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The six months between Trump\u2019s initial outreach to Putin, when he floated the idea of a land swap leading to normalization, and the upcoming Anchorage summit, which is predicated on the same proposal, was the moment to confront both illusions.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
Europe had the chance to act decisively, not only to anchor Ukraine\u2019s security in a European-led framework, but also to redefine its own role in the continent\u2019s defense. Mechanically, this could have meant fast-tracking a surge in defense-industrial expenditure and establishing a reassurance force as a bulwark against Russia\u2019s advances, future or present. Politically, however, it would have meant abandoning efforts to get a seat at the Trump-Putin table and building their own table, firmly planted in the bedrock of Europe\u2019s own strategic interests.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Instead, Europe took the easier option, hoping the tide would turn. European leaders mistook Trump\u2019s often mercurial pronouncements as evidence that he could be moved. Through shuttle diplomacy, Oval Office performances, rounds of golf, and endless video links, European leaders have sought to influence American policy without marshaling the political, military or fiscal capital needed to make that influence real. As a result, it\u2019s not only Ukraine\u2019s future that is being discussed largely without Europe\u2019s decisive input: it\u2019s Europe\u2019s future, too.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Reversing this trajectory will require more than just coordination between Europe and Ukraine. It will take a commitment to the near-term reduction of European dependence on US decision-making, while simultaneously building credible deterrence against Moscow. At this stage, while resources matter, political consistency matters more. A lack of confidence means that Europe\u2019s policy rises and falls with the ebb and flow of the Putin-Trump relationships. That is not sustainable.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
One of two things will happen in Alaska. Either Trump and Putin will emerge with a deal, which Trump will try to sell to Ukraine and Europe, or they won\u2019t. If there is a deal, Europe will need to gear up for a rapid and uncontestable response. The likely absence of a deal, however, shouldn\u2019t be taken as a reprieve. If Europe again fails to seize the initiative, it will have resigned itself \u2014 and, with it, Ukraine \u2014 to living with a settlement that institutionalizes instability and powerlessness.\u00a0<\/p>\n
For all the sound and fury, the genuinely significant discussions are not in Anchorage, but in Europe\u2019s own capitals, defense ministries, and industrial boardrooms, and the risk is not that Europe overreaches, but that it undershoots.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
Europe will never have all the resources it needs to assure itself of victory. Failing to go to diplomatic war with the army it has, however, assures it of defeat.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
Sam Greene is Director for Democratic Resilience at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is also a Professor of Russian Politics at King\u2019s College London. Before joining CEPA, he founded and directed the King\u2019s Russia Institute for 10 years. Prior to moving to London, he lived and worked for 13 years in Moscow.<\/p>\n
Europe\u2019s Edge<\/a>\u00a0is CEPA\u2019s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe\u2019s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.\u00a0CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.<\/p>\n
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