demonstrated why the agreement remains vital to Bahrain\u2019s security.<\/p>\n

C-SIPA can also help facilitate cooperation well beyond defense. For example, during Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa\u2019s visit to Washington this July (which included\u00a0discussions with UK officials<\/a>\u00a0about the importance of C-SIPA), Bahrain\u00a0announced<\/a>\u00a0$17 billion in new investment deals with the United States. The agreements include plans to replace Chinese servers with Cisco products, strengthen partnerships with Oracle, and increase Bahraini investments in US energy, tech, and manufacturing. A separate\u00a0memorandum\u00a0<\/a>signed by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani also laid the groundwork for peaceful nuclear cooperation, a demonstration of trust and confidence. These announcements show that C-SIPA can pave the way for real economic and technological benefits in addition to defense cooperation.\u00a0<\/p>\n

On a larger scale, C-SIPA was forged with ambitions to \u201cbuild<\/a>\u00a0a fully integrated regional security architecture in the Middle East,\u201d in the spirit of the Abraham Accords and the Negev Forum, \u201cwith the expectation of welcoming in . . . future additional parties.\u201d The United Kingdom\u2019s\u00a0joining<\/a>\u00a0the agreement, in the wake of the Twelve Day War, is a bold initial step to make C-SIPA multilateral. But to fully realize the regional security architecture that the United States and Bahrain envision, policymakers will need to expand C-SIPA within the Middle East region.<\/p>\n

Who\u2019s next?<\/strong><\/p>\n

I accompanied the\u00a0N7 Initiative\u2019s bipartisan congressional delegation<\/a>\u00a0to Bahrain this June, where Bahraini leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the agreement and emphasized its potential to serve as a foundation for broader regional cooperation. The participating members of Congress also signaled political support for the agreement\u2019s implementation.\u00a0<\/p>\n

But to realize the agreement\u2019s full potential, officials must continue to expand C-SIPA across the region.<\/p>\n

To advance the agreement\u2019s\u00a0stated<\/a>\u00a0integration goals, which align with and support the Abraham Accords, C-SIPA should pursue a phased expansion strategy that begins with Arab partners who already maintain formal ties with Israel or share core security priorities. This is so that C-SIPA, which supports\u00a0the security cooperation necessary to sustain deeper political and economic integration, can have a magnified impact in the Middle East. By beginning with these Arab partners, the agreement can help create the conditions for the Accords\u2019 long-term success, including the eventual goal of broader regional participation.<\/p>\n

Given its existing peace treaty with Israel and its status as a\u00a0close defense partner<\/a>\u00a0of the United States, Jordan is well-positioned to join C-SIPA. Jordan has previously expressed support for the creation of a regional security framework, with King Abdullah II\u00a0stating<\/a>\u00a0in a 2022 interview with CNBC that he would \u201cbe one of the first people that would endorse a Middle East NATO\u201d\u2014aligning well with C-SIPA, since it has been dubbed as \u201cArticle 4.5.\u201d Early efforts to engage Jordan could focus on cooperation around border security, counterterrorism, and cyber defense.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Egypt, which also maintains a long-standing peace treaty with Israel and plays a central role in regional security, would be a valuable addition to C-SIPA, particularly given its strategic position along the Red Sea and its leadership in counterterrorism and maritime security efforts.<\/p>\n

Jordan and Egypt joining C-SIPA would advance the Abraham Accords by turning their largely symbolic peace with Israel into deeper regional cooperation alongside the United States, the United Kingdom, and Bahrain. Their participation would reinforce the Abraham Accords\u2019 broader goals without requiring direct bilateral engagement with Israel.<\/p>\n

Additionally, the eventual inclusion of more Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries would significantly strengthen C-SIPA\u2019s regional credibility and operational capabilities.\u00a0With long-standing defense cooperation agreements and joint training exercises with the United States, and with countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) hosting US military bases, GCC members are already integrated into the US security architecture.\u00a0Moreover, shared concerns about Iranian proxy activity, missile threats, and maritime security in the Gulf align closely with C-SIPA\u2019s focus. The UAE stands out as a strong first GCC partner. It hosts US forces at Al Dhafra Air Base, has a\u00a0growing<\/a>\u00a0technology industry, and was one of the first countries to normalize relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. Expanding the agreement to include Gulf partners would amplify C-SIPA\u2019s deterrent value and create new avenues for regional integration if additional GCC members sign on.\u00a0<\/p>\n

To attract new members, however, current signatories must deepen cooperation and showcase the benefits that make participation attractive. One way to do this is by standing up the defense working group stipulated in\u00a0Article II<\/a>\u00a0of C-SIPA and adding working groups focused on areas such as economic integration and emerging technologies. Regularly convening these groups annually or biannually can yield visible outcomes and highlight the agreement\u2019s value. These meetings could also allow for limited participation by prospective partners, offering them a chance to engage prior to formal accession and see how involvement could help further their own interests. Allowing prospective partners to participate in a limited capacity could strengthen trust with current members and lay the groundwork for eventual accession.<\/p>\n

When Israel joins in<\/strong><\/p>\n

While immediate efforts should prioritize expanding C-SIPA among Arab partners, Israel\u2019s inclusion should remain a long-term objective. C-SIPA has already enabled indirect alignment with Israel;\u00a0following the air defense operation against Iranian missiles that took place in April last year, Bahrain\u00a0hosted<\/a>\u00a0senior Israeli and Arab military officials as part of a meeting led by the US Central Command, which reflects quiet, practical cooperation with Israel under the umbrella of regional security coordination.\u00a0Israel\u2019s formal inclusion in C-SIPA, though likely years away, would significantly enhance the agreement\u2019s operational effectiveness, enabling structured collaboration on missile defense, intelligence sharing, maritime security, artificial intelligence and technology, and strategic infrastructure projects such as the India\u2013Middle East\u2013Europe Economic Corridor.<\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s future inclusion in C-SIPA would also strengthen the political durability of its normalization agreement with Bahrain. Officials in Manama have stressed that cooperation with Israel must yield visible results to sustain domestic support. Israel\u2019s\u00a0experience<\/a>\u00a0countering Iranian missile and drone attacks, combined with its advanced\u00a0early warning systems<\/a>\u00a0and cyber capabilities, would strengthen C-SIPA\u2019s value. Along with traditional defense support, Israel could also contribute to the development of joint innovation platforms in emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, where it already has a competitive edge. Integrating Israel into C-SIPA could deliver tangible outcomes for Bahrain, shifting normalization from symbolic diplomacy to a platform for practical cooperation and mutual defense.<\/p>\n

For the United States, integrating Israel into C-SIPA would constitute a shift from decades of bilateral defense coordination to a more multilateral framework. The United States and Israel have a history of\u00a0collaboration<\/a>\u00a0on missile defense systems such as the Iron Dome and David\u2019s Sling, which are co-developed and co-funded. Including Israel in C-SIPA would elevate this cooperation to a regional scale by allowing for potential integration with GCC air defense systems and US command structures, enhancing interoperability and minimizing redundancies.\u00a0<\/p>\n

However, bringing Israel into C-SIPA too early could discourage Arab participation and raise expectations for formal US security guarantees. Prioritizing the inclusion of Arab partners would help build regional consensus and demonstrate that C-SIPA is intended to support shared regional interests, rather than simply advancing a narrower US-Israeli agenda. Focused cooperation on shared priorities such as air and missile defense, maritime security, and cybersecurity among aligned regional and international partners can create the conditions for Israel\u2019s future participation.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Focusing on Arab participation first would also give countries that cannot currently justify formal engagement with Israel, given the ongoing war, an opportunity to join the agreement and gradually build comfort with the idea of Israeli partnership in the future. Over time, this phased approach would allow C-SIPA to develop into a durable regional security framework.<\/p>\n

In an increasingly volatile region, the kind of integrated planning and coordination outlined in C-SIPA is essential. With the right political investment, C-SIPA can serve as the foundation for a durable, multilateral architecture that strengthens collective security, bolsters deterrence, and advances long-term regional integration.<\/p>\n

Cassidy McGoldrick<\/strong> is the assistant director for the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation.<\/p>\n

Further reading<\/p>\n

Image: July 17, 2025, Arlington, Virginia, USA: U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (R) welcomes Bahrain Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa (L) at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on July 17, 2025. (Credit Image: \u00a9 Mehmet Eser\/ZUMA Press Wire)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"MENASource August 11, 2025 \u2022 3:38 pm ET Print this page The United Kingdom has joined C-SIPA. Who…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":336917,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,4],"tags":[748,393,4884,1144,712,16,15,1764],"class_list":{"0":"post-336916","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-uk","8":"category-united-kingdom","9":"tag-britain","10":"tag-england","11":"tag-great-britain","12":"tag-northern-ireland","13":"tag-scotland","14":"tag-uk","15":"tag-united-kingdom","16":"tag-wales"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115012664283122888","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/336916","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=336916"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/336916\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/336917"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=336916"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=336916"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=336916"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}