As European leaders and the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky gather in Washington to persuade President Donald Trump not to abandon Ukraine and to secure Western security guarantees for Kyiv, one thing is certain: Vladimir Putin will not abandon his quest to dominate the Black Sea.\u00a0<\/p>\n
In a sprawling naval exercise, \u201cJuly Storm,\u201d the Russian navy practiced the very tactics Ukraine used against its Black Sea fleet. Kyiv\u2019s asymmetrical campaign deploying naval drone and missile strikes<\/a> destroyed or disabled one third of Russia\u2019s Black Sea fleet, broke the blockade of Ukrainian ports, forced most of the Russia fleet to decamp to southern Russia, and allowed Ukraine\u2019s commercial shipping, mostly grain exports, to recover to near pre-war levels.\u00a0<\/p>\n Kremlin took notes. In the July naval drills, Russia used explosive-laden naval drones to sink targets and practiced anti-submarine warfare, mine-laying, and missile strikes. Putin described the naval exercises as designed to train naval forces in \u201crepelling maritime attacks\u201d and \u201cunconventional operational and tactical missions,\u201d while referring to \u201cexperience gained\u201d from battles with Ukraine in the Black Sea.\u00a0<\/p>\n Given that Ukraine lacks a significant conventional navy, the Russian exercises seem to be aimed at the coming battles<\/a> beyond Ukraine.\u00a0<\/p>\n Why the Black Sea matters<\/p>\n Russia has long seen the domination of the Black Sea as necessary for its global ambitions, its great power status, and its identity as a civilizational state. From Peter the Great to Nicholas I, the czars fought wars to gain access to and control the Black Sea. Lenin pushed to secure the Black Sea region during the Russian Civil War. Stalin made the Black Sea Fleet a core element of Soviet military strategy.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Putin sees Russian identity as defined by a linguistic and cultural sphere that extends beyond the formal borders of the Russian Federation, and his denial of Ukrainian nationhood stems from this worldview. His war against Ukraine is tied to his quest to dominate the Black Sea, which offers strategic access and a pathway to project influence beyond the traditional Russian sphere into the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa.\u00a0<\/p>\n The importance of the Black Sea for Russia increased further after Finland and Sweden joined the NATO in 2023 and 2024, reinforcing the alliance\u2019s eastern flank and constraining Russia in the Baltic. Putin had already expanded Russian control of the Black Sea coast by occupying parts of Georgia in 2008, the Crimean peninsula in 2014, and Sevastopol and large parts of Kherson Oblast and Zaporizhzhia Oblast after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Occupying these Black Sea territories has helped Moscow position itself better to challenge European security through both conventional and unconventional ways.<\/p>\n Europe\u2019s Black Sea challenge<\/p>\n European security today is being forged in opposition to Russia. The Black Sea region stands out as a canvas of chokepoints and competing sovereignties, of energy routes and grain corridors, of overlapping jurisdictions and unresolved conflicts. It is the axis along which European security is being tested and it is poised to become<\/a> a central theater in the unfolding confrontation<\/a> between Europe and Russia.<\/p>\n The perception of U.S. withdrawal from Europe will likely further embolden Putin to exploit vulnerabilities and test the continent\u2019s resolve. Since the election of President Trump, Europe has built some momentum to bolster its collective defenses and increased commitments to defense spending from two to five percent of GDP.\u00a0<\/p>\n European leaders have discussed various scenarios for Black Sea security but, in essence, they circle back to a single strategy: keeping the U.S. engaged in Ukraine and the Black Sea region. If Trump does indeed end his confrontation with Russia over Ukraine and the Black Sea and decides against joining a Western security guarantee for Kyiv, Europe faces the grim prospect of facing Russia alone.<\/p>\n In May, the European Union adopted<\/a> a new Black Sea Strategy, which comes down to establishing a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub tasked with monitoring and providing early warning of emerging threats and malign activities. While it is unclear how such early warnings could translate<\/a> into action<\/a> ,\u00a0 if it is effectively implemented, the initiative could help constrain Russia\u2019s subversive actions and promote a more coordinated response among E.U. member states.\u00a0<\/p>\n Turkey controls the Black Sea\u2019s gates\u2014the Bosporus and the Dardanelles\u2014under the Montreux Convention, which governs passages through the Turkish straits in and out of the Black Sea. The West doesn\u2019t have the buy in from Ankara for any expanded Western or NATO presence in the region. Turkey sees it as contravening the Montreux Convention and its own strategic interests. Without Ankara\u2019s support, the European strategy for the Black Sea has little bite. <\/p>\n And the littoral Black Sea states\u2014Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania\u2014are vulnerable to Russian exploitation. Europe also needs to work with NATO to reduce their military, political, and socio-economic vulnerabilities. <\/p>\n Ukraine is the hinge. And Europe needs persistent, long term efforts to help Ukraine strengthen its capacity to preserve its control of its coastline and counterbalance Russia, in partnership with other littoral states. A strong Ukraine\u2014with a robust army and navy\u2014is not only crucial for Ukrainian nationhood and statehood but also for restraining Russia in the Black Sea and preventing future conflicts.\u00a0<\/p>\n Rebuilding Russia\u2019s Black Sea fleet<\/p>\n In the past decade or so, Russia tried to challenge European security from the Black Sea in its east and the Mediterranean Sea in the south. Kremlin positioned four submarines in the Black Sea and two submarines at a Mediterranean Sea base at Tartus in Syria, where it intervened aggressively to support the Bashar al Assad regime. But the Ukrainian naval successes and the fall of the Assad regime battered Russian maritime power in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In Syria, Moscow is seeking ways to retain part of its Assad-era presence and Damascus is being more receptive.\u00a0<\/p>\n One of Moscow\u2019s most pressing ambitions is to rebuild its Black Sea Fleet and to adapt to the changing nature of naval warfare. In June, Putin approved a new naval doctrine<\/a> aimed at restoring Russia\u2019s status as a preeminent naval power. According to Putin\u2019s chief aide, Nikolai Patrushev<\/a>, \u201cIn the coming years, the Black Sea sailors will be further strengthened with the arrival of new frigates, corvettes, aviation, marine robotic complexes.\u201d In his words, the Black Sea Fleet is crucial for containing NATO and countering Western interests in the region. Russia has already started building a naval base in Georgia\u2019s Abkhazia region<\/a>, which Moscow has occupied since the 2008 war.\u00a0<\/p>\n Russian influence in the Mediterranean and the future of its naval base in Syria have become uncertain after the fall of Assad. Moscow is keen to return its two submarines from Syria to the Black Sea to reinforce its fleet but they need to cross the Turkish straits. Ankara has closed that possibility as it exercised the rights granted to it by the Montreux Convention and immediately closed its straits to passages of warships and naval vessels after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Turkey is unlikely to open the straits until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached between Ukraine and Russia.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n